

Saint Lucie 2

1Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance: G Mar 31, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Follow Reactor Protection System Surveillance Procedure Resulting in Reactor Plant Trip

Green. A Green, self-revealing, non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1 was identified which requires that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering activities referenced in NRC Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, dated February 1978, including safety related activities carried out during operation of the reactor plant. Licensee surveillance test procedure 2-OSP-63.01, "Unit 2 RPS Logic Matrix Test," was not complied with as written when a Reactor Protection System (RPS) logic matrix switch was inadvertently placed out of position resulting in an unplanned reactor trip. The licensee entered this violation in their corrective action program as condition report 1657802.

The licensee's failure to fully implement RPS testing procedure 2-OSP-63.01, "Unit 2 RPS Logic Matrix Test," as written is a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be of more than minor significance because it resulted in a reactor trip and is similar to NRC Manual Chapter 0612 Appendix E, example 4.b. The inspectors evaluated the risk of this finding using IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment 4, "Phase 1 - Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings." The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because it did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. The finding involved the cross-cutting area of human performance, in the component of work practices and the aspect of procedural compliance (H.4.b), in that the licensee failed to ensure that personnel followed procedure requirements to prevent unexpected results.

Inspection Report# : [2012002](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: G Jun 30, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Failure to Comply with Design Drawing Results in Main Steam Vent Line Failure and Subsequent Transient

A self-revealing finding of very low safety significance was identified following a rapid downpower and manual reactor trip of Unit 2 on May 16, 2011. Specifically, the licensee failed to comply with an approved design drawing during installation fabrication of a one-inch vent line which resulted in a fatigue failure of the vent line. No violations of NRC requirements were identified because the location of the vent line was downstream of the main steam isolation valve and was classified as non-safety related. The licensee entered the issue into the Corrective Action Program as Action Request (AR) 1651817.

The finding was more than minor because it resulted in a rapid downpower and manual reactor trip. The finding was associated with the Design Control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as at power operations. Using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609.04, Significance Determination Process (SDP) Phase 1 – Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, Table 4a for the Initiating Events Cornerstone, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it was a transient initiator but did not increase the likelihood that mitigation equipment would not be available. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the performance deficiency was not indicative of current plant performance. Specifically, the performance deficiency occurred in 2005 or earlier.

Inspection Report# : [2011003](#) (*pdf*)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Dec 31, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Follow Operability Determination Procedure for Evaluation of Past Operability

The inspectors identified a NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1 and Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.33 for the licensee failing to implement a written procedure for operability determinations. Safety related procedure EN-AA-203-1001, "Operability Determinations and Functionality Assessments," was not fully implemented as written on multiple occasions when the 1A and 2A auxiliary feed water pump discharge pressure gauges used for periodic in-service surveillance testing were found out of calibration during periodic maintenance. Specifically, during the performance of maintenance procedure 1400064P, "Installed Plant Instrumentation Calibration," pressure gauge PI-09-7A was found out of calibration, required adjustment, and a condition report written for evaluation in the licensee's corrective action program. The inspector determined a performance deficiency existed when on three separate occasions from 2009 thru 2011, the senior reactor operator concluded incorrectly that the out of calibration gauge conditions did not affect past operability and therefore no engineering evaluation was performed as required by procedure EN-AA-203-1001.

The finding was more than minor because if the performance deficiency is not corrected then it could lead to a more significant safety concern. Using the NRC Manual Chapter 0609, ASignificance Determination Process, @ Table 4A, "Characterization Worksheet," the finding does not represent an actual loss of safety function or screen as potentially risk significant due to seismic, flooding, or severe weather. A contributing cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution, with a corrective action program aspect. Specifically, the operator failed to thoroughly evaluate the condition for past operability of the affected auxiliary feed water pump.

Inspection Report# : [2011005](#) (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : May 29, 2012