Hatch 2
1Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G Jun 30, 2011
Identified By: Self-Revealing
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions to ensure Bussmann fuses identified by the Part 21 notification 2005-37 were removed from use in safety related applications.
A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, was identified for failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions to ensure Bussmann fuses identified by the Part 21 notification 2005-37, were removed from use in safety related applications. Corrective actions taken include replacing the KTN-R 10 amp fuses on the 1B emergency diesel generator with fuses manufactured after 1991, placing a hold on all KWN-R and KTN-R fuses size 30 amps below manufactured between 1987 and 1991, and replacement of these fuses with new KWN-R and KTN-R fuses with a date code 2009 or newer. This violation has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program as condition report (CR) 2010116039.

Failure to promptly identify and take corrective actions to ensure Bussmann fuses identified by the Part 21 notification 2005-37 were removed from use in safety related applications is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute and adversely affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, on December 23, 2010, the Hatch 1B emergency diesel generator #3 stop circuitry operability light was discovered not illuminated on panel 1R43-P003B. Without power to this circuitry the 1B emergency diesel generator is inoperable and unavailable to provide its required safety function. The significance of this finding was screened using IMC 0609 Attachment 4, table 4a. The risk significance screening required a Phase 3 analysis, because the finding screened as potentially risk significant due to a seismic initiating event. The regional senior reactor analyst (SRA) performed a Phase 3 analysis for the finding. The analysis included two parts, the first covering the time period of total inoperability of the fuse; and the second covering the exposure time from when the non qualified fuses were installed until they were replaced, when they were subject to potential seismic failure. Calculations were performed using the NRC's plant specific risk models. The short exposure time for the first analysis, and the low likelihood of a seismic event at the plant for the second analysis, caused the combined result to be a very low risk condition. The finding was determined to be Green in the SDP. Because the performance deficiency occurred in 2006 and is outside the past three years, no cross-cutting aspect is assigned. (Section 4OA2.2)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 *(pdf)*

Significance: G Jun 30, 2011
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to consider potential adverse system interactions when developing procedure to open SRVs without power
An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for failure to establish adequate procedures that address potential adverse system interactions when opening safety relief valves (SRV) without power. Immediate corrective actions taken by the licensee include changing procedure 31EO-TSG-001-0, Attachment 6, SRV Actuation Without Power to Allow Injection with Portable Pump, to ensure the SRV control circuits are isolated electrically from the direct current (DC) busses prior to installing the

portable DC power supply. This violation has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 2011106008.

Failure to address potential adverse system interactions when developing procedures affecting quality is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Procedural Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the safety relief valves to reduce reactor pressure in response to a loss of alternating current (AC) and DC power event. Because this finding is associated with B.5.b mitigation strategies, the finding was assessed using MC 0609 Appendix L, B.5.b Significance Determination Process, Table 2. The inspectors performed an initial screening and determined the finding did not meet the criteria listed within Table 2 for greater than Green significance therefore this finding was screened as Green. Because the mitigating strategy was developed and implemented in site procedures in 2007, the performance deficiency occurred outside the past three years and no cross-cutting aspect is assigned. (Section 4OA5.3)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 *(pdf)*

Significance: G Jun 30, 2011
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to address the anticipated environmental conditions when developing procedures to manually operate containment vent valves
An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was identified for failure to establish adequate procedures that address the anticipated environmental conditions when operating containment vents without power. Immediate corrective actions taken by the licensee include changing procedure 34AB-R22-003-1/2, Station Blackout, to perform preliminary actions in the torus area before high containment pressure and temperature conditions require venting. This change is intended to allow required torus area entries to be performed prior to reaching high temperature conditions in the area. This violation has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR 2011105966 and CR 2011106007.

Failure to address the anticipated environmental conditions when developing procedures affecting quality is a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Procedural Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of the containment vent valves to allow reliable pressure control of primary containment in response to a loss of AC and DC power event. This finding was assessed using MC 0609 Appendix L, B.5.b Significance Determination Process, Table 2. The inspectors performed an initial screening and determined the finding did not meet the criteria listed within Table 2 for greater than Green significance therefore this finding was screened as Green. Because the procedure was developed and implemented in 2005, the performance deficiency occurred outside the past three years and no cross-cutting aspect is assigned. (Section 4OA5.3)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 *(pdf)*

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

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