

# La Salle 2

## 1Q/2009 Plant Inspection Findings

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### Initiating Events

**Significance:**  Nov 17, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Unauthorized Transient Combustibles**

A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of Technical Specifications was identified by the inspectors for the failure to implement a fire protection program procedure for combustible controls. Specifically, the inspectors identified three examples where transient combustible materials were staged adjacent to cable risers contrary to the licensee's procedure for combustible controls. The licensee subsequently removed the transient combustible materials and entered the issue into their corrective action program.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because, the finding was similar to IMC 0612, Appendix E, Example 4.k, in that the transient combustibles presented credible fire scenarios, which could affect equipment important to safety. The issue was of very low safety significance because, the finding represented a low degradation of the licensee's combustible controls program. Additionally, this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance for the Work Practices component because, multiple examples were identified where transient combustibles were staged contrary to site procedures. [H.4(b)]

Inspection Report# : [2008007](#) (*pdf*)

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### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Dec 31, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Failure to Incorporate Regulatory Guide 1.9 Testing Methodology into Procedures**

The inspectors' identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) and an associated NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, "Test Control", for the failure to establish a minimum DG run time of at least five minutes when performing the hot restart test as is called for by Regulatory Guide 1.9, "Selection, Design, Qualification, and Testing of Emergency Diesel Generator Units Used as Class 1E Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants", Revision 3. While reviewing DG testing and maintenance methodologies at LaSalle Station as a part of operating experience smart sample OpESS 2008 01, the inspectors identified that licensee procedures for performing the DG hot restart test did not include a minimum run time requirement of five minutes as is required in Regulatory Guide 1.9, "Selection, Design, Qualification, and Testing of Emergency Diesel Generator Units Used as Class 1E Onsite Electric Power Systems at Nuclear Power Plants", Revision 3. The inspectors noted that the licensee is committed to Regulatory Guide 1.9, Revision 3 for testing of the site's DGs as is noted in Appendix B of the LaSalle County Station UFSAR. Regulatory Guide 1.9, Revision 3 section 2.2.10 stated in part "Demonstrate hot restart functional capability at full load temperature conditions ... by verifying that the emergency diesel generator starts on a manual or autostart signal, attains the required voltage and frequency within acceptable limits and time, and operates for longer than 5 minutes." The inspectors noted that licensee procedures which performed the hot restart test were solely based on acceptance criteria specified in the station's TS Surveillance Requirement 3.8.1.15 which did not include the minimum five minute run time. The inspectors noted that the licensee's TS Bases document described the minimum 5 minute run time for those surveillances which required it as a TS acceptance criteria by stating in part, "the surveillance should be continued for a minimum of five minutes in order to demonstrate that all starting transients have decayed and stability has been achieved."

The inspectors subsequently reviewed operator logs to determine if the DGs had been run for the minimum five minutes when hot restart testing had been last performed. The inspectors identified that on September 19, 2007 the 1A diesel was run for only three minutes and on October 9, 2007 the 2B diesel was run for only two minutes when the hot restart test was last performed.

Inspection Report# : [2008005](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Nov 17, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Failure to provide a sprinkler system for Fire Zone 4F3**

A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of the license condition was identified by the inspectors for the failure to install a sprinkler system. Specifically, the licensee had installed a pre-action spray system above the suspended ceiling in Fire Zone 4F3 instead of a pre-action sprinkler system as specified by the Fire Protection Report. The licensee subsequently entered the issue into its correction action program.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because, the installed spray system was less capable than a sprinkler system in that, a fire would be permitted to grow to a larger size and cause more damage as a result of delayed system actuation. The issue was of very low safety significance due to remaining mitigating system capability.

Inspection Report# : [2008007](#) (*pdf*)

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## **Barrier Integrity**

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## **Emergency Preparedness**

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## **Occupational Radiation Safety**

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## **Public Radiation Safety**

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## **Physical Protection**

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

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## **Miscellaneous**

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