Quad Cities 1
1Q/2011 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G Mar 31, 2011
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
MSIV RPS LIMIT SWITCH PRECONDITIONING
NRC inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V on December 21, 2010. While observing performance of QCOS 0250-01, "MSIV [Main Steam Isolation Valve] Scram Sensor Channel Functional Test," inspectors identified that the licensee's surveillance procedure unacceptably preconditioned the reactor protection system (RPS) 'B' limit switches during testing of the RPS 'A' switches. The licensee had not previously evaluated the pre-conditioning to determine potential impact to the test and subsequently validated the inspectors' assessment that the test methodology did unacceptably precondition the 'B' RPS limit switches. The issue was documented in the corrective action program as Issue Report 1155212. The procedure was revised and subsequent retesting on March 26 and 27, 2011, demonstrated that all MSIV RPS limit switches were operable.
This issue was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the performance deficiency would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern in that preconditioning could mask a condition which would prevent an automatic actuation of RPS on MSIV closure. Inspectors performed the SDP phase 1 screening using IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Table 4a, Mitigating Systems Cornerstone column, and answered all questions "No." Therefore, this finding is Green, or very low safety significance. The issue was considered a legacy issue and no cross-cutting aspect was assigned.
Inspection Report# : 2011002 *(pdf)*

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Significance: G Jun 30, 2010
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
INCORRECT WIND DIRECTION ON NARS FORM
A NRC-identified finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(9) was identified for delayed corrective action without appropriate compensatory actions for a defective computer point that sends wind direction data to the plant parameter display system (PPDS). This defective computer point resulted in incorrect wind direction on a Nuclear Accident Reporting System (NARS) form transmitted to the State of Illinois as part of the declaration of an Unusual Event on May 19, 2010. Corrective actions included the restoration of the computer point for PPDS. Inspectors identified this performance deficiency had a cross cutting aspect in Problem Identification and Reporting Evaluation because although the non functional computer point, R234, was identified in December 2009, the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate, classify, and prioritize the condition of bad data from a computer point and

assess how the condition affected PPDS (P.1(c)).
This finding is more than minor because the performance deficiency matches an example of a Green finding from IMC 0609, Appendix B, Section 4.9, page B 20, “Equipment or systems necessary for dose projection are not functional for longer than 24 hours from the TIME OF DISCOVERY without compensatory measures, or corrective actions are inadequate or delayed.” Using IMC 0609, Appendix B, Sheet 1, “Failure to Comply Flowchart,” the performance deficiency screened as very low safety significance, or Green.

Inspection Report# : 2010003 *(pdf)*

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Significance: SL-IV Dec 31, 2010
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation
FAILURE TO UPDATE THE UFSAR FOR FIRE PROTECTION DOCUMENTS
A Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.71(e), “Periodic Update of the Final Safety Analysis Report,” and an accompanying Green finding were identified by the inspectors for the failure to update documents incorporated by reference in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and provided to the NRC in UFSAR updates. Specifically, the licensee did not update dose consequence calculations for a fire in the intermediate radwaste storage facility (IRSF) to reflect changes in packaging methods of solid radioactive waste material stored in the IRSF and used to provide a basis for determining if the increase in event consequences to offsite dose resulting from a fire in the facility was not more than minimal. Corrective actions included revision of the calculations and implementation of procedural controls to limit activity stored in the building to ensure offsite dose limits were not challenged in the event of a fire.
This finding was determined to be more than minor using IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "Issue Screening," because if left uncorrected the performance deficiency could have led to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, failure to update the UFSAR or associated licensing basis documents impacts the licensee’s ability to adequately evaluate plant changes under the 10 CFR 50.59 processes and could lead to the licensee erroneously making unacceptable changes to the facility. The phase 1 SDP screening performed by the inspectors concluded that, since no actual release had occurred, no dose was received as a result of the issue, and the probability of the initiating design basis fire for the IRSF was extremely low, both the Radioactive Material Control and the Effluent Release Program flowcharts of IMC 0609 Appendix D, “Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Program,” determine the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that this finding did not reflect present performance because it is a legacy issue with changes made to the facility more than 10 years previously; therefore, there was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding.

The associated Performance Deficiency is tracked as item 2010-005-02.

Inspection Report# : 2010005 *(pdf)*

Significance: G Dec 31, 2010
Identified By: NRC
Item Type: FIN Finding
FAILURE TO UPDATE THE UFSAR FOR FIRE PROTECTION DOCUMENTS
A Severity Level IV NCV of 10 CFR 50.71(e), “Periodic Update of the Final Safety Analysis Report,” and an accompanying Green finding were identified by the inspectors for the failure to update documents incorporated by reference in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and provided to the NRC in UFSAR updates. Specifically, the licensee did not update dose consequence calculations for a fire in the intermediate radwaste storage facility (IRSF) to reflect changes in packaging methods of solid radioactive waste material stored in the IRSF and

used to provide a basis for determining if the increase in event consequences to offsite dose resulting from a fire in the facility was not more than minimal. Corrective actions included revision of the calculations and implementation of procedural controls to limit activity stored in the building to ensure offsite dose limits were not challenged in the event of a fire.
This finding was determined to be more than minor using IMC 0612, "Power Reactor Inspection Reports," Appendix B, "Issue Screening," because if left uncorrected the performance deficiency could have led to a more significant safety concern. Specifically, failure to update the UFSAR or associated licensing basis documents impacts the licensee's ability to adequately evaluate plant changes under the 10 CFR 50.59 processes and could lead to the licensee erroneously making unacceptable changes to the facility. The phase 1 SDP screening performed by the inspectors concluded that, since no actual release had occurred, no dose was received as a result of the issue, and the probability of the initiating design basis fire for the IRSF was extremely low, both the Radioactive Material Control and the Effluent Release Program flowcharts of IMC 0609 Appendix D, "Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Program," determine the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors determined that this finding did not reflect present performance because it is a legacy issue with changes made to the facility more than 10 years previously; therefore, there was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding.

The associated traditional enforcement violation is tracked as item 2010-005-01.
Inspection Report# : 2010005 *(pdf)*

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the cover letters to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : June 07, 2011