

Vogtle 2

1Q/2010 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Mar 31, 2010

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Ineffective corrective action renders Unit 2 CCW pump #4 inoperable

A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) for failure to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI was identified. Specifically, for ineffective corrective maintenance performed on the Unit 2 Component Cooling Water (CCW) Pump #4. The corrective maintenance actions performed on CCW pump #4 in October 2009 to repair damage due to contact between the throttle bushing and the shaft sleeve on the inboard mechanical seal were ineffective, and consequently, the same damage to the inboard mechanical seal occurred in January 2010 when the pump was again operated. As a result, the Unit 2 CCW pump #4 was rendered inoperable for the second time in three months due to the same mechanical seal issue.

This issue was greater than minor because it was associated with a cornerstone attribute and adversely affected the objective of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. Specifically, the performance deficiency was an equipment performance issue which affected the availability, reliability, and capability of the B train emergency core cooling system (ECCS) to respond to a loss of coolant accident (LOCA). The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the event did not represent in an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specification allowed outage time. The inspectors determined that the cause of this finding was related to the Corrective Action Program component of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area due to less-than-adequate problem evaluation [P.1(c)]. Specifically, the corrective maintenance actions used to resolve the mechanical seal issue on CCW pump #4 were less than adequate. (Section 1R12)

Inspection Report# : [2010002](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Sep 30, 2009

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Human performance error renders 2BEDG inoperable

A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for a human performance error associated with inadvertently racking out the 2B emergency diesel generator (EDG) output breaker. The system operator racked out the incorrect breaker while performing lockout 2-DT-09-1217-00289 on the Auxiliary Component Cooling Water (ACCW) system. As a result, the 2B EDG was temporarily rendered inoperable. Licensee immediately restored the 2B EDG to operable status by returning the output breaker to the 'connect' position. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program.

This issue is more than minor because it is associated with a cornerstone attribute and adversely affected the objective of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. Specifically, the performance deficiency is a human performance error which affected the availability, reliability, and capability of the B train emergency core cooling system to respond to a loss of coolant accident during a loss of off-site power. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the event did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time. The inspectors determined that the cause of this finding was related to the Work Practices component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area due to less-than-adequate human error

prevention techniques [H.4(a)]. Specifically, peer checking techniques were less than adequate.

Inspection Report# : [2009004](#) (pdf)

Significance:  Sep 30, 2009

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Human performance error renders NSCW pump #5 inoperable

A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for a human performance error associated with failure of an operator to verify that the discharge valve on the Nuclear Service Cooling Water (NSCW) pump #5 went closed after securing the pump as required by the operating procedure. As a result, NSCW pump #5 was rendered inoperable for several hours. Licensee immediately effected repairs to the discharge valve MOV and returned the NSCW pump #5 to operable status.

This issue is more than minor because it is associated with a cornerstone attribute and adversely affected the objective of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. Specifically, the performance deficiency is a human performance error which affected the availability, reliability, and capability of the A train emergency core cooling system to respond to a loss of coolant accident. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the event did not represent an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time. The inspectors determined that the cause of this finding was related to the Work Practices component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area due to less-than-adequate human error prevention techniques [H.4(a)]. Specifically, self checking techniques were less than adequate.

Inspection Report# : [2009004](#) (pdf)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Sep 30, 2009

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

MOV program procedures were inadequate with regard to periodicity of preventive maintenance activities for stem lubrication

A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was identified. Specifically, Vogtle Electric Generating Plant's (VEGP) MOV preventative maintenance (PM) procedures lacked specific instructions that provided an adequate frequency for performing valve stem lubrication, which resulted in test failures of safety-related MOVs and affected the reliability of the MOVs' safety functions. The licensee removed the hardened grease, re-lubricated and successfully tested the MOVs. They have entered the issue into their corrective action program and are in the process of revising existing maintenance procedures to change the PM frequency from 54 months to 36 months for long stem, safety-related MOV stem lubrication.

The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected other safety related MOVs could be affected by the inadequate stem lubrication PM frequencies. The finding is associated with the configuration control attribute of the Barrier Integrity (BI) Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (e.g., containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, Containment Spray (CS) pump sump suction isolation MOVs experienced test failures and were declared inoperable, which required operability evaluations, thereby challenging their reliability and capability to perform their safety function. Using the Phase 1 worksheet in Attachment 4 of Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process," the finding affected the BI cornerstone and was of very low safety significance (Green) because it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment. Although the CS sump suction MOV's condition affected the mitigating system cornerstone, the finding analysis was assigned to the BI cornerstone because it best reflected the dominant risk of the finding. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of PI&R, Corrective Action Program, because VEGP did not thoroughly evaluate problems such that the

resolutions addressed the causes and extent of condition [P.1(c)]. Specifically, VEGP failed to thoroughly evaluate previous conditions of degraded and hardened grease on safety-related valves, such that the extent of the condition was considered and the cause was resolved.

Inspection Report# : [2009004](#) (*pdf*)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : May 26, 2010