

# Hatch 1

## 3Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings

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### Initiating Events

**Significance:**  Jun 30, 2010

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Failure to follow corrective action program procedure and prevent recurrence of severity level 2 root cause**

•Green. A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures and Drawings, was identified for the licensee's failure to follow their corrective action program procedure, NMP-GM-002, Ver. 4.0, that required severity level 1 and 2 condition reports (CR) to have corrective actions that prevent recurrence. From May 2006 to April 2010 licensee procedure NMP-GM-002, Corrective Action Program, Ver. 4.0, was not followed because corrective actions to prevent recurrence were not implemented prior to failure of Analog Transmitter Trip System (ATTS) card 1B21-N690C. The licensee's immediate corrective actions were to replace the failed card, 1B21-641C, the adjacent card 1B21-N690C and the high drywell pressure trip cards 1E11-N694A and C. The licensee initiated CR 2010105161 to address this issue.

The performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the Initiating Events cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. Specifically, the failure of ATTS card 1B21-N641C resulted in a spurious Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) signal that started Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) equipment and resulted in a power reduction to approximately 85%. Due to this finding affecting the safety of an operating reactor, the significance of this finding was screened using NRC IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Table 4a. Because the finding contributed to the likelihood of a reactor scram, but did not affect mitigation equipment availability, the finding screened as Green. The inspectors concluded that the performance deficiency does not have an associated cross-cutting aspect because the performance deficiency occurred in 2006 and is not indicative of the licensee's current performance in the area of root cause investigations. (Section 1R12)

Inspection Report# : [2010003](#) (*pdf*)

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### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Jun 30, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Failure to maintain safety related cables in a non-submerged environment**

•Green. The NRC identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, for the licensee's failure implement measures to assure that safety-related cables remained in an environment for which they were designed. Safety-related cables purchased and installed in underground electrical pull boxes at Hatch Nuclear Plant have been subjected to submergence, a condition for which they are not designed. To address this issue the licensee has performed the immediate corrective action of increasing the frequency of measuring water level and pump down of the pull boxes. The licensee initiated CR 2010104298 to address this issue.

This performance deficiency is more than minor because it is associated with the Design Control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, it is reasonable to conclude the cables may be in a degraded condition where the continued reliability of the cable cannot be ensured because: 1) the

licensee does not have a cable testing/monitoring program to detect degradation of inaccessible or underground power cables; 2) the cables have been subject to a submerged physical environment which is outside the cables design parameters; and 3) there have been documented failures of cables throughout the nuclear industry due to degradation caused by submergence in water. Because the finding affects the safety of an operating reactor, the significance of this finding was screened using the Phase 1 of the SDP in accordance with NRC IMC 0609, Attachment 4, Table 4a. The finding screened as Green, because the finding is a design or qualification deficiency confirmed not to result in loss of operability or functionality. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the Work Control component of the Human Performance area, because the licensee did not appropriately coordinate activities by incorporating actions where maintenance scheduling is more preventive than reactive. Specifically, the licensee did not schedule performance of procedure 52PM-Y46-001-0, Inground Pull Box and Cable Duct Inspection for Water, at a frequency that prevented safety related cable submersion (H.3(b)). (Section 1R06)

Inspection Report# : [2010003](#) (*pdf*)

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## **Barrier Integrity**

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## **Emergency Preparedness**

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## **Occupational Radiation Safety**

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## **Public Radiation Safety**

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## **Physical Protection**

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

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## **Miscellaneous**

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