

D.C. Cook 2

4Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Oct 21, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate As-Found Heat Exchanger Inspection Guidance and Acceptance Criteria

The inspectors identified a finding having very low safety-significance and an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the licensee's failure to establish inspection procedures that were appropriate for the circumstances. Specifically, the licensee's heat exchanger inspection guidance and acceptance criteria could potentially result in the design basis tube plugging limit being exceeded due to the accumulation of macro fouling and as a result the heat exchanger would not be able to meet the design basis heat removal capability. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program and a review of the heat exchanger tube plugging analysis identified additional margin to remain within its design basis heat removal capability.

The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it would have the potential to lead to a more significant safety concern. This finding was of very low safety-significance (Green) because the licensee was able to demonstrate adequate margin and therefore there was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because the licensee did not use conservative assumptions in decision making when developing the inspection guidance and acceptance criteria.

Inspection Report# : [2010006](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Mar 31, 2010

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

Failure to Implement Plant Procedures for Using a Mobile Crane

A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed for the failure to implement procedures for using mobile cranes and the failure to use human error prevention tools. Consequently, a mobile crane boom contacted and severed the middle phase of an overhead 12 kilovolt line in the owner controlled area 'W' yard. This caused a loss of power to the fire pump house, which rendered the electric fire pump inoperable. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Action Request 00860140. No violation of NRC requirements occurred.

This finding was more than minor because it was related to the external factors attribute (fire) of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability of systems that respond to initiating events. Specifically, the electric fire pump was rendered inoperable and unavailable when power was lost to the fire pump house, which degraded the fire protection defense-in-depth strategies. The finding was of very low safety significance because the fire protection system performance was not affected in that both diesel-driven fire pumps were operable. (H.4(c))

Inspection Report# : [2010002](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Mar 31, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Implement Corrective Actions in a timely and Effective Manner

The inspectors identified one finding of very low safety significance with an associated Non Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action." Specifically, licensee personnel failed to implement corrective actions for water intrusion into vaults below motor control centers containing safety related cabling in a timely and effective manner. Consequently, safety-related cabling was exposed to a water environment that if left uncorrected could result in subsequent cable degradation. For corrective action, the licensee performed an inspection of all cable vaults throughout the plant. Also, licensee personnel initiated a root cause evaluation to focus on the leadership and organizational failures associated with the response to the wetted cables in the 1-ABD-A cable vault and the thoroughness of the extent of condition evaluation. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as CR AR 2010-2558.

This finding affected the Mitigating Events cornerstone and was more than minor because the issue could become a more significant safety concern if left uncorrected. Specifically, failure to implement corrective actions for water intrusion into cable vaults could result in subsequent degradation of safety-related cabling. This finding was of very low safety significance because the finding does not constitute a design or qualification deficiency, did not result in a loss of system safety function, and did not meet the seismic, flooding, and severe weather screening criteria. This finding was associated with a cross cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution – corrective action program (P.1(c)).

Inspection Report# : [2010002](#) (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Dec 31, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Properly Preplan and Perform Maintenance on Safety-related Equipment

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance with an associated Non Cited Violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for the failure to adequately preplan and perform maintenance on the containment building divider barrier seal in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.33. Specifically, the work package to perform maintenance on the containment divider barrier seal did not contain sufficient guidance. Consequently, that seal was reinstalled improperly and was unknowingly inoperable on November 30, 2010, when the plant was placed in an operating mode (Mode 4) in which the seal was required to be operable per TS 3.6.13. This issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as 201012968.

This finding affected the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and was more than minor because it was sufficiently similar to more than minor example 5.a in the Inspector Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, and the issue could adversely affect the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that the containment protects the public from radionuclides releases caused by accidents or events. This finding was of very low safety significance because the plant had appropriately met the safety function guidelines for core heat removal, inventory control, power availability, containment integrity, and reactivity control. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the work practices component of the human performance cross-cutting area. Specifically, supervisory and management oversight of work activities were inadequate to ensure the containment divider barrier seal modification was properly installed.

Inspection Report# : [2010005](#) (*pdf*)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : March 03, 2011