Millstone 3
4Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G Jun 30, 2011
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
(NCV 05000423/2011003-01, Failure to Take Timely Corrective Actions for Dealloying of Aluminum Bronze Service Water Valves).
• Green. The inspectors identified a Green NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action in that Dominion did not take timely corrective action to address repetitive failures of aluminum-bronze (Al-Br) service water valves that were installed in safety related support systems from the process of de-alloying. Specifically, Dominion did not implement a plan to replace 3SWP*V699 (3HVQ*ACUS1B Bypass Valve), 3SWP*V018 (3HVQ*ACUS2B Unit Cooler Inlet Valve) and 3SWP*V696 (3HVQ*ACUS2B Unit Cooler Outlet Valve) prior to failure despite identifying in March 2009, that these valves would likely fail within 12 to 18 months. Dominion entered the issue into their corrective action system and replaced the three valves. The finding is similar to example 4.f in NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, “Examples of Minor Issues,” in that the failure to correct degraded conditions affected operability of the containment recirculation pumps. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the deficiency resulted in a loss of operability but did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in Problem Identification and Resolution, CAP component, because Dominion did not take appropriate corrective action in a timely manner to address the degraded condition commensurate with their safety significance. [P.1(d)](Section 71111.15)
Inspection Report# : 2011003 *(pdf)*

Significance: G Mar 31, 2011
Identified By: Self-Revealing
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
NCV 05000423/2011002-01, Failure to Prevent Safety Related Cables from Being Submerged
Green. A self-revealing Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, “Design Control,” was identified for Dominion’s failure to maintain safety related cables in an environment for which they were designed. Specifically, 480V safety related cables, which are not qualified for continuous submergence, were submerged in a cable vault for an undetermined length of time. Dominion took immediate corrective action to remove the water from the cable vault and entered the issue into their corrective action program (CAP).

The finding is more than minor because it was associated with the Protection Against External Events attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency which resulted in a loss of operability or functionality, did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as risk-

significant for greater than 24 hours, and was not potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Operating Experience (OE), because Dominion did not implement OE through changes in the stations programs for inspecting underground cables. [P.2(b)] (Section 1R06)

Inspection Report# : 2011002 *(pdf)*

Significance: G Mar 31, 2011
Identified By: Self-Revealing
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
NCV 05000423/2011002-02, Improper Restoration of Air Conditioning Equipment Following Maintenance Results in Inoperability of 'B' Train of Recirculation Spray System
Green. A self-revealing Green non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified for Dominion's failure to properly restore 3HVQ*ACUS2B, Containment Recirculation Pumps and Coolers Area B Air Conditioning Unit, following maintenance. This resulted in an additional 24 hours of inoperability of the 'B' train of the recirculation spray system (RSS). Dominion's entered the issue into their corrective action program.

The finding is more than minor because it was similar to NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," Example 4b in that not following written instructions in the tagging cover sheet caused the 'B' train of RSS to be inoperable for an additional 24 hours. The finding was associated with the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding did not represent a loss of system safety function, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, did not represent an actual loss of safety function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as risk-significant for greater than 24 hours, and was not potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding or severe weather initiating event. The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Practices, because operations personnel did not follow the instructions on the tagging cover sheet when returning the air conditioning unit to service. [H.4(b)] (Section 1R19)

Inspection Report# : 2011002 *(pdf)*

Significance: G Sep 22, 2010
Identified By: Self-Revealing
Item Type: VIO Violation
Failure to develop a mitigation strategy for depressurization of the Unit 3 steam generators and use a portable pump for injection make-up.
This finding, affecting the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, is related to developing a strategy to maintain core cooling and mitigate fuel damage, under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fire; in response to Section B.5.b. of the February 25, 2002, Interim Compensatory Measures (ICM) Order (EA-02-026) and related NRC guidance. This finding has been designated as "Official Use Only - Security-Related Information;" therefore, the details of this finding are being withheld from public disclosure. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution (Corrective Action Program). [P.1(c)]. See inspection report for more details.
Inspection Report# : 2010011 *(pdf)*

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : March 02, 2012