McGuire 1
3Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G Sep 30, 2012
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: FIN Finding
Failure to correctly implement technical specifications adversely affects requalification operating test quality
An NRC-identified finding was identified associated with the quality of the simulator scenarios developed by the licensee for the licensed operator requalification annual operating test. The licensee failed to follow the Technical Specification (TS) rules of usage for concurrent inoperability as shown in TS Example 1.3-3. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as PIP M-12-4157.

The performance deficiency (PD) was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that it impacted the licensee's ability to evaluate and ensure operator performance. The significance determination was performed in accordance with Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I, and determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The cause of the finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of personnel training and qualifications in the Resources component of the cross-cutting area of Human Performance, in that the licensee failed to ensure the quality of the operating tests used to evaluate the knowledge, skills, abilities, and training provided to operators to assure nuclear safety. [H.2(b)]
Inspection Report# : 2012004 *(pdf)*

Significance: G Jun 30, 2012
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to implement planned compensatory measures for impaired auxiliary building fire hose stations
An NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d was identified for failure to implement adequate compensatory measures for multiple impaired manual fire hose stations (FHSs) in accordance with the approved fire protection program. Gated wye valves were not installed as required during a periodic flush of multiple auxiliary building (AB) FHSs rendering them inoperable. The licensee took actions to install the gated wye valves in the affected FHSs to restore them to operable. This violation was entered into the licensee's corrective action program (CAP) as Problem Investigation Program (PIP) M-12-2816.

The performance deficiency (PD) was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external events attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that manual fire suppression capability was impaired. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it represented a low degradation of the manual fire suppression function. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of planning and coordination of work activities in the Work Control component of the Human Performance area, in that the licensee did not plan and coordinate work activities to ensure that adequate

compensatory measures were established for impaired fire hose stations. [H.3(a)] (Section 1R05)

Inspection Report# : 2012003 *(pdf)*

Significance: G Jun 18, 2012
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to Evaluate Potential Blocking of TDCA Pump Lube Oil Cooler During Certain Fire Events
The NRC identified a NCV of License Condition 2.C.4 for failure to evaluate potential blockage of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater (TDCA) pump lube oil cooler when pump suction is aligned to the circulating water (RC) system. Specifically, during certain fire events causing loss of plant control, the NRC identified that if the RC system piping was aligned to the suction of the TDCA pump as in accordance with the licensing basis, it could result in blockage of cooling water flow for the TDCA pump lube oil cooler. Immediate actions included performing a functional assessment and evaluating potential long term corrective actions. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as PIP M-12-2174.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was similar to IMC 0612 Appendix E question 3j in that, there was reasonable doubt as to the operability of the auxiliary feedwater system when suction was supplied from RC system. In addition, the finding was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was evaluated using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Phase 1, and IMC 0609 Appendix F, Fire Protection Significance Determination Process, Attachment 1, Phase 1 and determined to be of low safety significance because it only affected the ability to reach and maintain cold shutdown. The NRC determined that no cross cutting aspect was applicable to this performance deficiency because this finding was not indicative of current licensee performance.
Inspection Report# : 2012007 *(pdf)*

Significance: G Jun 18, 2012
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Inadequate Tornado Missile Protection for EDG Exhaust Ventilation System
The NRC identified a NCV of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," for the failure to ensure adequate tornado missile protection for the emergency diesel generator (EDG) exhaust relief and backdraft dampers as required. Specifically, 12 inches of the upper portion of the EDG Building ventilation system exhaust dampers were exposed and not protected from a tornado-generated missile. The licensee initiated compensatory measures in the form of concrete jersey barriers in front of each exhaust damper opening to provide additional shielding for the unprotected opening. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as PIP M-12-2158.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of Equipment Performance, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reiliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undersirable consequences. Specifically, there was reasonable doubt the EDG ventilation exhaust would remain functional to support EDG operation in the event tornado-induced missiles damaged the exhaust backdraft relief dampers. The NRC performed a Phase 1 evaluation per IMC 0609, Attachment 4 and determined that the finding was potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events (e.g., tornadoes). Consequently, a Phase 3 analysis was performed by a senior reactor analyst, who determined that the risk significance of the issue was very low (i.e., delta-LERF < 1.0E-7). The NRC determined there was a cross cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, in that the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate problems with adequate tornado missile protection such that the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions, as necessary. [P.1(c)]

Inspection Report# : 2012007 *(pdf)*

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Security

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : November 30, 2012