

## Diablo Canyon 1 3Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings

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### Initiating Events

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### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:** G Jun 22, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Inadequate Preferred Offsite Power System Design Control**

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," after plant engineers failed to adequately translate regulatory requirements and the design bases into the offsite power interface calculation on May 6, 2011. As a result, the licensee failed to demonstrate that the 230 kilo-Volt preferred offsite power source had adequate capacity and capability to supply the minimum required terminal voltage to plant engineering safety features following a limiting transmission system contingency. The licensee took corrective actions to limit the plant load that would automatically transfer to the preferred power source following a unit trip and entered the condition into the corrective action program as Notification 50492766.

The failure to ensure that the 230 kV power system had adequate capability and capability as defined in the current licensing basis requirements was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the modification design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors concluded this finding was of very low safety significance because the duration of potential losses of a single offsite power source safety function was less than the technical specification allowed outage time, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of risk significant non-technical specification equipment, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, associated with the decision making component, because the licensee did not demonstrate that the proposed action was safe in order to proceed while assessing the CLB requirement during decision making.

Inspection Report# : [2012003](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:** G Jun 22, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Failure to Perform a 50.59 Evaluation**

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.59, "Changes, Tests, and Experiments," because the licensee failed to document an evaluation providing a basis that changes made to the facility and associated changes to Procedure OP J-2:VIII, "Guidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for DCCP," did not require prior NRC approval. When a 50.59 review was performed, the licensee incorrectly concluded that only a screening was needed. Plant operators use Procedure OP J-2:VIII to determine the operability of the preferred offsite power system for various transmission system configurations. This change accepted a reduction in the preferred offsite power capacity and capability, below the minimum specified by the current licensing basis, due to local service area load growth. This condition would have likely required prior NRC approval had a 50.59 evaluation been performed. The licensee

entered this finding into the corrective action program as Notification 50492767.

The failure to perform a 50.59 evaluation was also a performance deficiency. The inspectors concluded that this issue involved traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it was associated with modification design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors concluded this finding was of very low safety significance because the duration of potential losses of a single offsite power source safety function was less than the technical specification allowed outage time, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of risk significant non-technical specification equipment, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, associated with the decision making component, because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions to adopt the licensing basis requirement during decision making.

Inspection Report# : [2012003](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Dec 31, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Failure to Perform an Operability Determination for New Seismic Information**

The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," after Pacific Gas and Electric failed to evaluate the affect of new seismic information on the operability of plant structures, systems and components. On January 7, 2011, the licensee completed and submitted to the NRC a report to the detailing the results of a deterministic reevaluation of the local seismology. This report concluded that an earthquake on three local faults could produce greater vibratory ground motion than bound by the safe shutdown earthquake as described in the Final Safety Evaluation Report Update. Quality Procedure OM7.ID12, "Operability Determinations," required plant operators to assess the impact of nonconforming conditions for the affect on plant structures, systems and components without delay. On June 22, 2011, the licensee entered the condition into the corrective action program as Notification 50410266 and completed an operability determination on June 24, 2011.

The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to evaluate the new seismic information against the plant design and licensing bases was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because the performance deficiency was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone initial design control attribute and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The senior reactor analyst evaluated the significance of the finding using a Phase 3 analysis because the inspectors were unable to confirm that the operability of plant systems was not impacted. The senior reactor analyst concluded that the finding was of very low risk significance (Green) because no significant change in overall core damage frequency resulted from the new seismic hazards. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the decision-making component because the licensee used non-conservative assumptions in deciding not to evaluate the new seismic information against the current plant design and licensing bases (H.1.b).

Inspection Report# : [2011005](#) (*pdf*)

## **Barrier Integrity**

**Significance:**  Jun 22, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Failure to Follow Procedure Resulted in the Loss of Low Temperature Overpressure Protection System Safety Function**

The inspectors identified a non-cited self-revealing violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," following the unplanned loss of the Unit 1 low temperature overpressure protection system during Mode 5 operations on June 7, 2012. One train of the low temperature overpressure protection system safety function was lost after a maintenance technician mistakenly opened the breaker providing power to the functioning train performing troubleshooting activities on the other train. The licensee's corrective actions included promptly restoring power to temperature overpressure protection system and entering the condition into the corrective action program as Notification 50488636.

The failure of the plant technician to follow troubleshooting work instructions was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency was more than minor because the performance deficiency is associated with the human performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors concluded that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because adequate mitigating equipment remained available and the finding did not constitute a loss of control, as defined in Appendix G, "Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process." This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because the licensee failed to use human error prevention techniques, such as self- and peer-checking, commensurate with the risk of the assigned task such that work activities were performed safely.

Inspection Report# : [2012003](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:** G Mar 23, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: VIO Violation

**Incomplete and Inaccurate Information Provided to the NRC in Response to Generic Letter 2003-01, "Control Room Habitability"**

The inspectors identified a Green finding and Severity Level III violation of 10 CFR 50.9, "Completeness and Accuracy of Information," after Pacific Gas and Electric failed to submitted complete and accurate information in response to Generic Letter 2003-01, "Control Room Habitability." Generic Letter 2003-01 requested that the licensee submit information demonstrating that the control room habitability system was in compliance with the current licensing and design bases. The licensee was specifically requested to verify that the most limiting unfiltered in-leakage into the control room envelope was no more than the value assumed in the design basis radiological analyses for control room habitability. On April 22, 2005, the licensee reported to the NRC that testing performed in the most limiting configuration for operator dose demonstrated that there was no unfiltered in-leakage into the control room envelope. This was material because the NRC used this information to close out Generic Letter 2003-01. In September 2011, the inspectors identified that the control room test results were greater than the value assumed in the design basis radiological analysis and that the licensee's testing was not performed in the most limiting configuration for operator dose. Using the actual control room in-leakage rates, the inspectors concluded that the resultant operator dose could have exceeded the limit established by current licensing and design bases during an accident.

The inspectors concluded that the failure of Pacific Gas and Electric to provide complete and accurate information in response to Generic Letter 2003-01 was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because the information was material to the NRC's decision making processes. The inspectors screened the issue through the Reactor Oversight Process because the finding included a performance deficiency that was reasonably within the licensee's ability to control. The inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because only the radiological barrier function of the control room was affected. The inspectors also screened the issue through the traditional enforcement process because the violation impacted the regulatory process. The inspectors concluded that the violation was a Severity Level III because had the licensee provided complete and accurate information in their letter dated April 22, 2005, the NRC would have likely reconsidered a regulatory position or

undertaken a substantial further inquiry. The inspectors did not identify a cross-cutting aspect because the performance deficiency was not reflective of present performance.

Inspection Report# : [2012002](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Dec 31, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Less than Adequate Evaluation of a Nonconforming Control Room Habitability Train**

The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” after operations personnel failed to adequately evaluate the operability and extent of condition of a nonconforming control room habitability train. Beginning on August 30, 2011, the inspectors identified several nonconforming conditions associated with the habitability system, including disconnected ductwork, two 12 inch diameter openings in the envelope boundary, and less than adequate control room envelope pressurization and tracer gas surveillance tests. On November 7, 2011, the licensee re-performed the tracer gas test and observed gross unfiltered in-leakage into the control room envelope. Plant operators declared the habitability system inoperable. The licensee restored system operability after implementing a series of compensatory measures. The licensee entered the finding into the corrective action program as Notification 50425114 and plans to restore the system to the current licensing basis condition.

The inspectors concluded that the failure of plant operators to adequately evaluate the operability and extent of a nonconforming condition was a performance deficiency. This finding was more than minor because the licensee’s operability evaluation created a reasonable doubt that the system was capable of performing the specified safety function, similar to Example 3.k in Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, “Examples of Minor Issues.” The inspectors concluded that the finding was of very low safety significance because only the radiological barrier function of the control room was affected. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, associated with the corrective action program component, because the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the degraded control room ventilation train for operability and extent of condition [P.1(c)].

Inspection Report# : [2011005](#) (*pdf*)

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## Emergency Preparedness

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## Occupational Radiation Safety

**Significance:**  Jun 22, 2012

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Entering a High Raditation Area with Dose Rates Greater than 1.0 Rem/Hour withouth knowing the Dose Rates in the Area**

The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.7.2, which was the result of a worker entering a high radiation area with dose rates greater than 1 rem/hour without knowing of the dose rates in the area. In response, licensee representatives suspended fuel movement, posted the area as a locked high radiation area, documented the occurrence in the corrective action program as Notification 50478716 and evaluated the occurrence.

Entering a high radiation area with dose rates greater than 1 rem/hour without knowing the dose rates in the area was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of program and process (exposure control) and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation because the failure exposed workers to high dose rates. Using the occupational radiation safety significance determination process, the inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because: (1) it was not an as low as is reasonably achievable finding, (2) there was no overexposure, (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the human performance area, resources component, because the licensee did not have adequate facilities and equipment in the form of physical or visual barriers to preclude moving fuel into the vicinity of the spent fuel pool door with the transfer canal drained.

Inspection Report# : [2012003](#) (*pdf*)

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## Public Radiation Safety

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### Security

Although the Security Cornerstone is included in the Reactor Oversight Process assessment program, the Commission has decided that specific information related to findings and performance indicators pertaining to the Security Cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that security information is not provided to a possible adversary. Other than the fact that a finding or performance indicator is Green or Greater-Than-Green, security related information will not be displayed on the public web page. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

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### Miscellaneous

**Significance:** N/A Mar 24, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

#### **Problem Identification and Resolution**

The inspection team concluded that the implementation of the corrective action program and overall performance related to identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems at Diablo Canyon was generally effective. Licensee identified problems were entered into the corrective action program at an appropriately low threshold. Problems were effectively prioritized and evaluated commensurate with the safety significance of the problems. Corrective actions were effectively implemented in a timely manner commensurate with their importance to safety and addressed the identified causes of problems. Lessons learned from industry operating experience were effectively reviewed and applied when appropriate. Audits and self-assessments were effectively used to identify problems and appropriate actions. Finally, Diablo Canyon effectively established and maintained a Safety Conscious Work Environment.

Inspection Report# : [2012007](#) (*pdf*)

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