

Harris 1

2Q/2009 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Nov 07, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Sprinkler System in Cable Spreading Room A Does Not Meet Licensee's Fire Protection Program Requirements

The team identified a non-cited violation of Shearon Harris Unit 1 operating license condition 2.F, for the licensee's failure to install the sprinkler system in Cable Spreading Room A (CSRA) in accordance with the approved fire protection program (FPP). Specifically, the installed system would not have been able to deliver the sprinkler system design density of 0.3 gallons per minute/square foot in CSRA, as stated in the FPP in Updated Final Safety Analysis Report Section 9.5.1.2.3. The licensee entered this issue in the corrective action program and established a continuous fire watch in CSRA as a compensatory measure in accordance with the Shearon Harris FPP.

Inspection Report# : [2008008](#) (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Jun 30, 2009

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Provide Procedures to Control and Adjust the Manipulator Crane Gear Limit Setpoints

A self-revealing Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1, Procedures, was identified when the licensee failed to follow Attachment 4, Manipulator Crane and Auxiliary Hoist Checkout, of Fuel Handling Procedure 20 (FHP-020), Refueling Operations, resulting in damaged grid straps on two fuel assemblies on April 23, 2009. Specifically, the value of the manipulator crane gear limit setpoints for the lower core slow zone exceeded the values allowed by the checkout procedure. This resulted in the fuel handlers damaging the grid straps on two successive fuel assembly moves. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program (CAP) as action request (AR) #332368. As corrective actions, the licensee suspended the core offload, reset the lower core slow zone within tolerance, and permanently discharged the affected fuel assemblies. Additionally, the licensee committed to revise FHP-020 prior to the next refueling outage in order to prevent recurrence.

The violation was more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone, and it affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it was a deficiency associated with fuel handling errors that did not cause damage to fuel clad integrity or a dropped fuel assembly. The finding has a crosscutting aspect of Procedural Compliance, as described in the Work Practices component of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because the licensee accepted the out of tolerance values that were outside the acceptance criteria of the procedure.

Inspection Report# : [2009003](#) (*pdf*)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Significance:  Sep 30, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Maintain Control Over the Station's Very High Radiation Areas

A self-revealing Green NCV was identified for the failure to maintain control of access to the station's very high radiation areas (VHRA), as required by 10 CFR 20.1602. The inspectors determined that the licensee failed to maintain sufficient controls of access to VHRAs from the fall of 2006 through January 2008, contrary to 10 CFR 20.1602 and station procedural requirements. Licensee corrective actions included the retrieval and disposition of the security guard master keys, and developing more specific procedural guidance for key control and issuance at the station.

Inspection Report# : [2008004](#) (*pdf*)

Public Radiation Safety

Significance:  Dec 31, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to monitor effluent releases from SFP filter backwash

The inspectors identified a non-cited (NCV) of 10 CFR 20.1302 (a) for failure to make adequate surveys of radioactive materials in effluents released to unrestricted areas. The licensee altered the configuration of the vent stack effluent radiation monitors without determining the impact the change would make on the capability of the monitors to detect and measure radioactive materials in the effluent stream from the main plant vent stack and thus demonstrate compliance with the dose limits for individual members of the public as defined in 10 CFR 20.1301. This condition existed from approximately July 2000 to approximately September 2008. The change resulted in the licensee failing to monitor and attribute potential doses to the public from particulate material originating in the SFP filter backwash system, which resulted in underestimating the dose to a member of the public by up to 40%. The licensee provided a reasonable basis for the determination that in a bounding case neither the limits in 10 CFR 20.1301, 10 CFR 50 Appendix I nor 40 CFR 190 were exceeded. Licensee corrective actions included collection of in-plant samples to bound releases until the monitors are restored to the as designed configuration.

The issue was more than minor because it was associated with the Program/Process attribute of the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone and potentially affected the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public domain as a result of routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. By removing the isokinetic sampling skids from service, the licensee could not be assured that the samples were representative of the effluents being released, and therefore the magnitude of the releases was unknown.

Inspection Report# : [2008005](#) (*pdf*)

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : August 31, 2009