

McGuire 2

4Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance: **G** Sep 30, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to establish adequate ND venting procedures

The inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, for the failure to establish acceptance criteria to determine operability in surveillance procedures used to vent the decay heat removal (ND) system in Modes 5, 6, and No-Mode in preparation for Mode 6. The issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as PIP M-11-04745

The licensee's failure to establish adequate acceptance criteria for ND venting surveillance procedures PT/1/A/4200/036 and PT/2/A/4200/036 was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was determined to be more than minor because if left uncorrected, the failure to establish acceptance criteria for surveillance tests which establish the basis for the ND system operability in modes 5 and 6 would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that conditions which could impact system operability could remain undetected. In addition, the finding adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, Attachment 1, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because a quantitative assessment was not required based on the criteria in Attachment 1. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect of implementation of operating experience in the Operating Experience component in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the licensee failed to implement operating experience from Generic Letter (GL) 2008-01 into station procedures [P.2(b)]. (Section 40A5.4)

Inspection Report# : [2011004](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: **SL-IV** Mar 31, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to update the UFSAR for GL 91-13

An NRC-identified SL-IV non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.71(e) was identified when the licensee did not update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) to reflect their response to Generic Letter (GL) 91-13, Essential Service Water System Failures at Multi-Unit Sites, which described capabilities in existing procedures for cross-connecting nuclear service water (RN) between units. Licensee corrective actions include submitting a license amendment and updating the UFSAR following amendment approval.

This performance deficiency (PD) was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function. This PD was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because it did not result in a condition evaluated as having low-to-moderate or greater safety significance (i.e., White, Yellow, or Red). Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 1R11.1)

Inspection Report# : [2011002](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to obtain a license amendment for RN sharing between units

An NRC-identified SL-IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.59 was identified for making changes to the UFSAR, section 9.2, and Abnormal Procedure AP-20, Loss of RN, which required prior NRC approval. The changes allowed donating a train of nuclear service water to the unit experiencing a loss of service water (LOSW) event by opening the unit crossover valves. Licensee corrective actions include removing the steps from AP-20, submitting a license amendment request, and updating the UFSAR following amendment approval.

This PD was considered as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function. This PD was determined to be a SL-IV violation in accordance with Section 6.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy because it did not result in a condition evaluated as having low-to-moderate or greater safety significance (i.e., White, Yellow, or Red). Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 1R11.2)

Inspection Report# : [2011002](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Mar 31, 2011

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to eliminate fish in the SNSWP

A self-revealing Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified for the licensee's failure to correct a condition adverse to quality. The licensee had previously identified that the fish population in the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond (SNSWP) had significantly increased but failed to perform the annual fish eradication of the SNSWP to prevent macro-fouling of the RN pump suction strainers. This resulted in the licensee declaring both trains of RN inoperable and entry into TS 3.0.3 for both units. Licensee corrective actions included chemically treating the SNSWP to eliminate the macro-fouling source, flushing the RN intake lines, and establishing a periodic chemical treatment of the SNSWP.

This PD was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute and adversely impacted the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of the RN system to provide long term decay heat removal because the macro-fouling of the suction strainers rendered the RN pumps inoperable. This finding was evaluated using IMC 0609, Significance Determination Process, with an exposure time of greater than 30 days. A Phase 3 SDP analysis was required to be performed and determined the resultant core damage frequency (CDF) was <math><1E-6</math> (Green). This finding was determined to be directly related to the conservative assumptions aspect of the Decision Making component in the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the licensee's decisions to defer the macro-fouling treatment of the SNSWP were non-conservative [H.1(b)]. (Section 4OA3.3)

Inspection Report# : [2011002](#) (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to notify the NRC of a situation related to public health and safety

• SL-IV. An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.72 was identified when the licensee did not notify the NRC that they had reported a non-routine event related to the health and safety of the public to another government agency. The licensee notified the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) of leakage in a FERC-licensed intake dike and did not notify NRC within four hours of notifying FERC. The licensee entered this condition into their correction action program (CAP) as Problem Investigation Program (PIP) M-11-3600.

The failure to notify the NRC as required by 10 CFR 50.72 about a notification to FERC of a significant condition related to public health and safety was a performance deficiency (PD). This PD was considered as traditional enforcement because the failure to notify the NRC had the potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function. This PD was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned to traditional enforcement violations. (Section 40A3.1)

Inspection Report# : [2011003](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to submit an LER for a valid RPS actuation

An NRC-identified non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report (LER) System, was identified for the licensee's failure to submit an LER within 60 days for a valid reactor protection system (RPS) actuation. The reactor was manually tripped when control rod L-13 did not respond as expected during rod control movement testing. The licensee entered this condition into their CAP as PIP M-11-2694.

The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to submit an LER in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) was a PD. This PD was dispositioned as traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory function. This violation was determined to be a SL-IV violation using Section 6.9 of the NRC Enforcement Policy. Cross-cutting aspects are not assigned for traditional enforcement violations.

Inspection Report# : [2011003](#) (*pdf*)

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