

# Nine Mile Point 1

## 1Q/2008 Plant Inspection Findings

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### Initiating Events

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### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Jun 29, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Failure To Take Action Per Operating Experience Results In Two Inoperable IRM Channels During Reactor Startup**

A self-revealing Green NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Actions," occurred when NMPNS failed to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality, associated with two of the four Unit 1 intermediate range monitor (IRM) instrument channels, when they failed to perform vendor recommended testing during refueling outage (RFO) 19. As a result, operators identified two of the four IRM instrument channels, associated with the 12 reactor protection system (RPS) trip, inoperable during the startup on April 14, 2007. Operators immediately halted the startup and maintenance repaired the signal cable connections. NMPNS entered the issue into its corrective action program (CAP) as condition report (CR) 2007-2359.

The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined that the finding to be of very low safety significance because the finding is not a design or qualification deficiency, does not represent a loss of a system safety function or safety function of a single train, and does not screen as potentially risk significant due to external events. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because NMPNS management failed to use conservative assumptions in decision making and inappropriately deleted vendor recommended testing designed to detect degraded IRM system cable connections (H.1.b.) (Section 1R20.1)

Inspection Report# : [2007003](#) (*pdf*)

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### Barrier Integrity

**Significance:**  Jun 29, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Procedural Noncompliance Resulted In Failure to Establish Primary Containment Prior to Reactor Startup.**

A self-revealing Green NCV of Unit 1 TS 6.4, "Procedures," occurred on April 2, 2007, when operators failed to resolve a position discrepancy identified with respect to the emergency cooling system (EC) vent line isolation valves prior to reactor startup following RFO 19. This resulted in the EC vent line isolation valves being left open, which represented an open pathway in the physical integrity of the reactor coolant and primary containment system boundaries. Upon discovery of the degraded barrier, operators immediately halted the startup and closed the valves. NMPNS entered the issue into its CAP as CR 2007-2380.

The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affects the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that reactor coolant and containment system physical design barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance because even though the open

valves were associated with the integrity of the reactor coolant system and containment they did not contribute to large early release frequency because the EC steam line vent to the reactor building (RB) equipment drain tank is less than two inches in diameter. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because operators failed to follow procedures (H.4.b.) (Section 1R20.2)  
Inspection Report# : [2007003](#) (*pdf*)

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## Emergency Preparedness

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## Occupational Radiation Safety

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## Public Radiation Safety

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## Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

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## Miscellaneous

**Significance:** N/A Jun 28, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

### **Problem Identification & Resolution**

Overall, the inspection team determined that the Corrective Action Program (CAP) at Constellation's NMPNS was generally effective in the identification, evaluation, and resolution of problems. The inspection team determined that NMPNS typically identified problems and placed them in the CAP. The inspection team identified that operating experience was utilized and considered at NMPNS, although certain issues at Unit 1 were not fully assessed in all aspects. The inspection team noted that NMPNS was effective in conducting root cause and apparent cause evaluations and effectively resolved most problems categorized as more significant. Based on interviews, observations of plant activities, reviews of the CAP and the Employees Concerns Program, the inspection team determined that site personnel were willing to raise safety issues.

Inspection Report# : [2007006](#) (*pdf*)

Last modified : June 05, 2008