

Robinson 2

1Q/2008 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Dec 31, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Determine the Cause of a Failure of the Steam-Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump to Start

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI for the licensee's failure in 2005 to determine the cause of a failure of the steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pump to start, thereby allowing a subsequent similar failure in 2007.

The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. Specifically, the performance deficiency decreased the reliability of the SDAFW pump by increasing the probability that the pump's governor air supply solenoid valve would fail to open on demand. This finding was determined to have very low safety significance because it was not a design or qualification deficiency and did not represent the loss of a system safety function. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance because the licensee did not ensure that personnel, equipment, procedures, and other resources were available and adequate to assure nuclear safety, in that the licensee did not ensure that resources were available and adequate to produce a complete investigation for a significant condition adverse to quality.

Inspection Report# : [2007005](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Aug 17, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Failure to install Thermal Overload (TOL) protection on the 'D' deep well pump

The team identified a finding having very low safety significance (Green) involving the failure of the licensee to meet a self imposed standard. The licensee committed in modification package EC 59037, "Install 'D' Deep Well Pump," to meet or exceed the requirements in the Electrical Power Distribution System Design Basis Document (DBD), DBD/R87038/SD16. DBD sections 4.3.1.c and 4.5.1.20 specified that overload protection be provided. The vendor technical manual for the 'D' deep well pump motor, which is included in the facility technical manual 762-209-103 for the 'D' deep well pump, specified that Thermal Overload (TOL) protection be provided. The vendor technical manual for the 'D' deep well pump motor was referenced in modification package, EC 59037. Contrary to the above, the licensee failed to install TOL protection for the "D" deep well pump.

This finding was more than minor based on the fact that it is associated with the reactor safety mitigation cornerstone aspect of design control. It impacted the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, "Significance Determination of Reactor Inspection Findings for At-Power Situations," the team conducted a Phase 1 SDP screening and determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). Since the 'D' deep well pump is not safety related equipment per Chapter 15 of the UFSAR, this finding does not represent a violation of any NRC requirements. The team did not identify any cross cutting aspects associated with this finding. This issue is documented in the corrective action program as nuclear condition report (NCR) 239915. (Section 1R21.2.9.)

Inspection Report# : [2007006](#) (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Significance:  Mar 31, 2008

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure of the licensee to assess the increased risk resulting from removing a boric acid injection path from service

The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the failure of the licensee to perform a risk assessment on March 10, 2008, before establishing maintenance boundaries which removed a boric acid injection flow path from service. This finding was more than minor because it is related to a risk assessment and management issue where the licensee failed to consider risk significant systems, structures, or components and support systems that were unavailable during maintenance. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance (H.3 (a)) because the operations staff did not appropriately plan the work activity of establishing maintenance boundaries by incorporating risk insights of the site's risk model.

Inspection Report# : [2008002](#) (*pdf*)

Last modified : June 05, 2008