

Salem 1

1Q/2008 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  May 01, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT STEP 3.6.2 OF THE COMPONENT FOULING PROCEDURE

The inspectors identified an NCV for failure to comply with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instruction, Procedures, and Drawings," when operators did not implement additional log readings for service water (SW) heat exchangers (HXs) as specified by plant procedures during extended periods of high river detritus from March through May of 2007. This required PSEG to take the 12 CC HX out of service for 45 hours to complete system flushes in May and June 2007 to restore full operability. The finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors conducted a Phase 1 SDP screening in accordance with IMC 0609 and determined that the finding is of very low safety significance.

The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because PSEG personnel did not follow plant procedures (H.4.b). Specifically, operators did not implement additional log readings for SW HXs as specified by plant procedures during extended periods of high river detritus from March through May of 2007.

Inspection Report# : [2007003](#) (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Dec 29, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

INADEQUATE TROUBLESHOOTING FOR A FAILURE OF 13 CONTAINMENT FAN COIL UNIT TO START IN SLOW SPEED

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1, "Procedures and Programs," on July 25, 2007, because PSEG did not conduct adequate troubleshooting and corrective maintenance following a repeat failure of the 13 containment fan coil unit (CFCU) to start in slow speed. The finding was greater than minor because it was associated with the structures, systems, and components and barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the objective to provide reasonable assurance that containment barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Specifically, because PSEG did not perform adequate troubleshooting following the July 25, 2007, 13 CFCU failure to start in slow speed, the 13 CFCU failed to start in slow speed again on November 6, 2007. This impacted the availability and reliability of a system designed to provide containment pressure control during an accident. In accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix H, "Containment Integrity SDP," table 6.1 "Phase 1 Screening-Type B Findings at Full Power", the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because the containment type is large dry and the CFCU failures do not significantly contribute to large early release frequency.

This finding has a cross-cutting aspect of procedure compliance in the area of human performance (H.4(b)). Specifically, PSEG personnel did not follow troubleshooting procedure MA-AA-716-004 following a repeat failure of

the 13 CFCU to start in slow speed on July 25, 2007.

Inspection Report# : [2007005](#) (*pdf*)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

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