

Catawba 1

1Q/2012 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance:  Sep 30, 2011

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

Failure to Adequately Implement Tagout Procedures

A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensee's failure to adequately implement their administrative tagout procedure resulting in the isolation of main feedwater while Unit 1 was in Mode 4. The licensee's corrective actions included revisions to operations administrative procedures and incorporation of lessons learned from the event into operator training.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of configuration control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the isolation of main feedwater caused the CA system to autostart. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because no checklist criteria were met that required a phase 2 analysis and there was no loss of the decay heat removal safety function. The cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of the need to keep personnel apprised of the operational impact of work activities as described in the Work Control component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the scope and plant impact of the tagout was not adequately understood by operations personnel responsible for implementation due to inadequate turnover and review [H.3(b)].

Inspection Report# : [2011004](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to adequately control energized temporary power sources with transient fire loads

An NRC-identified non-cited violation of the Fire Protection Program (FPP) was identified when the licensee failed to evaluate 600V temporary power sources installed in a housekeeping area with approved transient combustibles as required by NSD 313, Control of Combustible and Flammable Material. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program (CAP) and corrective actions included immediately removing the transient combustibles from the housekeeping area.

The failure to evaluate the energized 600V temporary power sources as an ignition source while located in a housekeeping area with approved transient combustibles was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors - Fire, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that a failure of the 600V temporary power source could ignite the transient combustibles causing damage to equipment located in the 1A Diesel Generator (DG) room. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the transient combustibles did not involve low flash point liquids or self igniting material. This finding was associated with the aspect of appropriately planning work activities by incorporating job site conditions which may impact plant systems, of the Work Control component in the Human Performance cross-cutting area in that the licensee did not consider the effect of energized 600V temporary power cables on transient combustibles in a housekeeping zone. [H.3(a)] (Section 1R05)

Inspection Report# : [2011003](#) (*pdf*)

Mitigating Systems

Significance: **G** Mar 31, 2012

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Safety-Related Manhole Sump Pump Discharge Outlet Blockage

Green. A NRC-identified non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, was identified for the licensee's failure to implement the requirements of their modification program. Surface grading work for the nuclear service water (RN) piping replacement modification was not reviewed to ensure it did not impact the CMH-2 sump pump function to eliminate accumulated water. Licensee's corrective actions included unclogging the sump pump discharge outlet, replacing the sump pump, and extending the height of the discharge outlet.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors - Flood Hazard and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the design modification activities affected the CMH-2 sump pump function to prevent water accumulation in the safety-related manhole structure. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the accumulated water in CMH-2 did not result in the loss of operability or functionality of safety-related structures, systems, and components (SSCs). The finding was associated with the aspect of appropriate and timely corrective actions of the Corrective Action Program component in the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area in that the licensee identified in August 2011 (PIP C-11-6342) that the sump pump discharge outlet needed to be raised; however, corrective actions were not implemented that would have prevented the blockage during the grading activities. [P.1(d)] (Section 1R06)

Inspection Report# : [2012002](#) (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

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