

# FitzPatrick

## 3Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings

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### Initiating Events

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### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:** SL-IV Jun 30, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **UFSAR Emergency Bus Voltage Not Updated, Consistent with Current Plant Conditions**

The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV (SL IV) NCV of Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR) Part 50.71(e) because FitzPatrick personnel did not update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) with information consistent with plant conditions. Specifically, FitzPatrick personnel did not remove reference to or correct information in UFSAR Section 8.6.6.c, "Emergency Bus Voltages When Operating From the Reserve Source," to reflect current plant conditions with regard to the listed maximum voltage capable of being produced at the emergency bus from the reserve source during a low load condition. This issue was considered within the traditional enforcement process because it had the potential to impede or impact the NRC's ability to perform its regulatory functions. FitzPatrick issued condition report (CR) CR-JAF-2011-03023 to address the UFSAR discrepancy.

The inspectors concluded that the violation was more than minor because the longstanding and incorrect information in the UFSAR had a potential impact on safety and licensed activities. Excessive voltage on an emergency bus can result in equipment damage, or loss due to the actuation of protective devices such as overcurrent fuses. Similar to Enforcement Policy Section 6.1, example D.3, the inspectors determined the violation was of SL IV because the erroneous information not updated in the UFSAR was not used to make an unacceptable change to the facility nor did it impact a licensing or safety decision by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

Inspection Report# : [2011003](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Mar 31, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Control Room Envelope Inoperable due to Unlatched Boundary Door**

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of very low safety significance of 10 CFR 50, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," because Entergy personnel did not identify and correct a condition adverse to quality related to a control room envelope (CRE) boundary door. Specifically, Entergy personnel did not identify and implement adequate actions to ensure the safety-related CRE boundary door, 70DOR-A-300-5, remained latched and able to perform its safety function. As corrective action, the foreign material that prevented the door from consistently latching was removed by Entergy personnel. The issue was entered into the corrective action program (CAP) as condition reports CR-JAF-2010-08617 and CR-JAF-2011-00407.

The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control and the barrier performance attributes specific to the radiological barrier function of the control room. The finding affected the Barrier Integrity cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix A, "Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations," based on a Phase 3 analysis. The inspectors determined the period that the door was potentially open was small relative to the technical specification (TS) allowed outage time, and therefore represented very low safety significance, considering the low probability of a design basis accident during that time period.

The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution within the corrective action program component because Entergy personnel did not completely and accurately identify the degraded condition of the door.

Inspection Report# : [2011002](#) (pdf)

**Significance:**  Dec 31, 2010

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Inadequate Procedure for Refueling Water Level Control Resulted in Overflowing of Reactor Cavity Water in the Reactor Building**

A self-revealing NCV of very low safety significance of technical specification (TS) 5.4, "Procedures," was identified because Entergy procedure OP-30A, "Refueling Water Level Control," did not provide adequate guidance to operators for filling the reactor cavity which resulted in the reactor building (RB) floor drains overflowing and water intrusion from higher to lower levels in the RB. Entergy personnel entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP), (CR-JAF-2010-05406 and CR-JAF-2010-05407) and performed several actions to ensure proper water level control prior to the next drain down of the reactor cavity. These actions included revising OP-30A to provide sufficient detail, ensuring additional detail would be included in pre-job briefings to include potential drain paths from the reactor cavity and spent fuel pool, and installing a dedicated camera to monitor reactor cavity water level.

This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown. Specifically, water spray throughout areas of the RB created a potential for water entering motors, valve operators, motor control centers, circuit breakers, and electrical junction boxes, such that electrical components could have been compromised, which increased the likelihood of an event that would upset plant stability and challenge a critical safety function. The inspectors determined the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix G, "Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process," Phase 1. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because Entergy personnel maintained an adequate mitigation capability and there was there neither an inadvertent loss of two feet of RCS inventory nor an inadvertent reactor coolant system pressurization.

The inspectors determined this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance within the resources component because the procedure used for filling the reactor cavity was not sufficiently complete to assure nuclear safety. (H.2(c) per IMC 0310).

Inspection Report# : [2010005](#) (pdf)

**Significance:**  Dec 31, 2010

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Failure to Maintain Equipment Status Control for a Manually Operated Normally Locked Open Residual Heat Removal Injection Valve**

A self-revealing NCV of very low safety significance of TS 5.4, "Procedures," was identified because Entergy personnel did not implement AP-12.06, "Equipment Status Control," as required. Specifically, Entergy personnel did not maintain status control and properly document the position of the residual heat removal (RHR) to reactor water recirculation loop 'B' isolation valve (10RHR-818) as closed nor did

operators restore the valve to its normal locked open position upon completion of a leak surveillance test. Entergy personnel entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP), (CR-JAF-2010-06656) and promptly restored the valve to its required locked open position.

This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the configuration control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e. core damage). Specifically, the operators did not maintain configuration control of the RHR isolation valve and restore the valve to a locked open position when the 'B' RHR subsystem was credited for maintaining acceptable shutdown risk. The inspectors determined the significance of the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix G, "Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process." The issue was determined to screen as very low safety significance (Green) because the 'B' RHR train could be considered available with respect to Appendix G, Section 4.0, and Attachment 3, Section 2.2.3. Specifically, the inspectors determined that operators had more than twice the time available (with a shortest time to boil of 5.8 hours) than would have been required to identify and take action to restore/open the RHR isolation valve in the event of a loss of shutdown cooling or RCS inventory.

This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance cross-cutting area, Work Practices component, because Entergy personnel did not define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance, and personnel did not follow procedures (H.4(b) per IMC 0310).  
Inspection Report# : [2010005](#) (*pdf*)

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## **Barrier Integrity**

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## **Emergency Preparedness**

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## **Occupational Radiation Safety**

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## **Public Radiation Safety**

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## **Physical Protection**

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

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## **Miscellaneous**

**Significance:** N/A Dec 03, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

**2010 FitzPatrick PIR Team Summary**

The team concluded that Entergy personnel were generally effective in identifying, evaluating, and resolving problems. In most instances, FitzPatrick personnel identified problems at a low threshold and entered them into the Corrective Action Program (CAP). The team determined that FitzPatrick staff screened issues appropriately for operability and reportability, and prioritized issues commensurate with the safety significance of the problems. Causal analyses appropriately considered extent of condition, generic issues, and previous occurrences. The team determined that corrective actions addressed the identified causes and were implemented in a timely manner.

Entergy's audits and self-assessments reviewed by the team were thorough and probing. Additionally, the team concluded that Entergy personnel, in general, adequately identified, reviewed, and applied relevant industry operating experience (OE) to FitzPatrick. Based on interviews, observations of plant activities, and reviews of the CAP and the Employee Concerns Program (ECP), the team did not identify concerns with site personnel's willingness to raise safety issues nor did the team identify conditions that indicated a negative impact on the site's safety conscious work environment.

Inspection Report# : [2010007](#) (*pdf*)

Last modified : January 04, 2012