

Fort Calhoun

4Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance:  Sep 30, 2010

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Maintenance Procedure Results in Water in East Switchgear Room and Room 19

The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing Green noncited violation of Fort Calhoun Station Technical Specification 5.8.1, for the licensee's failure to provide an adequate maintenance procedure for fire protection system flushing. Specifically, while performing OP-PM-FP-1000 on August 19, 2010, water backed up the VA-87 drain line and spilled onto the east switchgear room floor, into Room 19 below, as well as pooling on top of and inside of cable trays. The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2010-4423.

The inadequate maintenance procedure is a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected the performance deficiency could have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. Specifically the use of OP-PM-FP-1000 allows the potential wetting of safety related equipment in the east switchgear room and Room 19. Because this finding occurred while the unit was operating at full power, the inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, to determine its significance. Using Attachment 4 of that appendix, the inspectors determined that the finding has very low safety significance because the finding did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. Through conversations with the fire protection system engineer and other licensee members and the fact that similar issues have occurred in the past, the inspectors determined that the primary cause of this finding was the failure to adequately assess the significance of previous condition reports which would have required them to perform a more thorough cause evaluation. Therefore, this finding has a crosscutting aspect in the corrective action program component of the problem identification and resolution area because the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate problems, such that, the resolutions address causes and extent of conditions, as necessary.

Inspection Report# : [2010004](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Sep 22, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Perform a Risk Assessment When Required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for Maintenance in the Vicinity of Safety-Related Equipment

The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), "Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," for failing to perform a risk assessment prior to performing activities involving a man basket in the vicinity of the T1 transformer. The licensee has entered this performance deficiency into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2010-4689.

The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to perform a risk assessment and implement appropriate risk management actions was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone. It directly affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Additionally, if left uncorrected, the practice of not adequately evaluating crane activities in the vicinity of safety-related equipment by appropriately trained individuals would become a more significant safety concern. Specifically, in that it could result in a more than minimal increase in risk associated with other risk important equipment that would not be identified and not result in appropriate actions being taken. The inspectors evaluated this finding using the Appendix K, "Maintenance Risk Assessment, and Risk Management Significance Determination Process" worksheets of Manual Chapter 0609 because the finding is a maintenance risk assessment issue. Flowchart 1, "Assessment of Risk Deficit," requires the inspectors to determine the risk deficit associated with this issue. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the incremental

core damage probability deficit was less than 1×10^{-6} . Because of the confusion with performing a risk assessment with a crane but not with a man basket, the finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with resources in that the licensee failed to provide complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures.

Inspection Report# : [2010005](#) (pdf)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Nov 17, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Maintain Licensed Operator Examination Integrity

The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 55.49, "Integrity of Examinations and Tests," for the failure of the licensee to ensure that the integrity of an operating test administered to licensed operators was maintained. Two licensed operators received five job performance measures for their retake operating tests that had been potentially compromised during earlier weeks when this week's operating test book was left out and uncontrolled overnight in the training building. These job performance measures were removed from the operating tests for subsequent weeks and a condition report was written to ensure that these job performance measures were not used in subsequent weeks. However, these actions did not prevent these job performance measures from being used for the retake operating tests for two licensed operators that failed previous operating tests. This resulted in a compromise of operating test integrity because control of these items was lost; however, it did not lead to an actual effect on the equitable and consistent administration of the examination. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2010-5977.

The failure of the licensee's training staff to maintain the integrity of examinations administered to licensed operations personnel was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency is more than minor, and therefore a finding, because it adversely impacted the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Additionally, if left uncorrected, it could have become more significant in that allowing untested licensed operators (in this case, operators that had the potential to have an invalid test because of the lack of examination integrity) at the controls could be a precursor to a more significant event if undetected performance deficiencies develop. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Phase 1 worksheets, and the corresponding Appendix I, "Licensed Operator Requalification Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because, although the finding resulted in a compromise of the integrity of operating test job performance measures and compensatory actions were not immediately taken when the compromise should have been discovered in 2009, the equitable and consistent administration of the exam was not actually impacted by this compromise. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with corrective actions because the licensee did not take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues in that an operating test compromise issue occurred that was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2009 4066. This corrective action document stated that these compromised items shall not be used on any subsequent operating tests for that cycle and they were subsequently used on the 2009 annual operating test.

Inspection Report# : [2010005](#) (pdf)

Significance:  Oct 04, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Properly Apply an Approved ASME Code Case

The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.55a(b)(5)(i) because the licensee failed to adequately apply ASME Section XI Code Case N-513-2 when they evaluated a degraded section of raw water piping for operability. The licensee has entered this performance deficiency in the corrective action program as Condition

The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to adequately apply ASME Code Case N-513-2 was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and it directly affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Additionally, if left uncorrected, improper application of an approved code case would become a more significant safety concern in that it could result in the failure to identify inoperable safety related piping. Because this finding occurred while the unit was operating at full power, the inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 to determine its significance. Using Attachment 4 of that chapter, the inspectors determined that this finding has a very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, does not represent an actual loss of safety function, nor did it screen as potentially risk significant for external events. Because the licensee revised an old operability determination and did not recognize that the code case application was incorrect, the finding had crosscutting aspects in the area of human performance associated with decision-making in that the licensee failed to make safety-significant or risk-significant decisions using a systematic process.

Inspection Report# : [2010005](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Sep 30, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Documentation of the Adequacy of Design for the Pumps that Transfer Fuel Oil from Storage Tank FO-10 to FO-01

The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria III due to the failure of the licensee to perform suitable testing to determine the adequacy of the design of equipment related to transferring diesel fuel from one storage tank to another. Specifically, the inspectors questioned whether fuel oil transfer pump FO-37 or a portable hand pump to be used in the event that FO-37 was unavailable to transfer fuel from storage tank FO-10 to FO-1 would be able to perform the design function. No calculations or previous testing documentation could be provided and when tested to demonstrate that the portable hand pump could perform the intended design function, the portable hand pump failed. Subsequently, the licensee evaluated that fuel oil transfer pump FO-37 is adequately designed to transfer fuel oil from FO-10 to FO-1. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Reports 2010-3123, 2010-3921, and 2010-4315.

The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to provide calculations or testing documentation that fuel oil transfer pump FO-37 or the designated portable hand pump could perform the intended design function was a performance deficiency. This finding is greater than minor because it affected the Mitigating System Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences, and the equipment performance attribute to maintain availability and reliability of the diesel generators. Because this finding occurred while the unit was operating at full power, the inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 to determine its significance. Using Attachment 4 of that chapter, the inspectors determined that this finding has a very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, does not represent an actual loss of safety function nor did it screen as potentially risk significant for external events. Since the finding is not indicative of current licensee performance, there is no crosscutting aspect assigned to this finding.

Inspection Report# : [2010004](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Sep 30, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Perform Vendor and Industry Recommended Testing on Safety-Related and Risk Significant 4160 V and 480 V Circuit Breakers

The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.8.1(a) for inadequate procedures associated with 4160 V and 480 V safety-related breaker maintenance procedures. The inspectors determined that maintenance procedures used to ensure that 4160 V and 480 V safety-related breakers were being maintained and overhauled in a timely manner were inadequate. The licensee did not have an engineering analysis or technical basis to justify the deviation from vendor and/or Electric Power Research Institute guidance. The inspectors determined that this issue affected the procedure quality attribute for maintenance procedures of the Mitigating System Cornerstone of

reactor safety. Specifically, the issue was more than minor because the failure to incorporate the vendor required maintenance and frequency or fully incorporate Electric Power Research Institute maintenance recommendations for extending the service interval into maintenance procedures for safety related breakers. If left uncorrected, this failure affected the availability, reliability, and capability of mitigating systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences because the reliability of safety-related breakers refurbished using the deficient procedures cannot be predicted. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Condition Report 2009-2306.

Using the Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Screening Worksheet, for the Initiating Events, Mitigating Systems, and Barriers Cornerstones the finding was potentially risk significant for multiple systems. Because the probability of multiple system effects is not effectively addressed by a Phase 2 analysis, a Phase 3 analysis was performed. The analyst determined that while the licensee failed to perform adequate maintenance on the breakers, the actual failure rate of the breakers was no greater than the theoretical design failure rate. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the deficiency did not result in any loss of function. The finding was not risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather-initiating event and because other plant-specific analyses that identify core damage scenarios of concern were not impacted. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution because the licensee did not effectively incorporate pertinent industry operating experience into the preventive maintenance programs for the 4160 V and 480 V safety-related and risk significant non-safety-related circuit breakers.

Inspection Report# : [2010004](#) (pdf)

Significance:  Sep 30, 2010

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Maintenance Procedure Results in a Plant Shutdown

A self-revealing Green noncited violation of Fort Calhoun Station Technical Specification 5.8.1 occurred for an inadequate procedure for verifying the connection between cable lugs and cables. This inadequacy resulted in the loss of Motor Control Center MCC-3A1 and a subsequent plant shutdown. The licensee repaired the affected equipment and entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2010-4423.

The inspectors determined that the licensee's inadequate maintenance procedure was a performance deficiency. This finding was greater than minor because it was similar to a non-minor example 4.b in Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," in that a procedural error caused a reactor trip or other transient. Because this finding occurred while the unit was operating at full power, the inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 to determine its significance. Using Attachment 4 of that chapter, the inspectors determined that this finding has very low safety significance because all of the items in Table 4a, of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone checklist, were answered in the negative. Since the finding is not indicative of current licensee performance, there is no crosscutting aspect assigned to this finding

Inspection Report# : [2010004](#) (pdf)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATIONS FOR HIGH RIVER LEVEL

The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2)(ii)(B) for the failure to include an adequate limiting condition for operation in the technical specification. Specifically, the reactor cannot be placed in a cold shutdown condition using normal operating procedures when the river level exceeds 1009 feet mean sea level, as required by Technical Specification 2.16. This violation has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program to determine the appropriate limiting condition for operation.

The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to include an adequate limiting condition for operation in the technical specification was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it affected the protection against external events attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent

undesirable consequences, in that the reactor cannot be placed in a cold shutdown condition using normal operating procedures when the river level exceeds 1009 feet mean sea level. Because this finding occurred while the unit was operating at full power, the inspectors used Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, to determine its significance. Using Attachment 1 of that appendix, the inspectors determined that this finding had very low risk significance because the finding did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event, using the criteria included in Exhibit 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609 Attachment 4. Since the finding is not indicative of current licensee performance, there is no crosscutting area assigned to this finding.

Inspection Report# : [2010003](#) (pdf)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2010

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Correct Repeated Tripping of the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump FW-10

A self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," occurred for the licensee's failure to assure that a condition adverse to quality was corrected. Specifically, five instances were identified where the licensee failed to correct an adverse configuration design which allowed the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump FW-10 exhaust backpressure trip reset lever to be bumped and unlatched which would have prevented the pump from starting when required. The failure to correct this adverse condition resulted in the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump reset lever becoming unlatched and causing the pump to trip off during a surveillance test start attempt on February 17, 2010. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report CR-2010-0813.

The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 – Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," the issue screened as potentially risk significant since the finding represented a loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time. The finding required a Phase 2 analysis. When evaluated per Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations," and the Fort Calhoun Phase 2 pre-solved table item, "Turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Fails to Start," the inspectors determined this finding to be potentially risk significant. A Phase 3 analysis was performed and it was determined that the finding was of very low risk significance. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with the corrective action program component because the licensee's periodic trends and assessments did not recognize the significance of precursor events related to bumping the reset lever and prompt action to prevent further problems with the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump FW-10.

Inspection Report# : [2010006](#) (pdf)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Verify that the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Exhaust Backpressure Trip Lever was Fully Latched

The team identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.8.1.a regarding the licensee's failure to implement written procedures as recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Paragraph 3.1 of Appendix A requires procedures for startup, shutdown and operation of the auxiliary feedwater system. Specifically, the licensee had no procedural guidance to verify full engagement of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump FW-10 exhaust backpressure trip mechanism when latched. This resulted in the licensee's failure to identify the partially latched condition of the exhaust trip mechanism which subsequently vibrated loose during a surveillance test causing a start failure of the pump, on February 17, 2010. The licensee entered this deficiency in their corrective action program as Condition Report CR 2010 0813.

This finding is greater than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of

procedural quality and it affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 – Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," the issue screened as very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency that resulted in a loss of operability or functionality, did not create a loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time and did not affect seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating events. The finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution associated with operating experience because the licensee failed to implement and institutionalize operating experience through changes to station operating procedures when they failed to incorporate industry information to verify the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is fully latched.

Inspection Report# : [2010006](#) (pdf)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2010

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Vent Control Oil Following Maintenance Results in Failure of Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump to Start.

A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.8.1.a was identified regarding the licensee's failure to implement and maintain the applicable procedures recommended in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978. Paragraph 9.a of Appendix A requires that such maintenance that can affect the performance of safety-related equipment be properly preplanned and performed in accordance with documented instructions. Specifically, the licensee failed to have an adequate procedure for ensuring air was vented from the auxiliary feedwater pump control oil system following maintenance. As a result, the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump failed to start during the February 26, 2009, operability test. The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action program as Condition Report CR 2009 0905.

The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating System Cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," the finding was found to have very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design deficiency; did not represent loss of a safety function, loss of a single train for greater than its allowed outage time, or loss of a non-technical specification required train of equipment; and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with conservative assumptions due to the licensee failing to identify possible unintended consequences of high points in a control oil system tubing design change that could become air bound and interfere with fast starts of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump.

Inspection Report# : [2010006](#) (pdf)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2010

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Trip Due to Inadequate Design Margin

A self-revealing noncited violation of 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," occurred when the licensee failed to ensure that the design basis of certain structures, systems and components were translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions when implementing Engineering Change 45105. Specifically, this design change reduced the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump's margin between the pump discharge pressure and the pump's high discharge pressure trip set-point resulting in an April 6, 2009, high pump discharge pressure trip during a scheduled surveillance test start. The licensee entered this issue in their corrective action program as Condition Report CR 2009 1611.

The inspectors determined the finding is more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using

Manual Chapter 0609.04, "Phase 1 – Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," the issue screened as potentially risk significant since the finding represented a loss of system safety function of a single train for greater than the technical specification allowed outage time. The finding required a Phase 2 analysis. When evaluated per Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Determining the Significance of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations," and the Fort Calhoun Phase 2 presolved table item, "Turbine-driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Fails to Start," the inspectors determined this finding to be potentially risk significant. The finding was forwarded to a senior reactor analyst for review. A Phase 3 analysis was performed and it was determined that the finding was of very low risk significance. The finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance because the licensee failed to use conservative assumptions in decision making when a nonconservative design margin was approved and implemented on the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump.

Inspection Report# : [2010006](#) (pdf)

Significance: Y Jun 21, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: VIO Violation

Failure to Maintain External Flood Procedures

Yellow. The inspectors identified an apparent violation of Technical Specification 5.8.1.a, "Procedures," for failure to establish and maintain procedures that protect the intake structure and auxiliary building during external flooding events. The inspectors determined that the procedural guidance of GM-RR-AE-1002, "Flood Control Preparedness for Sandbagging," was inadequate because stacking and draping sandbags at a height of four feet over the top of floodgates would be insufficient to protect the vital facilities to 1014 feet mean sea level, as described in Updated Safety Analysis Report and station procedures. The licensee has entered this condition into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2010-2387. As result of this violation, the licensee has implemented a corrective action plan to correct identified deficiencies and ensure site readiness.

This performance deficiency is more than minor because it adversely affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of external events and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined the finding resulted in the degradation of equipment and functions specifically designed to mitigate a flooding initiating event. In addition, an external flood event would degrade two or more trains of a multi-train safety system. Therefore, the finding was potentially risk significant to flood initiators and a Phase 3 analysis was required. The preliminary change in core damage frequency was calculated to be $3.1E-5$ /year indicating that the finding was of substantial safety significance (Yellow). The finding was determined to have a crosscutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, corrective action program, for failure to take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues and adverse trends in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance and complexity. Specifically, from 2003 to 2008, the licensee failed to initiate appropriate corrective actions to ensure regulatory compliance of the external flooding design basis was maintained. [P.1(d)] (Section 40A5.1)

ERRATA - 10/19/10 issued IR 05000285/2010008-01 to document final significance determination process letter.

Inspection Report# : [2010008](#) (pdf)

Inspection Report# : [2010007](#) (pdf)

Barrier Integrity

Significance: G Sep 30, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Translate Calculation into Calibration Procedure

The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," which states, in part, "Measures shall be established to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2 and as specified in the license application, for those structures, systems, and components for which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions."

Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to assure that applicable regulatory requirements and the design basis, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2 and as specified in the license application, for those structures, systems, and components for which this appendix applies are correctly translated into specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, since January 2009, the licensee failed to correctly translate results of Calculation FC 05561, "CCW Relief Valve Setpoints," into calibration procedures used to calibrate pressure control switches PCS-412 and PCS-413. The licensee has entered this violation into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2010-3658.

The inspectors determined that the failure to correctly translate the results of the setpoint calculation into calibration procedures and instructions as required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control" is a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it adversely affected the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that the physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Additionally, the finding was more than minor because the finding resulted in a condition where there was a reasonable doubt on the operability of the component cooling water system containment isolation valves. Using Phase 1 of Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," the finding was determined to have very low safety significance (Green) because the finding only represents a degradation of the radiological barrier function provided for the auxiliary building. This finding has a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance work practice because the licensee failed to define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel following procedures. Specifically, in January 2009, the licensee failed to effectively communicate expectations regarding personnel following procedures to implement calculation changes.

Inspection Report# : [2010004](#) (*pdf*)

Emergency Preparedness

Significance:  Jun 30, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Conduct an Adequate Audit of Emergency Preparedness Interfaces with Offsite Authorities

The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.54(t)(2) for the failure to conduct an evaluation of the adequacy of interfaces between the licensee and state and local governments during a periodic review of the site emergency preparedness program. Specifically, the quality assurance audit team, for the February 2010 emergency preparedness audit, did not evaluate the adequacy of interfaces with offsite agencies and did not contact state or local emergency management or radiological health agencies during the audit to obtain information about their working relationships with the licensee. The licensee has placed this violation in their corrective action program as Condition Report 2010-2078.

This finding is more than minor because it affected the offsite emergency preparedness attribute of the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone objective. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was a failure to comply with an NRC requirement and was not associated with the planning standards of 10 CFR 50.47(b). This finding is associated with the resources component of the human performance crosscutting area [H.2(b)]

Inspection Report# : [2010003](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

FAILURE TO CONDUCT DRILLS TO MAINTAIN ENVIRONMENTAL MONITORING SKILLS

The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14) for the failure to conduct drills that were adequate to maintain key skills. Specifically, environmental monitoring teams were not required to collect environmental samples during the 2008 and 2009 annual environmental monitoring drills. The licensee has placed this violation in their corrective action program as Condition Report 2010-2055.

This finding is more than minor because it affected the emergency response organization performance and procedure quality cornerstone attributes of the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone objective. The finding is of very low safety

significance because it is a failure to comply with NRC requirements, was associated with nonrisk significant planning standard 10 CFR 50.47(b)(14), and was not a functional failure of the planning standard. This finding is associated with the resources component of the human performance crosscutting area

Inspection Report# : [2010003](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATION PROCESSES ALLOW FOR THE UNNECESSARY EVACUATION OF THE PUBLIC

The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(10) and 50.54(q) for the failure to develop and put into place guidelines for the choice of protective actions during an emergency that were consistent with federal guidance. Specifically, the licensee's methodology for determining protective action recommendations could result in recommendations to evacuate members of the public in areas where dose projections did not exceed EPA protective action guides. The licensee has placed this violation in their corrective action program as Condition Report 2010-2174.

This finding is more than minor because it adversely affected the emergency response organization performance and procedure quality cornerstone attributes of the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone objective. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was a failure to comply with NRC requirements, is a finding associated with a risk significant planning standard, and is not a risk significant planning standard functional failure or degraded function. This finding was associated with the operating experience component of the problem identification and resolution crosscutting area [P.2(a)]

Inspection Report# : [2010003](#) (*pdf*)

Occupational Radiation Safety

Significance:  Sep 30, 2010

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Follow Radiation Work Permit Requirements

The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.8.1, for failure to follow radiation work permit requirements. On November 13, 2009, two individuals became contaminated while cleaning the gasket seating surface on the endbell of the letdown heat exchanger because they did not use face shields as required by the radiation work permit. The licensee immediately restricted the two individuals from entry into the radiologically controlled area, conducted a coaching session with the individuals involved and placed this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2009-5688.

The failure to follow the instructions listed on a radiation work permit was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute (exposure control) of program and process and affected the cornerstone objective, in that, the failure to follow radiation work permit instructions increased personnel dose. Using the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspectors determined the finding to have very low safety significance because: (1) it was not associated with ALARA planning or work controls, (2) there was no overexposure, (3) there was no substantial potential for an overexposure, and (4) the ability to assess dose was not compromised. The finding has a human performance crosscutting aspect associated with work practices, human error prevention techniques, because the individuals failed to use self and peer checking to ensure they were signed onto the appropriate task for the work to be performed. [H.4 (a)]

Inspection Report# : [2010004](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Sep 30, 2010

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Properly Plan a Maintenance Activity

The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing, noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.8.1, for failure to appropriately control radiation exposures due to improperly planned maintenance activities associated with Work Package 09-AP-20. The maintenance work involved valve modifications and boric acid system cleanups. These activities resulted in exceeding the original dose estimate by more than 50 percent. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Reports 2009-6171, 2009-6264 and 2010-1696.

The failure to properly plan maintenance activities to minimize personnel radiation dose is a performance deficiency. This finding is greater than minor because it affected the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of program and process in that ALARA planning or radiological controls did not prevent unplanned, unintended dose for a work activity. This caused increased collective radiation dose for the job activity to exceed the planned dose of approximately 14 rem by more than 50 percent. Using the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the inspector determined this finding to be of very low safety significance because the finding involved ALARA planning and controls and the licensee's latest rolling 3-year average does not exceed 135 person-rem. This finding had an associated human performance crosscutting aspect in the work practices component because the licensee did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including the contractor, to maintain doses ALARA.

Inspection Report# : [2010004](#) (pdf)

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Submit a Required Licensee Event Report

The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV noncited violation for the failure to submit a licensee event report within 60 days as required by 10 CFR 50.73. Specifically, the diesel fuel oil storage system was inoperable for approximately 24 hours from January 6, 2010, until January 7, 2010. On January 6, 2010, fuel oil transfer pump FO-37 was inoperable due to a fire main rupture submerging the pump for approximately 24 hours. With no other means to transfer fuel from storage tank FO-10 to FO-1, the fuel oil storage system was inoperable, and the fuel volume in FO-10 was unavailable. This was reportable condition required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by technical specifications. The licensee performed a reportability evaluation, and the violation was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2010-3865.

The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to submit a licensee event report was a performance deficiency. The inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612 and the NRC Enforcement Manual. Through this review, the inspectors determined that traditional enforcement was applicable to this issue because the NRC's regulatory ability was potentially affected. Specifically, the NRC relies on licensees to identify and report conditions or events meeting the criteria specified in regulations in order to perform its regulatory function, and when this is not done the regulatory function is impacted, and is therefore more than minor. The

inspectors determined that this finding was not suitable for evaluation using the significance determination process, and as such, was evaluated for traditional enforcement only in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. This is a Severity Level IV violation as defined in Section 2.2.1.c of the NRC Enforcement Policy

Inspection Report# : [2010004](#) (pdf)

Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Update the Updated Safety Analysis Report – Solid Waste

The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV, noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.71, “Maintenance of Records, Making of Reports,” paragraph (e) which states, in part, “Each person licensed to operate a nuclear power reactor shall update periodically the final safety analysis report originally submitted as part of the application for the license, to assure that the information included in the report contains the latest information developed.” Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to update periodically the Updated Safety Analysis Report originally submitted as part of the application for the license, to assure that the information included in the report contains the latest information developed. Specifically, since December 2006, the licensee stored a significant source of radioactivity in the original steam generator storage facility but failed to describe the source, volume, and storage of radioactive equipment in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. The licensee has entered this violation into their corrective action program as Condition Report 2010-3636.

The inspectors determined that the failure to update the Updated Safety Analysis Report as required by 10 CFR 50.71 (e), “Maintenance of Records, Making of Reports” was a performance deficiency. This finding was evaluated using traditional enforcement because it had the potential for impacting the NRC’s ability to perform its regulatory function. The finding was more than minor because it had a material impact on licensed activities in that a radioactive solid waste storage facility was relocated from the plant radiological controlled area to the owner controlled area without being described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. The finding was characterized as a Severity Level IV violation in accordance with Section 6.1.d.3 of the NRC Enforcement Policy
Inspection Report# : [2010004](#) (pdf)

Significance: SL-IV Sep 30, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Perform a 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation

The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV violation of 10 CFR 50.59 after the licensee failed to perform an adequate evaluation to demonstrate that prior NRC approval was not required before making changes to the facility as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report. On April 9, 2010, the licensee changed the facility as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report to install a cable splice in a safety related cable without determining if prior NRC approval was required. The licensee took actions to make the modification temporary until a permanent repair could be made and entered the issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report 2010-4466.

Fort Calhoun Station utilizes NEI 96-07 as their process to meet 10 CFR 50.59 requirements. Their failure to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, in accordance with NEI 96 07, prior to changing the facility as described in the Updated Safety Analysis Report is a performance deficiency. The inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612 and the NRC Enforcement Manual. Through this review, the inspectors determined that traditional enforcement was applicable to this issue because the NRC's regulatory ability was potentially affected. Specifically, the NRC relies on licensees to identify and report conditions or events meeting the criteria specified in regulations in order to perform its regulatory function, and when this is not done the regulatory function is impacted, and is therefore more than minor. The inspectors determined that this finding was not suitable for evaluation using the significance determination process, and as such, was evaluated for Traditional Enforcement only in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The inspectors concluded that the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation would have likely identified that prior NRC approval would have been required, unless the change to the facility was for a short duration of time. This was due to the introduction of additional potential failure mechanisms of the splices that are age-dependent. Since the licensee subsequently classified the cable splice as a temporary modification, and scheduled to be removed during the next refueling outage, the aging mechanisms would no longer be applicable. Therefore, this is a Severity Level IV violation as defined in Section 2.2.1.c of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Inspection Report# : [2010004](#) (pdf)

Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

FAILURE TO SUBMIT A REQUIRED LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

The inspectors identified a noncited violation for the failure to submit a licensee event report within 60 days of discovery of an event as required by 10 CFR 50.73. Specifically, the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, FW 10, was inoperable from February 26 until April 6, 2009, which is a reportable condition required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) as a condition prohibited by technical specifications. On March 11, 2009, the electric motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump, FW-6, was inoperable for approximately four hours when diesel generator 1 was inoperable. With both auxiliary feedwater pumps simultaneously inoperable, this was a reportable condition required by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v) as an event that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. The licensee entered this violation into their corrective action program, completed a reportability evaluation and determined that a licensee event report was required to be submitted within 60 days of April 6, 2009, and had not been submitted. The licensee event report will be submitted prior to August 10, 2010.

The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to submit a Licensee Event Report was a performance deficiency. The inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612 and the NRC Enforcement Manual. Through this review, the inspectors determined that traditional enforcement was applicable to this issue because the NRC's regulatory ability was potentially affected. Specifically, the NRC relies on licensees to identify and report conditions or events meeting the criteria specified in regulations in order to perform its regulatory function, and when this is not done the regulatory function is impacted, and is therefore a finding. The inspectors determined that this finding was not suitable for evaluation using the significance determination process, and as such, was evaluated for traditional enforcement only in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. This is a Severity Level IV noncited violation consistent with Section IV.A.3 and Supplement I, Paragraph D.4, of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Inspection Report# : [2010003](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: SL-IV Mar 31, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Reportability Guidance

Severity Level IV. The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV noncited violation of Fort Calhoun Technical Specification 5.8.1 for inadequate corrective action documents. Specifically, the documents do not adequately address assigning reportability evaluations. As a result, the licensee failed to evaluate the reportability of a condition that was determined to be reportable until questioned by the inspectors.

The inspectors determined that the licensee's inadequate corrective action documents were a performance deficiency. The inspectors reviewed this issue in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0612 and the NRC Enforcement Policy. Through this review, the inspectors determined that traditional enforcement was applicable to this issue because the NRC's regulatory ability was potentially affected. Specifically, the NRC relies on the licensees to identify and report conditions or events meeting the criteria specified in regulations in order to perform its regulatory function, and when this is not done the regulatory function is impacted, and is therefore a finding. The inspectors determined that this finding was not suitable for evaluation using the significance determination process, and as such, was evaluated in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy. The finding was reviewed by NRC management and due in part to its repetitive nature the violation was determined to be of more than minor significance, however since it was not found to be willful, and was entered into the corrective action program, this violation is being treated as a Severity Level IV noncited violation consistent with the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Inspection Report# : [2010002](#) (*pdf*)

Last modified : March 03, 2011