

# Millstone 3

## 1Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings

---

### Initiating Events

---

### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Jun 30, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**(NCV 05000423/2011003-01, Failure to Take Timely Corrective Actions for Dealloying of Aluminum Bronze Service Water Valves).**

• Green. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action in that Dominion did not take timely corrective action to address repetitive failures of aluminum-bronze (Al-Br) service water valves that were installed in safety related support systems from the process of de-alloying. Specifically, Dominion did not implement a plan to replace 3SWP\*V699 (3HVQ\*ACUS1B Bypass Valve), 3SWP\*V018 (3HVQ\*ACUS2B Unit Cooler Inlet Valve) and 3SWP\*V696 (3HVQ\*ACUS2B Unit Cooler Outlet Valve) prior to failure despite identifying in March 2009, that these valves would likely fail within 12 to 18 months. Dominion entered the issue into their corrective action system and replaced the three valves. The finding is similar to example 4.f in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," in that the failure to correct degraded conditions affected operability of the containment recirculation pumps. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the deficiency resulted in a loss of operability but did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in Problem Identification and Resolution, CAP component, because Dominion did not take appropriate corrective action in a timely manner to address the degraded condition commensurate with their safety significance. [P.1(d)](Section 71111.15)

Inspection Report# : [2011003](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Sep 22, 2010

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: VIO Violation

**Failure to develop a mitigation strategy for depressurization of the Unit 3 steam generators and use a portable pump for injection make-up.**

This finding, affecting the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, is related to developing a strategy to maintain core cooling and mitigate fuel damage, under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire; in response to Section B.5.b. of the February 25, 2002, Interim Compensatory Measures (ICM) Order (EA-02-026) and related NRC guidance. This finding has been designated as "Official Use Only - Security-Related Information;" therefore, the details of this finding are being withheld from public disclosure. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution (Corrective Action Program). [P.1(c)]. See inspection report for more details.

Inspection Report# : [2010011](#) (*pdf*)

---

### Barrier Integrity

---

## Emergency Preparedness

---

## Occupational Radiation Safety

---

## Public Radiation Safety

---

## Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

---

## Miscellaneous

Last modified : May 29, 2012