

# Crystal River 3

## 3Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings

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### Initiating Events

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### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:** **G** Mar 31, 2011

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

#### **Operating Crew Failures on the 2011 Annual Requalification Operating Test**

A self-revealing Green finding, associated with operating crew performance on the simulator during facility-administered requalification examination was identified. Two of the eight crews evaluated failed to pass their simulator examinations. As immediate corrective action, the failed operating crews were remediated (i.e., the operating crews were re-trained and successfully retested) prior to returning to shift. The licensee has entered this issue into the corrective action program as Nuclear Condition Report (NRC) 450196.

The inspectors determined that the crew failures constituted a performance deficiency based on the fact that licensed operators are expected to operate the plant with acceptable standards of knowledge and abilities demonstrated through periodic testing as required by 10 CFR 55.59(a)(2). Two out of eight crews of licensed operators failed to demonstrate a satisfactory understanding of the required actions and mitigating strategies required to safely operate the facility under normal, abnormal, and emergency conditions. The finding is greater than minor because the performance deficiency potentially affects the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the finding reflected the crew's potential inability to take timely actions in response to actual abnormal and emergency conditions. The cause of this finding was directly related to the cross-cutting aspect of personnel training and qualifications in the Resources component of the Human Performance area, in that the licensee failed to ensure the adequacy of the training provided to operators to assure nuclear safety. (H.2(b)) (Section 1R11)

Inspection Report# : [2011002](#) (*pdf*)

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### Barrier Integrity

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### Emergency Preparedness

**Significance:** **W** Jul 15, 2011

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: AV Apparent Violation

#### **Failure to Maintain a Standard EAL Scheme**

TBD. An AV was identified for failure to follow and maintain in effect emergency plans which use a standard emergency classification and action level scheme. Specifically, the licensee's emergency plan emergency action level (EAL) 1.4, General Emergency - Gaseous Effluent, specified instrument values that were beyond the limits of the effluent radiation monitors capabilities to accurately measure.

This finding was considered more than minor because the licensee is required to be capable of implementing adequate

measures to protect public health and safety in the event of a radiological emergency. Regulations require a standard emergency classification and action level scheme, the bases which include facility system and effluent parameters, in use by the licensee and State and local response plans call for reliance on information provided by the licensee for determination of minimum initial offsite response measures. As a result of having General Emergency EAL threshold values that were beyond the range of the associated effluent radiation monitors, Crystal River Unit 3 personnel may not have been able to perform timely and accurate classification of an emergency based upon an effluent radioactive material release. Emergency response actions directed by the State and local emergency response plans, which rely on information provided by the licensee, could have potentially been delayed.

The cause of the finding is related to the human performance cross-cutting element of Decision-making (H.1(a)) for ensuring that risk-significant decisions are made using a systematic process and obtaining interdisciplinary input and reviews.

Inspection Report# : [2011501](#) (*pdf*)

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## **Occupational Radiation Safety**

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## **Public Radiation Safety**

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## **Physical Protection**

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

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## **Miscellaneous**

Last modified : January 04, 2012