

Oconee 3

3Q/2008 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance:  Mar 31, 2008

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Implement the Procedure to Stroke RBS Valves (Section 1R22)

A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1 was identified for failure to adequately implement the procedure to stroke reactor building spray (RBS) valves, which resulted in a loss of Reactor Coolant System (RCS) inventory while in Mode 5.

The inspectors determined that the loss of RCS inventory while in Mode 5 was a performance deficiency. The finding was considered to be more than minor because it affected the Configuration Control attribute of the Reactor Safety/Initiating Events Cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown, as well as power operations. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. This was based initially on a determination that the event did not meet the loss of control criteria in MC 0609, Appendix G, and also on the Phase 1 screening criteria found in Manual Chapter (MC) 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, Attachment 1, Checklist 2. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of appropriate coordination of work activities [H.3.b], including incorporating actions to address interdepartmental coordination, the need to keep personnel apprised of work status, the operations impact of work activities, and plant conditions that may affect work activities, as described in the work control component of the human performance cross-cutting area. (Section 1R22)

Inspection Report# : [2008002](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Mar 31, 2008

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Dilution of the RCS While Lining Up for SFP Makeup (Section 4OA3)

A self-revealing NCV of TS 5.4.1 was identified for the failure to properly implement the procedural requirements of OP/3/A/1104/006C, Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) Makeup, which led to an over dilution of the Unit 3 RCS.

The failure to properly implement the procedural requirements of OP/3/A/1104/006C was considered to be a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the Initiating Event Cornerstone attribute of configuration control; thereby, impacting the associated cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors reviewed this finding in accordance with MC 0609, Significance Determination Process. Although the unintentional dilution was a transient initiator, it did not increase the likelihood of a reactor trip, nor did it increase the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions will not be available. Consequently, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of procedural compliance for a failure to follow procedures [H.4.b] as described in the work practices component of the human performance cross-cutting area. (Section 4OA3)

Inspection Report# : [2008002](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Dec 31, 2007

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Loss of Unit 3 SFP Cooling Procedure

A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1 was identified for failure to establish and implement an adequate procedure for loss of the Unit 3 spent fuel pool (SFP) cooling and/or level. More specifically, Abnormal Procedure AP/3/A/1700/035, Loss of SFP Cooling and/or Level, did not reflect the dependency that Unit 3 SFP cooling has on condenser circulating water (CCW) booster pump flow. If it had, the unexpected Unit 3 SFP temperature increase on December 1, 2007, could have been mitigated in a more timely manner and the SFP temperature increase limited to a lower value.

The licensee's failure to adequately establish and implement the procedure for loss of spent fuel pool cooling was a performance deficiency. The finding was considered to be more than minor because it affected the initiating events cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions. The finding was not suitable for SDP evaluation, but was reviewed by NRC management and was determined to be of very low safety significance, because the rate of SFP heatup was low (10 degrees F in four hours), the operators demonstrated the ability to restore CCW booster pump flow within a relatively short time period with respect to the heatup rate, and the Unit 1 and 2 recirculating cooling water (RCW) system was available to be lined up to supply cooling to the Unit 3

SFP cooling heat exchangers per existing plant procedures if needed.

This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program. It has a cross-cutting aspect of complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures (H.2.c), as described in the resources component of the human performance cross-cutting area. (Section 1R20b.(1))

Inspection Report# : [2007005](#) (*pdf*)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Mar 31, 2008

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

Inadequate Installation of SSF DG Field Flash Relay Cover (Section 1R19)

A self-revealing finding (FIN) was identified for failure to implement self-checking during Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) diesel generator (DG) field flash relay cover reinstallation, resulting in a failure of the relay during post maintenance testing and subsequent loss of the electronic governor.

The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to correctly install the SSF DG field flash relay cover was a performance deficiency. The finding was considered to be more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green), based on the Phase 1 screening criteria found in MC 0609, Appendix A, Attachment 1, in that the additional 15.6 hours of SSF unavailability resulting from the deficiency was less than the TS allowed outage time. Additionally, the Oconee Phase 2 pre-solved table for exposure times of less than three days yields a Green result for the SSF DG. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of human error prevention techniques [H.4.a], as described in the work practices component of the human performance cross-cutting area. (Section 1R19)

Inspection Report# : [2008002](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Mar 14, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Design Control in the Translation of Design Basis Information into Procedure for Draining and Nitrogen Purging the RCS (Section 1R21.2.2)

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. Specifically, the licensee failed to verify the applicability of design basis information, related to critical vortex height to assure adequate low pressure injection (LPI) pump suction conditions, before translating that information into the shutdown operations procedure for draining the reactor coolant system.

This finding is greater than minor because if left uncorrected, the finding would become a more significant safety concern. In particular, the station routinely uses older calculations, test information, and analyses to establish operator action or alarm set points, support operability determinations, or change the design of the plant. If the applicability of that information is not verified for the system configuration and conditions under review, the quality of that engineering product could be compromised, resulting in a significant safety concern. The finding was determined to be of very low significance, via Manual Chapter (MC) 0609, Appendix G, Attachment 1, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process (SDP), Phase 1 because it did not significantly degrade the station capability to recover decay heat removal. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting area of problem identification and resolution, specifically with respect to corrective action, because the licensee did not thoroughly evaluate the previous similar finding in the 2006 Oconee Component Design Bases Inspection (CDBI) such that the resolution adequately addressed causes and extent of condition (MC 0305, aspect P.1.c).

[Section 1R21.2.2]

Inspection Report# : [2008006](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Mar 14, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Verification of Local Manual Operating Capability for EFW Flow Control Valves (Section 1R21.2.6)

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance involving a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control. Specifically, the licensee failed to establish measures to verify the design capability for local manual handwheel operation of the emergency feedwater (EFW) flow control air operated valves (AOVs). Local manual operation was an alternate method of controlling EFW flow specified in station emergency procedures.

The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating System Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was of very low safety significance since it did not result in a loss of system safety function. Specifically, the licensee performed a technical evaluation during the inspection which demonstrated that a plant operator would be able to successfully cycle the valves using the manual handwheel. [Section 1R21.2.6]
Inspection Report# : [2008006](#) (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Dec 31, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Establish Adequate Procedures for Containment Closure Following a Loss of Decay Heat Removal Event

The inspectors identified an NCV of TS 5.4.1 for the failure to establish and implement adequate procedures for containment closure following a potential loss of decay heat removal (LDHR) event. More specifically, existing procedures did not adequately address control of vehicles blocking the equipment hatch opening, as was the case on October 27, 2007.

The licensee's failure to implement adequate procedures to close the equipment hatch in the event of a LDHR was considered to be a performance deficiency. The finding was determined to be more than minor as it was associated with the barrier integrity cornerstone attribute of procedure quality, thereby impacting the associated cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors reviewed this finding in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, Attachment 1, Checklist 3. This finding did not meet the criteria in the checklist for requiring a Phase 2 or 3 analysis, and was therefore determined to be of very low safety significance.

This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program. It has a cross-cutting aspect of complete, accurate, and up-to-date procedures (H.2.c), as described in the resources component of the human performance cross-cutting area. (Section 1R20b.(2))
Inspection Report# : [2007005](#) (*pdf*)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the

[cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

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