

Millstone 3

2Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance:  Jun 30, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

FIN 05000423/2010003-03, Reactor Trip Caused by Loss of Positive Control of Steam Generator Level

•Green. A self-revealing finding (FIN) of very low safety significance was identified for Dominion's failure to implement effective corrective actions for known degraded conditions associated with the steam generator (SG) water level control system. Specifically, the instrument control system for the feed regulating bypass valves (FRBV) had not been adequately designed and maintained. The degraded adverse conditions had not been corrected despite prior opportunities. The combination of these degraded conditions led to a reactor trip on May 17, 2010. Dominion entered this issue into their corrective action program.

This finding is more than minor because it was similar to NRC IMC 0612, Appendix E, "Examples of Minor Issues," Example 4F, in that the failure to correct a condition adverse to quality resulted in a reactor trip. It is associated with the Equipment Performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. This finding has very low safety significance (Green) because it did not affect the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program because Dominion did not take appropriate corrective actions to address the longstanding adverse conditions associated with control of the FRBVs. [P.1(d)] (Section 71111.20).

Inspection Report# : [2010003](#) (*pdf*)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Jun 30, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

NCV 05000423/2010003-02 Charging Pump Overheating and Cavitation during RCS Loop Vacuum Fill

•Green. A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings", was identified for Dominion's failure to have an adequate procedure for starting the charging pumps. Specifically, OP 3304A, "Charging and Letdown," did not require verification of Reactor Plant Closed Cooling Water (RPCCW) flow to the seal water heat exchanger. On May 1, 2010, Dominion started the "B" centrifugal charging pump without cooling water supplying the seal return heat exchanger. This caused the charging pump to overheat and cavitate, and resulted in the pump being declared inoperable. Dominion entered this issue into their corrective action program.

This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the configuration control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not result in a loss of safety function, a loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, or a loss of risk significant non-technical specification train of equipment. Additionally, it is not risk significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Work Control because Dominion relied on the work control process to assure that the RPCCW cooling water was in

service to the seal water heat exchanger at the time that the RCS loop vacuum fill was scheduled. The work control process was insufficiently robust to ensure that cooling water was supplied to the seal water heat exchanger during charging pump operations. [H.3.b]. (Section 71111.20)

Inspection Report# : [2010003](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: SL-IV Jun 30, 2010

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

NCV 05000423/2010003-01, Failure to Make a 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)(c) Report for an Inoperable Secondary Containment

•Severity Level IV. The inspectors identified a NCV of 10 CFR 50.72 “Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors” for Dominion’s failure to make a timely eight-hour report for a condition that, at the time of discovery, could have prevented secondary containment from fulfilling its safety function. Dominion took immediate corrective action to restore operability of secondary containment, initiated a 10 CFR 50.72 Report and entered the issue into their corrective action program.

Per NRC Enforcement Policy Supplement I- Reactor Operations, Example D.4, a failure to make a required Licensee Event Report (LER) is categorized as a Severity Level IV violation. The inspectors considered Dominion’s failure to make the required 50.72 report for 5 days to meet the intent of this example. This finding has a cross cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, Decision Making, because Dominion did not use conservative assumptions in their decision making when they could not demonstrate that secondary containment would provide its safety function.[H.1 (b)] (Section 71111.04)

Inspection Report# : [2010003](#) (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : September 02, 2010