

# Perry 1

## 2Q/2009 Plant Inspection Findings

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### Initiating Events

**Significance:**  Jun 30, 2009

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Inability to Operate RHR common suction Line Valve**

A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was self-revealed for the failure to implement the requirements of licensee (normal operating procedure) NOP OP-1014, "Plant Status Control," Revision 00. Specifically, operations personnel used a mechanical advantage device to operate valve 1E12F0010 without evaluating the affect on the valve. Damage to residual heat removal (RHR) valve 1E12F0010 prevented the plant from entering shutdown cooling. It was determined that the valve operator stem sheared due to excessive torque used to operate the valve. As part of their immediate corrective actions, licensee personnel repaired the valve stem operator to restore shutdown cooling and entered the issue into their corrective action program.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown operations. Specifically, the failure of the RHR shutdown cooling common suction isolation valve caused both trains of shutdown cooling to be unavailable during shutdown operations. Using IMC 0609, Appendix G, "Shutdown Operation Significance Determination Process," Checklist 7, the inspectors determined that the finding did not require a Phase 2 or Phase 3 analysis because the plant had appropriately met the safety function guidelines for core heat removal, inventory control, power availability, containment integrity, and reactivity control. The issue did not need a quantitative assessment and screened as having very low safety significance using Figure 1. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, per IMC 0305 H.4(c) because the licensee did not ensure adequate supervisory and management oversight of work activities to ensure nuclear safety. Specifically, supervisors were aware of the use of mechanical advantage devices on the RHR shutdown cooling common suction manual isolation valve and did not ensure an appropriate evaluation was conducted.

Inspection Report# : [2009003](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Jun 30, 2009

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Near Loss of Shutdown Cooling due to Maintenance Activity**

. A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was self-revealed when technicians performed maintenance on protected equipment without implementing risk management requirements specified in station procedures. This resulted in a loss of shutdown cooling flow to the reactor coolant system. Specifically, the licensee established procedure NOP-OP-1005, "Shutdown Defense in Depth," Revision 10 as the implementing procedure to manage risk during shutdown conditions. The licensee failed to implement the significant risk management actions prescribed in procedure NOP-OP-1005 for maintenance on protected equipment. This resulted in a blown fuse in the reactor protection system causing a loss of shutdown cooling flow to the reactor coolant system. The licensee replaced the fuse and restored shutdown cooling. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as CR 09-58110.

The finding was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the finding resulted in a loss of reactor decay heat removal event while the reactor was shutdown. Using IMC 0609, Appendix G, "Shutdown Operation Significance Determination Process," Checklist 8, the inspectors determined that the finding did

not require a Phase 2 or Phase 3 analysis because the plant had appropriately met the safety function guidelines for core heat removal, inventory control, power availability, containment integrity, and reactivity control. The issue did not need a quantitative assessment and screened as having very low safety significance using Figure 1. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work control, per IMC 0305 H.3(a), because the licensee did not appropriately plan the work activity consistent with nuclear safety, incorporating risk insights, job site conditions, or the need for planned contingencies, compensatory actions, and abort criteria.

Inspection Report# : [2009003](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Jun 30, 2009

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

### **Work on Wrong Relay Potential Impact on Shutdown Cooling**

A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed on April 28, 2009, for the failure to follow maintenance procedure PTI-N41-P0002, "Generator Switchgear Protective Relay Trip Test," when electricians performed maintenance on an incorrect relay associated with bus L11. The licensee posted bus L11 as a protected train and repaired the 1R22-Q103A and 86B circuitry. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program as CR-09-58187.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, had the 1R22-Q103A relay circuitry functioned as designed, a loss of decay heat removal event would have occurred. Using IMC 0609, Appendix G, "Shutdown Operation Significance Determination Process," Checklist 8, the inspectors determined that the finding did not require a Phase 2 or Phase 3 analysis because the plant had appropriately met the safety function guidelines for core heat removal, inventory control, power availability, containment integrity, and reactivity control. The issue did not need a quantitative assessment and screened as having very low safety significance using Figure 1. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, per IMC 0305 H.4(a), because the licensee did not use error prevention techniques commensurate with the risk of the maintenance activity.

Inspection Report# : [2009003](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Mar 31, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **INEFFECTIVE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MOTOR FEEDWATER PUMP IN 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) STATUS**

A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) was identified by the inspectors for the licensee's failure to take reasonable corrective action to avoid recurrence of unavailability of a component in accordance with the maintenance rule. The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to implement the corrective action identified by the expert review panel, after the motor feedwater pump (MFP) did not meet licensee established goals. Specifically, the licensee failed to continuously run a purifier on the MFP lube oil sump to ensure the MFP was capable of fulfilling its intended function. On August 2, 2008, the portable lube oil purifier failed and the licensee did not connect a readily available purifier until after water intrusion into the oil rendered the MFP unavailable on August 7, 2008, and the plant entered YELLOW probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) risk. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program, attached the available lube oil purifier to restore the MFP, and purchased an additional lube oil purifier to ensure the plant would continue to implement the program's corrective action to avoid further MFP unavailability.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during plant operations. Specifically, the failure to implement a corrective action challenged the availability of a risk-significant component with a known degraded

equipment problem and placed the plant in unplanned YELLOW PSA risk. The primary cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution per IMC 0305 P.1(c) because the organization failed to properly prioritize the purification system repair. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance following an SDP review.

Inspection Report# : [2009002](#) (pdf)

**Significance:**  Mar 31, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **INADEQUATE INSPECTIONS ON THE RPV HEAD STRONGBACK LIFTING DEVICE MAJOR LOAD-CARRYING WELDS AND CRITICAL AREAS**

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, "Test Control." The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to perform required nondestructive testing on the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head strongback. Specifically, on February 25, 2009, the licensee failed to conduct a complete nondestructive examination (NDE) of a structural weld associated with the strongback lifting device. As part of their corrective actions, the licensee entered the issue into its corrective action program and performed a functionality assessment of the RPV head strongback, prior to lifting the RPV head, to assure that the strongback could perform its design function.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown operations. Specifically, the purpose of the NDE testing of RPV head strongback major load carrying welds and critical areas is to limit the likelihood of an RPV head strongback structural component failure, and hence, to assure safe load handling of heavy loads over the reactor core or over safety-related systems. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance following a qualitative SDP review. The primary cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting area of Problem Identification and Resolution per IMC 0305 P.1(c), because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate corrective actions to ensure they appropriately addressed the identified issue.

Inspection Report# : [2009002](#) (pdf)

**Significance:**  Mar 31, 2009

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **LOSS OF SERVICE AIRE TO MAIN STEAM LINE PLUGS**

A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of Technical Specification Section 5.4.1 was self-revealed on March 7, 2009, when main steam line plug seal pressure began to drop unexpectedly while the reactor cavity was flooded for refueling operations. Operators failed to conduct an adequate shift turnover regarding the configuration of service air isolation valves to containment affecting the main steam line plugs and subsequently isolated the air supply to the plug seals. As part of their immediate corrective actions, licensee personnel restored air to the main steam line plug seals and entered the issue into their corrective action program.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown operations. Specifically, loss of air pressure to main steam line seals increased the likelihood of a loss of reactor water inventory event during refueling operations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance following a Phase II SDP review. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance, work control, per IMC 0305 H.3(b) because the licensee did not appropriately coordinate work activities associated with service air system testing.

Inspection Report# : [2009002](#) (pdf)

**Significance:**  Mar 31, 2009

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**MAINTENANCE ON HPCS SYSTEM RESULTED IN EMERGENCY OPERATING PROCEDURE ENTRY**

A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of Technical Specification Section 5.4.1 was self-revealed on February 3, 2009, when the control room received an unexpected high pressure core spray (HPCS) pump room sump level high alarm and entered Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) – 3, "Secondary Containment Control." The licensee did not properly control a maintenance activity on the HPCS system resulting in unexpected water spray in the HPCS pump room. As part of their immediate corrective actions, licensee personnel recovered from the drain down of the system and entered the issue into their corrective action program.

This finding was considered more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability. The event challenged shutdown operations as operators entered the EOP and responded to reports of significant water spray entering the pump room. The finding was determined, through an SDP analysis, to be of very low safety significance as no mitigation equipment or functions were affected. The primary cause of this finding was related to the cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance per IMC 0305 H.3(a) because the organization failed to appropriately plan work activities that impact plant structures and systems, and failed to ensure appropriate contingencies were in place to perform a maintenance activity.

Inspection Report# : [2009002](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Dec 31, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**INSPECTION PROCEDURE FOR RPV HEAD STRONGBACK OMITTED NON-DESTRUCTIVE TESTING OF STRUCTURAL WELDS**

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures and Drawings." Specifically, the licensee failed to perform nondestructive testing of reactor pressure vessel (RPV) head strongback major load carrying welds and critical areas required by American National Standards Institute (ANSI) N14.6-1978. The issue was entered into the licensee's corrective action program, and the licensee revised a procedure to perform nondestructive testing of RPV head strongback major load carrying welds and critical areas.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown. Specifically, the purpose of the nondestructive testing of RPV head strongback major load carrying welds and critical areas is to limit the likelihood of a RPV head strongback structural component failure, and hence, to ensure safe load handling of heavy loads over the reactor core or over safety-related systems, structures and components. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance following a qualitative significance determination process review. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance as defined in Inspection Manual Chapter 0305 H.2(c), because the licensee did not provide a complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedure to plant personnel.

Inspection Report# : [2008005](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Dec 31, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**CONTAINMENT POLAR CRANE TROLLEY SEISMIC RESTRAINTS DID NOT MEET SEISMIC CATEGORY I REQUIREMENTS**

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," in that, the design basis structural analysis for the containment polar crane trolley did not adequately evaluate the trolley seismic restraints. Specifically, the trolley

seismic restraint calculation failed to ensure that design stresses remained below acceptance limits. Also, the as-built configuration of the trolley seismic restraints was not in accordance with the analyzed condition. As a result, the design basis calculation was not sufficient to ensure conformance with Seismic Category I requirements for safe load handling of heavy loads over the reactor core or over safety-related systems, structures and components. The issues were entered into the licensee's corrective action program. The licensee initiated the revision of the trolley seismic restraint calculation and the restoration of the trolley seismic restraint as-built condition to meet Seismic Category I requirements.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Initiating Events cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown. Specifically, compliance with Seismic Category I design requirements was to ensure safe load handling of heavy loads over the reactor core or over safety-related systems, structures and components. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance following a qualitative significance determination process review.

Inspection Report# : [2008005](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Sep 30, 2008

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

#### **Failure to Adequately Manage Risk Associated With Working Around a Risk-Significant Underground Vault**

A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed on July 30, 2008. While performing inspection and dewatering of an underground vault area, plant workers inadvertently dropped a man-hole cover into the vault. The 15-foot vault area contained 125 Volts direct current control power conduits that supplied fault protection circuitry for switchyard breakers. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program.

This finding was considered more than minor because it was related to maintenance risk assessment and risk management issues. Specifically, the licensee failed to manage risk for maintenance activities associated with the electrical switchyard that could increase the likelihood of initiating events by causing a loss of offsite power. The finding was determined through a SDP analysis to be of very low safety significance as no mitigation equipment or functions were affected. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance as defined in IMC 0305 H.4(a), because the organization failed to ensure the use of human error prevention techniques commensurate with the risk of the assigned task. No violation of NRC requirements occurred.

Inspection Report# : [2008004](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Sep 30, 2008

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

#### **Loss of Configuration Control of the Hydrogen Water Chemistry Injection System Resulting in High Radiation Levels.**

A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed on June 28, 2008, when high radiation alarms for all four main steam lines were received in the control room during a plant power maneuver. Specifically, maintenance technicians failed to adhere to procedures and manipulated a hydrogen water chemistry control system while performing a surveillance test associated with the plant off-gas system. The off-gas system surveillance test procedure did not address operation of the hydrogen water chemistry control system and the technicians were not trained to operate the system. As part of their immediate corrective actions, the licensee corrected the system lineup to reduce radiation levels and entered the issue into their corrective action program.

This finding was considered more than minor because the manipulation of plant systems that are different from those specified in the authorized work procedure would become a more significant safety concern if left uncorrected. In this case, the finding led to an unexpected increase in radiation levels in areas accessible to plant personnel and was associated with the operating equipment lineup of the configuration control attribute of the Initiating Events Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability. The finding was determined through a SDP analysis to be of very low safety significance as no mitigation equipment or functions were affected and no actual increase in personnel exposure occurred. This finding has a cross-

cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance as defined in IMC 0305 H.4(b), because the organization failed to ensure that personnel do not proceed with a task in the face of uncertainty. No violation of NRC requirements occurred.

Inspection Report# : [2008004](#) (pdf)

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## Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Jun 30, 2009

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Failure to Prevent Contact of Energized Components Renders RCIC System Inoperable**

A finding of very low safety significance (Green) and associated NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.1 was self-revealed when technicians failed to implement actions to prevent contact of energized electrical components during maintenance. Specifically, the reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC) Division 2 logic tripped while attempting to lift leads and a test lug. The technicians suspended their surveillance procedure and operators restored the RCIC system in accordance with licensee procedures. Operators also verified high pressure core spray (HPCS) was operable. The licensee visually inspected the RCIC system and found no apparent damage. The licensee conducted additional training on the use of error prevention tools and entered the issue into the corrective action program as CR 09-59356. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the short circuit resulted in the RCIC system being inoperable. The finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it did not represent a loss of system safety function, a loss of safety function of a non-TS train designated as risk significant for greater than 24 hours, an actual loss of safety function of a single train for greater than its TS- allowed outage time, or screen as potentially risk-significant due to a seismic, flooding, or severe weather initiating event. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance per IMC 0305 H.4 (a) because the technician failed to use error prevention techniques, such as self-checking, that are commensurate with the risk of the assigned task. Specifically not using 'STAR' (Stop, Think, Act, Review) during an activity that could render the RCIC system inoperable.

Inspection Report# : [2009003](#) (pdf)

**Significance:**  Jun 30, 2009

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **RHR System Over-Pressurization Due to Failure to Implement Corrective Actions for a Condition Adverse to Quality**

A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," was self-revealed for the failure to implement corrective actions to ensure residual heat removal (RHR) check valve 1E12F0050A seated during plant pressurizations. Specifically, the licensee failed to establish and maintain corrective actions for check valve 1E12F0050A inability to seat under low differential pressure conditions, resulting in the over-pressurization of a section of RHR system piping. As part of the licensee's corrective action, the operators depressurized the RHR system below operating pressure and were revising procedures to ensure the check valve 1E12F0050A seats fully during system pressurization. This issue was entered into the licensee corrective action program by CR 09-58808 and CR 09-58995 and an appropriate permanent corrective action was being evaluated. The inspectors determined that the finding was more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, removal of the RHR venting evolution from station procedures resulted in an unexpected over-pressurization which could have resulted in system damage. Using IMC 0609, Appendix G, "Shutdown Operations Significant Determination Process," Checklist 8, the inspectors determined that the finding did not require

a Phase 2 or Phase 3 analysis because the plant had appropriately met the safety function guidelines for core heat removal, inventory control, power availability, containment integrity, and reactivity control. The issue did not need a quantitative assessment and screened as having very low safety significance using Figure 1. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution per IMC 0305 P.1(c), because the organization failed to thoroughly evaluate the impact of modifying a corrective action. Specifically, the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate the consequences of removing the venting section of a procedure that was a corrective action for the check valve's inability to seat under low differential pressure conditions.

Inspection Report# : [2009003](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Jun 26, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Failure to Maintain Procedures for Post Fire Operation of Control Room HVAC Fans and Control of Remote Shutdown Room Toolbox Inventory.**

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1a for failure to maintain procedures for post-fire operation of control room heating, ventilation, and air conditioning (HVAC) Train A fans and for control of the Division 1 remote shutdown room toolbox inventory. Specifically, Procedure ARI H13 P904 0001 B6, "Control Room HVAC Train A Tripped," stated that if a fire has occurred and the Train A fans have tripped, then restart the Train A fans in emergency recirculation mode. The correct action was to restore Train B fans in emergency recirculation mode. In addition, Procedure IOI 11 "Control Room Isolation," Attachment 20, contained a list of equipment operators were to obtain from the toolbox, located by the alternate remote shutdown panel, following a control room fire. The list included nine items; one of the items consisting of three FRS R 4 Amp fuses was missing. The procedure should have been revised to remove the requirement to obtain the fuses. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as CR 09 60317 and CR 09 60373.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the mitigating system cornerstone attribute of procedure quality and affected the cornerstone's objective of ensuring the capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the failure to maintain the procedures could have complicated plant safe shutdown in the event of a fire. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety-significance since the procedure deficiencies did not substantially impact performance in the event of a fire.

Inspection Report# : [2009007](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Jun 26, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Failure to Assure That Systems Structures and Components Necessary to Achieve And Maintain Hot Shutdown Conditions Were Free of Fire Damage Without Repair Actions.**

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.(6) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, involving the licensee's failure to ensure, in the event of a fire, that one redundant train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions was free of fire damage. Specifically, the licensee failed to ensure, in the event of a control room fire, certain Systems, Structures, and Components (SSCs) necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions (e.g., MOVs 1P45 F0014A and 1P45 F0068A and emergency service water system (ESW) equipment) were free of fire damage. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program for resolution as CR 09 60977. The control room area, which is susceptible to this condition, is continuously manned; therefore making a compensatory action of a fire watch unnecessary.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (Fire) and affected the cornerstone's objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The Phase 2 screening determined this finding was of very low safety-significance because no potentially challenging fire scenarios were developed.

Inspection Report# : [2009007](#) (pdf)

**Significance:**  Jun 26, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Failure to Provide Required Electrical Isolation for Post Fire Safe Shutdown Electrical Circuits**

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1, Facility Operating License Condition 2.C.(6) and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3, for failure to provide the required electrical isolation in the design of the post-fire safe shutdown control logic circuitry. Specifically, the control logic for the Division 1 diesel generator building ventilation fan 1M43 C001A did not have the required physical isolation to isolate control room fire-induced electrical faults when transferring control to the remote shutdown station. This is required to ensure that postulated fire-induced electrical faults would not result in the loss of post-fire alternative safe shutdown equipment. The licensee's immediate corrective action was to perform a preliminary evaluation of the electrical circuitry and cables. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as CR 09 60873. The control room area, which is susceptible to this condition, is continuously manned; therefore making a compensatory action of a fire watch unnecessary.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the mitigating systems cornerstone attribute of protection against external factors (Fire) and affected the cornerstone's objective of ensuring the capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The violation is associated with degradation of a fire protection feature. In accordance with IMC 0609, "Significance Determination Process," Attachment 0609.04, "Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings," Table 3b, the inspectors determined the finding degraded the fire protection defense-in-depth strategies. Therefore, screening under IMC 0609, Appendix F, "Fire Protection Significance Determination Process," was required. Using Part 1 of the Fire Protection SDP Phase 1 Worksheet in Manual Chapter 0609, "Significance Determination Process [SDP]," the performance issue was determined to be in the post-fire safe shutdown category. The degradation rating was low based on FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company's (FENOC's) engineering evaluation that concluded that there were no fire induced electrical faults resulting from a control room fire that would prevent the plant from achieving and maintaining a safe shutdown in the event of a control room fire. Therefore, the finding screened as Green or of very low safety significance in the Phase 1 Worksheet. This violation is being treated as a NCV consistent with Section VI.A of the Enforcement Policy. The cause of the finding related to the cross-cutting aspect of problem identification and resolution (Section 1R05.6b).

Inspection Report# : [2009007](#) (pdf)

**Significance:** SL-IV Dec 31, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **FAILURE TO REPORT ALL 10 CFR 50.73 REPORTABLE EVENTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE DISCOVERY OF LOOSE CONTAINMENT GRATING**

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), "Licensee Event Reports." The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to submit a required Licensee Event Report (LER) within 60 days after discovery of conditions requiring a report. On August 26, 2007, the licensee identified improperly installed containment floor grating that affected safety system operability. The licensee failed to report conditions of operations prohibited by Technical Specification, operations in an unanalyzed condition, and loss of safety function from August 6 to August 9, 2007, that were associated with inoperability of low pressure core injection 'A.' The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program.

The primary cause of this non-cited violation was related to the cross-cutting area of problem identification and resolution as defined in Inspection Manual Chapter 0305 P.1(c) because the licensee failed to thoroughly evaluate problems for reportability conditions.

Inspection Report# : [2008005](#) (pdf)

**Significance:**  Sep 30, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Impaired Fire Barrier for Safety-Related Building**

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of the Perry Nuclear Power Plant Operating License Condition C(6). During a maintenance activity, licensee personnel degraded a fire barrier in a manner that was contrary to the procedural requirements of the Perry Plant Fire Protection Program. As part of their immediate corrective action, the licensee restored the fire barrier and entered the issue into their corrective action program.

The inspectors determined that the performance deficiency was more than minor in accordance with IMC 0612, Appendix B, "Issue Disposition Screening," because the finding was associated with protection against external factors attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, by the inappropriate use of fixed impairments on the fire doors between the diesel fire pump room and the emergency service water pumphouse, the licensee removed a fire barrier which could impact safety-related equipment. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance during a Phase 2 SDP review. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance as defined by IMC 0305 H.4(a), because the licensee did not ensure that appropriate human error prevention techniques were used.

Inspection Report# : [2008004](#) (*pdf*)

**G**

**Significance:** Sep 30, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Failure to Implement Compensatory Measures for a Risk-Management Activity**

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for failure to assess and manage the risk associated with maintenance activity affecting the low pressure core spray system. Specifically, the licensee removed floor plugs in the auxiliary building and failed to implement risk control measures to assure operability of low pressure core spray. As part of their immediate corrective actions, the licensee personnel re-installed building floor plugs and returned low pressure core spray to an operable status.

The finding was considered more than minor because the licensee failed to prescribe significant compensatory measures for external conditions; and if the practice were left uncorrected, the issue would become a more significant safety concern. The finding was of very low safety significance because the incremental core damage frequency associated with the activity was less than  $1 \times 10^{-6}$ . This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance as defined in IMC 0305 H.3(a), because the organization failed to adequately plan work activities that are associated with risk.

Inspection Report# : [2008004](#) (*pdf*)

**G**

**Significance:** Sep 30, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Failure to Implement a Procedurally-Required Risk management Activity for a Protected Train**

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and a NCV of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for failure to implement a procedurally-required risk management activity for a safety system protected train. The licensee failed to provide required management oversight of work on emergency closed cooling 'A' while the plant was in Yellow Risk. The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program.

The finding was considered more than minor because the licensee failed to effectively manage significant compensatory measures for an elevated risk condition; and if the practice were left uncorrected, the issue would become a more significant safety concern. The finding was of very low safety significance, because the incremental core damage frequency associated with the activity was less than  $1 \times 10^{-6}$ . This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance as defined by IMC 0305 H.3(a), because the organization failed to adequately plan work activities that are associated with risk.

Inspection Report# : [2008004](#) (pdf)

**G**

**Significance:** Sep 30, 2008

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Failure to Use procedures for Work Affecting Safety**

A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was self-revealed on August 4, 2008, when contract workers bored a hole into a safety-related structure in an inappropriate location. The workers did not use documented instructions, procedures, or drawings when performing the work. As part of their immediate corrective actions, the licensee conducted worker training and entered the issue into their corrective action program.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the design control attribute of Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences.

Specifically, the licensee initiated work on a seismically qualified structure in the absence of an approved work package and degraded the structure. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not result in safety system inoperability. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance as defined by IMC 0305 H.4.(a), because the licensee failed to communicate human error prevention techniques through a pre-job brief and personnel proceeded in the face of unexpected circumstances.

Inspection Report# : [2008004](#) (pdf)

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## **Barrier Integrity**

**G**

**Significance:** Jun 30, 2009

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **RCS Temp Below Minimum Allowed by TS due to Inadequate Station Procedures**

A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," was self-revealed when operators failed to maintain reactor coolant system (RCS) temperature greater than the Technical Specification minimum allowable temperature because Integrated Operations Instruction (IOI)-9, "Refueling," was inadequate. The licensee did not properly control an outage activity in that they failed to ensure the water sprayed into the reactor pressure vessel met temperature requirements. As part of their immediate corrective actions, licensee personnel stopped the activity and restored the RCS system above the TS 3.4.11 temperature requirements of 70 °F. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as CR 09-55397.

This finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, failure to maintain RCS temperature greater than the minimum allowed by TS affected the functionality of this barrier. Using IMC 0609, Appendix G, "Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process," Checklist 8, the inspectors determined that the finding did not require a Phase 2 or Phase 3 analysis because the plant had appropriately met the safety function guidelines for core heat removal, inventory control, power availability, containment integrity, and reactivity control. The issue did not need a quantitative assessment and screened as having very low safety significance using Figure 1. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work control, per IMC 0305 H.3(a) because the organization failed to appropriately plan work and coordinate work activities consistent with nuclear safety. Specifically, job site conditions, including environmental conditions which may impact plant structures, systems, and components; were not considered to ensure water sprayed into the RCS would maintain temperature above 70 °F.

Inspection Report# : [2009003](#) (pdf)

**Significance:**  Jun 30, 2009

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

**Failure to Follow Industrial Safety Manual Results in Damage to Fuel Handling building Roll-up Door**

A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed when contract personnel failed to follow the FENOC Industrial Safety Manual to control vehicle movement inside the fuel handling building (FHB). Specifically, a Sealand truck backed into the FHB roll-up door, dislodging the door in the open position. The licensee suspended fuel movements and implemented compensatory measures for containment integrity. The licensee repaired the roll-up door and conducted training with contract and oversight personnel, and entered the issue into the corrective action program as CR 09 56062.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with Barrier Integrity cornerstone attribute of SSC and barrier performance and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, the finding resulted in an event that challenged FHB integrity, which is a functional barrier to fission product release. Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, "Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria," was used since IMC 0609, Appendix G, "Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process," does not address the potential risk significance of FHB operations. Regional management determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because there was no fuel handling accident during this period. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, per IMC 0305 H.4(c) because the licensee failed to ensure adequate supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that nuclear safety is supported.

Inspection Report# : [2009003](#) (pdf)

**Significance:**  Jan 30, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**FAILURE TO ADHERE TO PROCEDURES FOR SCAFFOLD AFFECTING CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS**

A finding of very low safety significance and associated non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4, "Procedures," was identified by the team for the failure to erect scaffolding in accordance with procedural requirements. Specifically, scaffold constructed in the Intermediate Building had seismic bracing attached to a safety related cable tray support and was connected to a duct support without an approved engineering document as specified in procedural requirements.

Although the licensee was able to demonstrate that the cable tray support and duct support were operable, the finding was determined to be more than minor because there was reasonable doubt that the licensee routinely performed engineering evaluations on similar scaffold issues. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance, work practices, because the licensee failed to ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities such that nuclear safety is supported. Specifically, the licensee failed to provide effective oversight of the erected seismic scaffold to ensure compliance with procedural requirements [H.4(c)].

Inspection Report# : [2009006](#) (pdf)

**Significance:**  Sep 30, 2008

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Adequacy of Airlock Ball Valve Maintenance**

A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B,

Criterion 5 ,” Procedures,” was identified on June 1, 2008, when a containment airlock door seal failed during routine operations. On March 26, 2008, the licensee failed to implement airlock maintenance procedures appropriate to the circumstances and this led to a failure of the containment upper airlock outer door seal. As part of their corrective actions, the licensee conducted training and revised procedures.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because the upper airlock inner door remained closed and the finding did not represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment.

Inspection Report# : [2008004](#) (*pdf*)

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## Emergency Preparedness

**Significance:**  Dec 31, 2008

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

### **LOSS OF THE V-1F AND V-2F NON-VITAL BUSES RESULTING THE THE LOSS OF TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER COMPUTERS**

A finding of very low safety significance was self-revealed on October 30, 2008, when licensee personnel failed to appropriately respond to a Technical Support Center (TSC) computer room high temperature alarm. As a result, electrical power supply to plant emergency response equipment and control systems was interrupted. Affected systems included the Integrated Computer System (ICS), Emergency Response Data System (ERDS), one train of power to the Digital Feedwater Control System (DFWCS), and the chemistry computer. As part of their immediate corrective actions, licensee personnel restored the affected systems entered the issue into their corrective action program.

This finding is considered more than minor because it was associated with the Facilities and Equipment attribute of the Emergency Preparedness Cornerstone and affected the objective of ensuring the licensee is capable of implementing adequate measures to protect the health and safety of the public in the event of a radiological emergency. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the equipment was restored to a functional status in less than seven days. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution because the organization failed to ensure that issues were identified accurately and in a timely manner commensurate with their significance as defined in Inspection Manual Chapter 0305 P.1(a).

Inspection Report# : [2008005](#) (*pdf*)

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## Occupational Radiation Safety

**Significance:**  Jun 30, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Failure to Maintain Appropriate Water Shielding Between Irradiated Fuel and in-vessel 360 degree platform**

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of TS 5.4.1.a for the failure to establish, implement, and maintain adequate written procedures regarding the radiation safety program. The licensee failed to implement procedurally required compensatory measures associated with moving irradiated fuel assemblies. Specifically, workers on the 360 platform were within close proximity of the refueling mast while fuel moves were in progress. As corrective actions, the licensee posted information signs to control access to specific areas of the 360 platform and planned to incorporate more rigorous radiological controls into the governing procedure. The licensee entered the issue into its corrective action program as CR 09-54697.

The finding was more than minor because it impacted the program and process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of protecting worker health and safety from exposure to radiation, in that, not implementing adequate radiological control may potentially result in unplanned exposures to radioactive material. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not an as-low-as-is-reasonably-achievable (ALARA) planning issue, there was no overexposure nor potential for overexposure, and the licensee's ability to assess dose was not compromised. The finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the decision making component of the human performance area in accordance with IMC 0305 H.1(b), because the licensee did not adequately use conservative assumptions in decision making.

Inspection Report# : [2009003](#) (pdf)

**Significance:**  Jun 30, 2009

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Failure to Barricade and Conspicuously Post a High Radiation Area**

The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of Technical Specification 5.4.7.a for the failure to barricade and conspicuously post a high radiation area on the 599' elevation of the auxiliary building. As corrective actions, the licensee barricaded and conspicuously posted the affected area as a high radiation area and performed gravity flushes of piping with clean water to reduce the ambient dose rates. The licensee entered the issue into its corrective action program as CR 09-55453.

The finding was more than minor because it impacted the program and process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of protecting worker health and safety from exposure to radiation, in that, not barricading and conspicuously posting high radiation areas may result in unnecessary and unplanned radiation exposures to workers. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not an ALARA planning issue, there was no overexposure nor potential for overexposure, and the licensee's ability to assess dose was not compromised. The finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the work control component of the human performance area in accordance with IMC 0305 .H.3(b), because the licensee did not adequately coordinate work activities.

Inspection Report# : [2009003](#) (pdf)

**Significance:**  Mar 31, 2009

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **FAILURE TO PERFORM AN ADEQUATE EVALUATION TO DETERMINE THE USE OF RESPIRATORY PROTECTION EQUIPMENT AND/OR ENGINEERING CONTROLS**

A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 20.1501 was identified for the failure to perform an adequate survey (evaluation) to determine whether the use of respiratory protection equipment and/or engineering controls were necessary to maintain the total effective dose equivalent As-Low-As-Is-Reasonably-Achievable (ALARA). Specifically, a high efficiency particulate air vacuum cleaner that was used during a spent fuel pool clean-up campaign was opened without fully evaluating the potential hazards. As a result, two contracted decontamination technicians received an unplanned intake of radioactive materials. As immediate actions, the licensee assessed the internal dose to the workers and secured the area to minimize additional exposure. The licensee entered the issue into its corrective action program as CR 08-33692.

The finding is more than minor because it impacted the program and process attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation, in that not performing adequate evaluations to determine the use of respiratory protection equipment and/or engineering controls for the work resulted in unplanned, additional dose to workers. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was not an ALARA planning issue, there was no overexposure nor potential for overexposure, and the licensee's ability to assess dose was not compromised. The finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance area per IMC 0305 H.4(c), because the licensee failed to ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that

nuclear safety is supported.

Inspection Report# : [2009002](#) (pdf)

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## Public Radiation Safety

**Significance:**  Mar 31, 2009

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **FAILURE TO DOCUMENT ALL APPLICABLE HAZARDS ON SHIPPING MANIFEST**

A self-revealed finding of very low safety significance and an associated NCV of Title 10 CFR 71.5 was identified. Specifically, the licensee failed to comply with Title 49 CFR 172.203(c) and shipped a package of radioactive material with a transport manifest that did not document all applicable hazardous substances. The issue was entered in the licensee's corrective action program as CR 07-23098. The licensee's immediate corrective actions were to provide a corrected copy of the transport manifest to the waste processor and to initiate an apparent cause investigation to identify corrective actions to avoid recurrence.

The finding is more than minor because it was associated with the Public Radiation Safety cornerstone attribute of Program and Process (transportation program) and affected the cornerstone objective, in that, providing incorrect information, as part of hazard communication, could impact the actions of response personnel. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because using the Public Radiation Safety SDP, the inspector determined that: (1) radiation limits were not exceeded; (2) there was no breach of a package during transit; (3) it did not involve a certificate of compliance issue; (4) it was not a low level burial ground nonconformance; and (5) it did not involve a failure to make notifications or provide emergency information. Because the finding was not indicative of current performance, a cross-cutting aspect was not identified.

Inspection Report# : [2009002](#) (pdf)

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## Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

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## Miscellaneous

**Significance:** N/A Jan 30, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

### **PI&R Report Summary**

Based on the sample selected for review, the team concluded that implementation of the corrective action program (CAP) was adequate. The licensee had a low threshold for identifying problems and entering them in the CAP. Items entered into the CAP were screened and prioritized in a timely manner using established criteria; were properly evaluated commensurate with their safety significance; and corrective actions were generally implemented in a timely manner, commensurate with the safety significance. The team noted that the licensee reviewed operating experience for applicability to station activities. Audits and self assessments were determined to be performed at an appropriate level to identify deficiencies. On the basis of licensee self-assessments and interviews conducted during the inspection, workers at the site expressed freedom to raise safety concerns. The team observed that improvements have

been made in the licensee's identification and assessment of human performance issues and in root and full apparent cause analyses quality. While noting some improvement in the identification of negative trends, the team also noted that in at least one case the licensee had not identified a negative trend in an area previously highlighted by an NRC finding and associated non-cited violation.

Inspection Report# : [2009006](#) (*pdf*)

Last modified : August 31, 2009