

Catawba 2

3Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance:  Sep 30, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to adequately control transient combustible material in accordance with the fire protection program

An NRC-identified Green NCV of the Fire Protection Program (FPP) was identified when transient combustible materials of greater than 15 pounds and located near an ignition source were stored in the Unit 2 electrical penetration room without prior review and approval as required by NSD 313, Control of Combustible and Flammable Material. The issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Problem Investigation Program report (PIP) C-10-5521.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of fire and adversely affected the cornerstone objective in that the adjacent 600V pressurizer heater breaker panel could ignite the combustibles and cause damage to safety-related containment pressure transmitters. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the transient combustibles did not involve low flash point liquids or self igniting material. This finding was associated with the cross-cutting aspect of the licensee defining and effectively communicating expectations regarding procedural compliance in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance area because the requirements of NSD 313 were not clearly communicated [H.4(b)]. (Section 1R05)

Inspection Report# : [2010004](#) (*pdf*)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Dec 31, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Underground Fuel Oil Storage Tank Vent Tornado Missile Protection

A NRC-identified Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, was identified in that the installed emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil storage tank vents did not meet the design basis of bending without crimping. The licensee completed corrective actions to install tornado missile protection to prevent crimping of the vents.

The licensee's failure to correctly translate the licensing basis into specifications for the vent piping was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone design control attribute and adversely impacted the cornerstone objective in that the vent piping could bend and completely crimp on impact of a tornado generated soft missile. A Phase 3 analysis was required because the finding involved the loss or degradation of equipment or function specifically designed to mitigate a severe weather initiating event. A qualitative assessment was performed to determine the risk significance because factors required for determining the risk were not easily quantifiable. Based on the qualitative assessment, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). A cross-cutting aspect for this issue was not identified as it was determined to be a legacy design issue and not indicative of current licensee performance. (Section 4OA5.3)

Inspection Report# : [2009005](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: **G** Oct 15, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to monitor the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump sump valves for units 1 and 2

The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) for the licensee's failure to monitor the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump (CAPT) sump valves for Units 1 and 2. PIPs C-09-05020 and C-09-04390 initiated immediate corrective actions, including testing of the subject valves during the inspection, wherein valve 1WL848 failed to stroke. Additionally, the licensee increased the maintenance category of the affected components and made procedural modifications to provide positive valve position controls.

The team determined that the licensee's failure to monitor the performance and condition of Valve 1WL848 was a performance deficiency. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to perform periodic testing or preventative maintenance resulted in a lack of reasonable assurance that the valves would perform their function of protecting CAPT. The team determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) using the SDP because the finding did not represent an actual loss of safety function. This finding was reviewed for cross-cutting aspects and none were identified since the performance deficiency was not indicative of current licensee performance. (Section 1R21.2.5)

Inspection Report# : [2009006](#) (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : November 29, 2010