

Susquehanna 1

1Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance: **G** Mar 21, 2012

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

Inadequate Gain Settings Result in Reactor Scram

A self-revealing finding of very low safety significance was identified when Unit 1 automatically scrammed from 32 percent power on April 22, 2010, due to low reactor water level. PPL entered inadequate gain settings in the feedwater digital ICS for reactor feed pump turbine (RFPT) speed control as part of the ICS design modification, and the test procedure, which was in progress at the time, did not specify exit criteria that would have ended the test prior to an automatic scram. PPL completed corrective actions related to the direct cause by updating the RFPT speed control characterizer block gain settings. This issue was entered in PPL's CAP as condition report (CR) 1257781 (April 2010) and CR 1348940 (January 2011).

The inspectors determined that inadequate procedures to perform post-modification testing on the digital ICS was a performance deficiency because the testing performed did not detect incorrect gain settings prior to a reactor scram. The inspectors screened the performance deficiency in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, "Issue Screening." The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of Design Control, and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operation. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, "Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," and determined the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment would not be available. Consequently, the finding is of very low safety significance (Green).

This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Control, because PPL did not plan and coordinate work activities consistent with nuclear safety. Specifically, PPL did not appropriately consider risk during the design modification and did not have adequate planned contingencies for the testing of the new digital ICS. (H.3(a)) (Section 4OA3.1)

Inspection Report# : [2012008](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: **W** Sep 30, 2010

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

Procedural Inadequacies Result in Reactor Scram and Loss of Normal Heat Sink

A self-revealing preliminary White finding regarding procedure NDAP-QA-0008, "Procedure Writer's Guide," Revision 8, was identified following a July 16, 2010, flooding event in the Unit 1 condenser bay which resulted in a manual reactor scram and loss of the normal heat sink. There were three instances of inadequate procedures identified. The first instance involved maintenance procedure MT-043-001 which provided inadequate instructions regarding installation of the condenser waterbox gaskets and led to the event. In addition, two other off-normal procedures were inadequate in that they complicated operator response to the event. Specifically, operators used a diagram in off-normal procedure ON-100-003, "Chemistry Anomaly," to identify and isolate the leak which was incorrect, delayed leak isolation, and resulted in a manual reactor scram in anticipation of a loss of the normal heat sink. Finally, ON-142-001, "Circulating Water (CW) Leak," did not contain specific instructions to isolate a condenser waterbox leak which contributed to operators using ON-100-003 which was not intended to be used to isolate the condenser box during flooding conditions. PPL corrected the diagram error, dewatered and repaired affected equipment, and entered this issue into their CAP (1282128).

This finding was determined to be more than minor as it affected the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of Procedure Quality and its objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operation. The finding was evaluated using Phases 1, 2, and 3 of the Significance Determination Process. The conclusion of the Phase 3 analysis was an estimated change in core damage

frequency (CDF) of 1.1E-6/yr (White) and an estimated change in large early release frequency (LERF) of 2.6E-7/yr (White). The finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program, in that PPL did not thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address the causes and extent of condition, as necessary. Specifically, PPL did not appropriately evaluate and correct a known issue in an off-normal procedure or adequately evaluate previous CW system waterbox manway gasket leaks to ensure that future occurrences could be prevented.

Final SDP issued 12/16/2010. IR 2010-008

Inspection Report# : [2010004](#) (pdf)

Inspection Report# : [2010008](#) (pdf)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Mar 31, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate MOV Program Implementation

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,” regarding PPL’s safety-related motor operated valve (MOV) program. Specifically, the program lacked a procedure, qualification, and prescribed acceptance criteria for actuator grease analysis and PPL improperly implemented maintenance instructions for lubricating valve stems. PPL’s QA organization conducted a separate investigation and entered this issue in their CAP via CRs 1545581 and 1544737.

This finding was considered more than minor because it was similar to IMC 0612, Appendix E, examples 3.j and 3.k, in that significant programmatic deficiencies existed that could lead to worse errors if uncorrected. The lack of a procedure, repeatable acceptance criteria, qualification, and multiple cycles without stem lubrication could result in untimely actuator overhauls and ultimately MOV degraded performance. Further, the performance deficiency affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and its objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, inadequate MOV program implementation affects MOV reliability. The issue screened to Green via IMC 0609 Attachment 4 since it was not a design or qualification deficiency or loss of safety function and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to external events. The issue was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution. In this case, PPL was aware of the lack of procedural guidance and qualification for MOV grease analysis as well as non-compliance with stem lubrication instructions but had not entered the concerns in its CAP. [P.1(a)] (Section 1R12)

Inspection Report# : [2012002](#) (pdf)

Significance:  Dec 31, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Failure to Properly Implement Work Instructions Results in C EDG Inoperability

An NRC-identified Green finding of TS 5.4.1, “Procedures,” due to PPL’s failure to properly plan and implement work instructions and Quality Control (QC) hold point inspections associated with a modification to the ‘C’ Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) fuel pump assemblies was identified. The error resulted in the failure of the ‘C’ EDG to continue running during surveillance testing on December 6, 2011. This resulted in PPL failing to meet the requirements of TS 3.8.1, “AC Sources- Operating”, when it was determined that the ‘C’ EDG was inoperable from September 19, 2011, following restoration from its maintenance outage, until December 6, 2011, when the operable ‘E’ EDG was substituted for the ‘C’ EDG. Additionally, the failure to implement work instructions resulted in PPL failing to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion X, “Inspection,” which requires, in part, that licensees execute a program for inspection of activities affecting quality to verify conformance with the documented instructions, procedures, and drawings for accomplishing the activity. The deficiency was entered into PPL’s corrective action program (CAP) as condition Report (CR) 1506105 and a root cause analysis (RCA) was

performed.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Human Performance, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The finding was evaluated using Phase 1 and inspectors determined the finding was potentially greater than very low safety significance because the finding represented an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its TS Allowed Outage Time. The Phase 2 analysis determined the finding was potentially greater than very low safety significance given an exposure time of 75 days. A Phase 3 analysis was conducted by an NRC Senior Reactor Analyst (SRA). This analysis indicated an increase in core damage frequency (? CDF) for internal initiating events in the range of 1 core damage accident in 40,000,000 years of reactor operation, in the low E-8 range per year for each unit. The dominant core damage sequences included losses of offsite power with the failure of all EDGs, due to common cause, resulting in a station blackout, followed by operator failure to extend RCIC operation with loss of DC power, failure to depressurize the reactor and failure to recover offsite power within 4 hours. The finding is related to the CCA of Human Performance, Work Practices, in that PPL personnel did not use human error prevention techniques, such as holding pre-job briefings, self and peer checking, and proper documentation of activities, commensurate with the risk of the assigned task, such that work activities are performed safely. Specifically, PPL did not perform adequate human error prevention techniques such that the incorrect assembly of delivery valve springs and stops avoided. (H.4(a)) (Section 1R13)

Inspection Report# : [2011005](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: SL-IV Nov 08, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: VIO Violation

Violation of 10CFR55.25, Failure to Notify NRC of a Change in Medical Status and Request a Conditional License

The inspectors identified a SL IV NOV of 10 CFR 55.25, "Incapacitation Because of Disability or Illness," for PPL failing to notify the NRC of a known permanent change in medical status of a licensed operator, and 10 CFR 55.3, "License Requirements," for failing to ensure that an individual license holder, in the capacity of a reactor operator (RO), met the medical prerequisites prior to performing licensed operator duties. Specifically, an RO failed a medical examination in both 2009 and 2011 which identified a disqualifying condition and performed licensed duties without an NRC-approved, amended license. He performed the function of an RO while on watch from April 2009 through August 2011, when the NRC identified this issue. However, the operator did wear corrective lenses while standing watch since April 2009. Upon notification PPL submitted, and the NRC approved, a conditional license to address the disqualifying medical condition. PPL entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 1450138.

The inspectors determined that PPL's failure to notify the NRC of a known permanent change in a licensed operator's medical status and request an amended license in order to assume licensed duties was a performance deficiency. This finding was evaluated using the traditional enforcement process because the issue had the potential to impact or impede the regulatory process. Specifically, there was a potential for license termination or the issuance of a conditional license to accommodate for a medical condition. The RO performed licensed duties from April 2009 through August 2011 with a disqualifying condition that required his license to be amended. Using the NRC Enforcement Policy, this violation was characterized at SL IV, in accordance with Section 6.4.

This violation is being cited in the enclosed Notice in accordance with NRC Enforcement Manual Section 3.1.2, because the violation was determined to be repetitive of NRC Enforcement Action (EA) 09-248 dated January 28, 2010, an SLIII Notice of Violation related to a Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) standing watch without meeting a medical qualification requirement. The medical conditions in both the former and current cases were similar; therefore, it was reasonable that an adequate extent of condition review for EA-09-248 should have identified the additional discrepancy.

This significance of the associated performance deficiency was screened against the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) per the guidance of IMC 0612, Appendix B. No associated ROP finding was identified and no cross-cutting aspect was assigned. (Section 1R11)

Inspection Report# : [2011004](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: **G** Jun 30, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Implement Risk Management Actions during Dual Unit Elevated Risk

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50.65a(4) when PPL failed to manage risk as assessed on June 1, 2011. During a period of dual unit Orange risk, PPL did not adequately implement protected equipment risk management actions (RMAs) designated in its risk assessment. During a walkdown, the inspectors identified that none of the core spray divisions or safety relief valves (SRVs) on either unit had been protected. They also identified that Unit 1 Division II low pressure coolant system (LPCI) had not been protected and Unit 2 Division I LPCI was only partially protected. Finally, the inspectors identified that some Unit 1 Division II residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling equipment listed as protected in the Station Leadership Report had not been protected. This issue was documented in PPL's CAP as Condition Report (CR) 1417135.

The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor due to its similarity to examples 3.j and 3.k of IMC 0612 Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues." The issue also affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences and its human performance attribute. Specifically, the issue was programmatic based on the extent of protected equipment deficiencies, five consecutive quarters of 10 CFR 50.65a(4) violations, the timing of the violation during dual unit Orange risk, and that if left uncorrected could lead to more significant issues such as pre-event human error that impacts mitigating equipment availability during a subsequent initiating event with already elevated plant risk. Since the exposure time of the deficiency was limited to four hours and with due consideration of the other RMAs taken by PPL, this finding is determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in Problem Identification and Resolution, (PI&R) CAP. Specifically, although PPL had recognized the negative trend with execution of a root cause analysis (RCA), interim corrective actions for the adverse trend of 10 CFR 50.65 a(4) violations proved inadequate to prevent another violation of this regulation for the fifth consecutive quarter. (P.1 (d)) (1R13)

Inspection Report# : [2011003](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: **G** Jun 30, 2011

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Establish Design Control Measures Associated with Installation of a Gland Liner in the HPCI Steam Supply Inboard Isolation Valve

A self-revealing Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," occurred when a brass gland liner was installed in the gland for HV155F002, the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) steam supply inboard isolation valve, without appropriately evaluating the material and design of the liner for its potential impact on the valve packing system. Inappropriate design and fabrication of the gland liner resulted in numerous steam leaks since its installation and ultimately led to a significant steam leak that resulted in the inoperability of the primary containment isolation valve (PCIV), necessitating isolation of the HPCI system. PPL entered this issue into their CAP as 1361274.

The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, inappropriate design of the gland liner resulted in numerous steam leaks since its installation and ultimately led to the significant steam leak that resulted in the inoperability of the PCIV and isolation of the HPCI system. The finding was evaluated for significance using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings." The inspectors answered "Yes" to the screening question, "Does the finding represent a loss of system safety function?" since the HPCI system is a single train high pressure injection system. Therefore, a Phase 2 SDP evaluation was performed using IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations." The pilot Phase 2 evaluation conducted using the SDP interface and the SRA conducted Phase 3 evaluation, assuming that HPCI was inoperable for 5 days, indicated a ?CDF in the low E-7 per year range. The dominant core damage sequence was a medium loss of coolant accident followed by a failure of high pressure cooling and failure of the operators to depressurize to allow use of low pressure core cooling systems. Given the delta CDF, in the low E-7 range, the SRA determined that the increase in large early release frequency (?LERF) would not be greater than very low significance

because of the 0.3 high pressure core damage sequence factor applied for BWR Mark II containments in IMC 0609 Appendix H. Further the SRA determined that external events were not of concern given the very short < 5 day, exposure period. This issue was determined to not have a cross-cutting aspect as this issue was not reflective of current performance. This was based on the age of design modification, which was installed in 1996 and re-evaluated in 1998. (4OA2)

Inspection Report# : [2011003](#) (pdf)

Significance:  Dec 31, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Scenarios for NRC Annual Operating Examinations Did Not Meet Quantitative Standards for Total Malfunctions

The inspectors identified greater finding in that 20% of the NRC annual operating exam simulator scenarios reviewed did not meet the quantitative standard for total malfunctions, 4 to 8 for a single scenario, and 10 to 14 for a scenario set established in NUREG-1021, "Operator Licensing Examination Standards for Power Reactors," Form ES-604-1, "Simulator Scenario Review Checklist." In addition, the licensee's procedures NTP-QA-31.11, "Operator Requalification Exam Preparation and Implementation" and NTP-QA-31.7, "Simulator Scenario Writers Guides," recommend these same quantitative standards. The quantitative guidelines for malfunctions is an important metric because it establishes an objective standard used throughout the nuclear industry to ensure that the simulator portion of the NRC-required annual operating exams are written at an appropriate level of difficulty. As an immediate corrective action, the licensee entered this finding into their corrective action process (CR 1187760).

This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigation Systems cornerstone and affected the objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the finding affected the level of difficulty of simulator operating exams which potentially impacted PPL's ability to appropriately evaluate licensed operators. A review of the possible cross-cutting aspects was performed and no cross-cutting aspect was identified that would be considered a contributor to the cause of the finding.

Inspection Report# : [2009005](#) (pdf)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Nov 08, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Surveillance Procedure Results in Missed Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements for Secondary Containment

An NRC-identified Green NCV of Susquehanna Unit 1 and 2 TS 5.4.1, "Procedures," was identified for an inadequate surveillance procedure for implementing Technical Specifications (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.4.1.4 and 3.6.4.1.5. Specifically, the implementing procedure was revised allowing the SR to be missed and subsequently required entry into SR 3.0.3. PPL entered this issue in their CAP as CR 1460362.

The finding is more than minor because it was similar to example 3.d in IMC 0612 Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues" in that the failure to implement the TS SR as required is not minor if the surveillance had not been conducted. In this case, the SR had not been completed for all configurations of secondary containment and required both Unit 1 and Unit 2 to enter SR 3.0.3 for a missed surveillance. Additionally, it is associated with the procedure quality attribute to maintain functionality of containment and the Barrier Integrity cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the inadequate surveillance procedure resulted in missed surveillances, SRs 3.6.4.1.4 and 3.6.4.1.5 and entry into SR 3.0.3 for missed surveillances. The finding was evaluated for significance using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings." Since the finding only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the reactor building (RB) (i.e. secondary containment), the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Human

Performance – Resources because PPL did not ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, the procedures did not ensure surveillance requirements (SRs) required by TS 3.6.4.1 were implemented.

Inspection Report# : [2011004](#) (pdf)

Significance: SL-IV Nov 08, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inaccurate RCS PI Data Submittal

An NRC-identified SL-IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.9(a), “Completeness and Accuracy of Information,” occurred when PPL inaccurately reported reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage values under the RCS leakage performance indicator (PI) for both units since inception of the PI in April 2000. PPL entered the issue in their CAP as CR 1441824, completed an apparent cause evaluation, and plans to revise PI data previously submitted. No performance indicator crossed the Green/White threshold once the values were updated.

Because violations of 10 CFR 50.9 are considered to potentially impede or impact the regulatory process, they are dispositioned using the traditional enforcement process. The inspectors concluded that PPL had reasonable opportunity to foresee and correct the inaccurate information prior to the information being submitted to the NRC. PPL's failure to identify and correct the recurring errors over this period of time indicated the existence of a programmatic issue. Additionally, verification of the corrected PI data in a subsequent inspection will have more than an insignificant regulatory impact on the NRC. Accordingly, although none of the affected PIs in this case would have crossed the threshold, the NRC has determined that the violation is of more than minor significance. The finding was not considered to be more significant since had this information been accurately reported, it would not have likely caused the NRC to reconsider a regulatory position or undertake a substantial further inquiry. The significance of the associated performance deficiency was screened against the ROP per the guidance of Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix B. No associated ROP finding was identified and no cross-cutting aspect was assigned

Inspection Report# : [2011004](#) (pdf)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Surveillance Procedure Results in Failure to Meet Required Action of Technical Specifications for Secondary Containment Isolation Valves

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of Susquehanna Unit 1 and 2 TS 3.6.4.2, “Secondary Containment Isolation Valves” and TS 5.4.1, “Procedures” for an inadequate surveillance procedure for implementing TS Surveillance Requirements and Action Statements. Specifically, the procedure failed to ensure that SCIVs were verified administratively when in a high radiation areas as required. PPL entered this issue in their CAP as 1421356 and 1431750.

The finding is more than minor because it was similar to example 3.d in IMC 0612 Appendix E, “Examples of Minor Issues” in that the failure to implement a requirement of TSs is not minor if the action had not been conducted. In this case, the valves inside of high radiation areas had not been verified in their closed position as required by TS 3.6.4.2 Required Action A.2. Additionally, it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the inadequate surveillance procedure resulted in a violation of TS 3.6.4.2, “SCIVs” since valves that were closed to isolate a pathway due to an inoperable blind flange were not verified in the correct position as required. The finding was evaluated for significance using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, “Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings.” Since the finding only represented a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the reactor building (RB) (i.e. secondary containment), the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). This finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance – Resources because PPL did not ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety. Specifically, the surveillance procedures SO-000-010, Revision 23, “Monthly Zone III Integrity,” SO-100-010, Revision 24, “Monthly Zone 1 Integrity Verification” and SO-200-010, Revision 24, “Monthly Zone II Integrity Verification,” did not ensure surveillance requirements or actions statements required by TS 3.6.4.2 were implemented. (H.2(c)) (1R04)

Emergency Preparedness

Significance:  Mar 31, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Instrumentation to Implement EALs for Unplanned Radiological Effluent Release

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR Part 50.54 q and 50.47(b)(4) because PPL did not have adequate instrumentation to assess and determine if an abnormal radiological effluent release was in progress such that the EAL classification process would declare an Alert accurately and in a timely manner. Specifically, the maximum range for the liquid radwaste discharge radiation monitor was inadequate to ensure the meter was onscale when the threshold value of 200 times the alarm setpoint established by the discharge permit was reached.

The finding was more than minor because it is associated with the Emergency Preparedness (EP) cornerstone attribute of Facilities and Equipment, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring that a licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. Specifically, the effective range for the liquid radwaste discharge monitor was insufficient to ensure a timely and accurate EAL classification could be made. Using IMC 0609, Appendix B, Section 5.4, the finding is of very low safety significance because the finding was determined to be an example of an ineffective EAL, such that an Alert would be declared in a degraded manner. This finding is related to the cross-cutting area of PI&R - CAP because PPL did not thoroughly evaluate problems such that the resolutions address the causes and extent of conditions, to include properly classifying, prioritizing and evaluating for operability. Specifically, PPL failed to appropriately evaluate the extent of condition from similar NCVs issued in November 2008 and 2010 regarding inadequate instrumentation to support EAL declarations. [P.1(c)] (Section 1EP6)

Inspection Report# : [2012002](#) (pdf)

Occupational Radiation Safety

Significance:  Mar 31, 2012

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Noncompliance with Radiological Barrier

A self-revealing, Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.1 was identified when a worker did not comply with a radiological barrier and protective measures for high radiation area (HRA) entry. Specifically, the worker entered a HRA but was not on the proper radiation work permit (RWP) and had not been briefed for HRA entrance. Upon identification, PPL conducted a Susquehanna Error Prevention Team Assessment (SEPTA), entered this issue into their CAP as Condition Report (CR) 1546827, and issued both an Effluents department clock reset and a Radiological Safety Note to station personnel.

The finding was determined to be more than minor based on similarity to IMC 0612, Appendix E, Example 6.h, which describes an improper entry into an HRA. Specifically, the individual was not authorized entry into a HRA. It was also more than minor based on association with the human performance attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone and its objective to ensure the adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. The finding was evaluated in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix C, where it was determined to be Green since PPL's three year average collective dose is less than 240 person-rem/unit. The inspectors determined that this issue had a cross-cutting aspect in Human Performance - Work Practices. Human error prevention techniques, such as pre-job briefings and self-checking are expected to be used commensurate with the risk of the assigned task, such that work activities are performed safely. Personnel also do not proceed in the face of uncertainty or unexpected circumstances. In this case, the worker did not adhere to the pre-job briefings associated with the assigned RWP that prohibited HRA entry and the worker's health

physics (HP) briefing that did the same. Further, the individual proceeded in the face of uncertainty by breaching the HRA boundary. [H.4(a)] (Section 40A2.1)

Inspection Report# : [2012002](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Mar 31, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Follow Radiation Protection Procedures

The inspectors identified a Green NCV of TS 5.4.1.a, which requires that written procedures be implemented covering the activities in the applicable procedures recommended by Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33, including procedures for RWPs. On December 5, 2011, a work crew identified that dose rates exceeded the “Alert” levels specified on their RWPs used to transfer an 1100 Curie Cesium 137 source from a shipping cask to a calibration irradiator. Procedure NDAP-QA-0626, “Radiological Controlled Area (RCA) Access and RWP System,” Appendix X, provides specific actions that the radiation protection technician providing job coverage must take when “Alert” levels are exceeded. All of the actions were not completed prior to restarting the work on December 5, 2011. Specifically, higher levels of supervision were not notified, the RWP was not changed, and no additional actions or precautions were documented in the RWP remarks log as required by NDAP-QA-0626, Appendix X. PPL subsequently entered the issue into their CAP as CR 1521467.

The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Radiation Safety - Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone attribute of program and process and affected the cornerstone objective of protecting worker health and safety from exposure to radiation. Specifically, PPL did not take the appropriate actions defined in the procedure to evaluate actions to prevent recurrence prior to restarting work when RWP alert levels had been exceeded. Using the IMC 0609, Appendix C, “Occupational Radiation Safety SDP,” the inspector determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not involve: (1) an as low as is reasonably achievable (ALARA) planning and controls deficiency, (2) an overexposure, (3) a substantial potential for overexposure, or (4) an impaired ability to assess dose. This finding was caused by inadequate procedure compliance. Consequently, the cause of this deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance. Specifically, PPL did not follow procedures. [H.4(b)] (Section 40A2)

Inspection Report# : [2012002](#) (*pdf*)

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : May 29, 2012