Catawba 1
4Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance: G Sep 30, 2011
Identified By: Self-Revealing
Item Type: FIN Finding
Failure to Adequately Implement Tagout Procedures
A self-revealing finding was identified for the licensee's failure to adequately implement their administrative tagout procedure resulting in the isolation of main feedwater while Unit 1 was in Mode 4. The licensee's corrective actions included revisions to operations administrative procedures and incorporation of lessons learned from the event into operator training.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of configuration control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the isolation of main feedwater caused the CA system to autostart. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because no checklist criteria were met that required a phase 2 analysis and there was no loss of the decay heat removal safety function. The cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect of the need to keep personnel appraised of the operational impact of work activities as described in the Work Control component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the scope and plant impact of the tagout was not adequately understood by operations personnel responsible for implementation due to inadequate turnover and review [H.3(b)].
Inspection Report# : 2011004 *(pdf)*

Significance: G Jun 30, 2011
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to adequately control energized temporary power sources with transient fire loads
An NRC-identified non-cited violation of the Fire Protection Program (FPP) was identified when the licensee failed to evaluate 600V temporary power sources installed in a housekeeping area with approved transient combustibles as required by NSD 313, Control of Combustible and Flammable Material. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program (CAP) and corrective actions included immediately removing the transient combustibles from the housekeeping area.

The failure to evaluate the energized 600V temporary power sources as an ignition source while located in a housekeeping area with approved transient combustibles was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of Protection Against External Factors - Fire, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that a failure of the 600V temporary power source could ignite the transient combustibles causing damage to equipment located in the 1A Diesel Generator (DG) room. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the transient combustibles did not involve low flash point liquids or self igniting material. This finding was associated with the aspect of appropriately planning work activities by incorporating job site conditions which may impact plant systems, of the Work Control component in the Human Performance cross-cutting area in that the licensee did not consider the effect of energized 600V temporary power cables on transient combustibles in a housekeeping zone. [H.3(a)] (Section 1R05)

Inspection Report# : 2011003 *(pdf)*

Mitigating Systems

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Significance: G Mar 31, 2011
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
Failure to update bases for EAL changes
An NRC-identified NCV of 10 CFR 50.54(q) with two examples was identified for failing to maintain emergency plans that meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The licensee failed to revise the Emergency Action Level (EAL) basis which potentially impacted the licensee's ability to accurately and timely classify emergency conditions. The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Problem Investigation Program report (PIP) C-11-2304.

The failure to revise the EAL basis document as required by the Catawba Emergency Plan was a performance deficiency (PD). The PD was more than minor because if left uncorrected, the potential to incorrectly classify events associated with the fission product barrier matrix or security-event classification scheme within the brief time available would lead to a more significant safety concern. This finding was associated with the risk significant planning standard (RSPS) 10 CFR 50.47(b)(4). The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss or degradation of a RSPS function. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of complete and accurate procedures in the Resources component of the Human Performance area because the procedure used to evaluate EAL changes, EPFAM Section 3.10, did not include a requirement to change the EAL basis document as appropriate. [H.2(c)] (Section 1EP4)
Inspection Report# : 2011002 *(pdf)*

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : March 02, 2012