

# Hope Creek 1

## 4Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings

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### Initiating Events

**Significance:**  Jun 29, 2007

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **FAILURE TO FOLLOW TEST PROCEDURE RESULTS IN REACTOR SCRAM**

A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," occurred when technicians did not follow a procedure during undervoltage relay testing on the normal supply breaker for the 10A401 4 kV bus. This resulted in a momentary loss of power to the 10A401 4kV vital bus that caused the loss of two reactor feed pumps (RFPs) and required the manual insertion of all control rods (scram). PSEG's corrective actions included changing the procedure guidance for the sequence of breaker testing and adding independent verification steps for the removal of test equipment.

The finding was greater than minor because it affected the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and impacted the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during plant operations. Specifically, failure to follow surveillance test procedures resulted in the momentary loss of power to the 10A401 vital bus and a reactor scram. The inspectors determined the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because personnel did not follow procedures (H.4.b). Specifically, maintenance technicians failed to remove test equipment in accordance with the test procedure.

Inspection Report# : [2007003](#) (*pdf*)

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### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Sep 28, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **DEGRADED REACTOR CORE ISOLATION COOLING SYSTEM FLOW CONTROLLER AT THE REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL NOT CORRECTED**

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," because PSEG did not identify and correct a condition adverse to quality involving a degraded reactor core isolation cooling system (RCIC) flow controller at the remote shutdown panel (RSP). PSEG's corrective actions included replacing a defective circuit card and creating an administrative tool to periodically check and record the status of RSP controls and indications.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because it resulted in RCIC not able to perform its safety function from the RSP. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green). The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution because PSEG did not identify the degraded RSP RCIC flow controller completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with its potential safety significance (P.1.a). Specifically, PSEG did not identify the leaking capacitors that caused the controller's setpoint to drift.

Inspection Report# : [2007004](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Sep 28, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

## **INADEQUATE OPERATING PROCEDURE FOR THE SERVICE WATER STRAINERS**

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," because PSEG did not have adequate procedures to operate the service water strainer baskets under conditions of high differential pressure. This resulted in PSEG not detecting severe damage to the D service water strainer basket on April 25, 2007, which caused the B1 and B2 safety auxiliaries cooling system (SACS) heat exchangers to become fouled with river grass. PSEG's immediate corrective actions included cleaning the SACS heat exchangers and replacing the D service water strainer basket. Other corrective actions include improving the strainer basket strength and evaluating other improvements to the service water system to minimize susceptibility to river grass.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because it resulted in degradation of the B1 and B2 SACS heat exchangers' capability due to macrofouling. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution because PSEG did not evaluate problems such that the resolution addressed the causes (P.1.c). Specifically, PSEG's evaluations did not identify procedural weaknesses related to the operating limitations of the service water strainer baskets.

Inspection Report# : [2007004](#) (*pdf*)

**G**

**Significance:** Sep 28, 2007

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **FOREIGN MATERIAL RESULTS IN UNAVAILABILITY OF D SERVICE WATER TRAIN**

A self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 was identified when PSEG did not remove foreign material from the D service water bay following desilting activities that subsequently caused the D service water strainer to seize. The D service water train was unavailable for approximately 45 hours to implement repairs. PSEG's immediate corrective actions included removing foreign material from the D service water bay, repairing the D service water strainer, reviewing potential design improvements for the service water traveling screens, and enhancing the desilting procedures to verify that foreign material was removed from the bay prior to system restoration.

The finding was determined to be more than minor because it resulted in approximately 45 hours of unavailability for the D service water train. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because workers did not follow procedures (H.4.b). Specifically in accordance with PSEG procedure MA-AA-716-008, divers did not remove all foreign material that was identified in the D service water bay.

Inspection Report# : [2007004](#) (*pdf*)

**G**

**Significance:** Sep 28, 2007

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **ABB 4kV HK CIRCUIT BREAKER FOR D VITAL BUS FAILED DUE TO HARDENED GREASE**

A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, criterion XVI, 'Corrective Action', occurred when a safety-related 4160 volt breaker did not operate as expected on July 24, 2007, due to hardened grease in the breaker mechanism. This was the third similar breaker failure in which PSEG did not identify or correct deficiencies that led to this nonconforming condition. PSEG subsequently replaced the breaker with a fully refurbished spare breaker, tested the breaker successfully, and revised the preventive maintenance tasks to address this issue in other similar breakers.

This issue was greater than minor because it affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, not identifying and correcting this condition adverse to quality resulted in unplanned unavailability of various safety related equipment such as support equipment for the D emergency diesel generator, the B control room emergency filtration supply fan, and the D filtration, recirculation, and ventilation system recirculation fan. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) based on a Phase 1 screening evaluation. The finding has a

cross-cutting aspect in the area of operating experience review because PSEG did not take appropriate corrective action to address the breaker grease hardening condition in a timely manner.

P. 2. (b).

Inspection Report# : [2007006](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Sep 28, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**B CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION FAILURE DUE TO DAMPER CONTROLLER POWER SUPPLY FAILURE**

The inspectors identified, non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, “Corrective Action,” occurred when on June 11, 2006, the “B” Control Room Emergency Filtration (CREF) damper flow controller did not meet its Technical Specification 3.7.2 required flow rate due to failure to implement corrective actions identified on October 1, 2004. The CREF failure resulted in high flow rate to the CREF Charcoal Filters and inoperability of the “B” CREF System. At the time of the event, PSEG repaired the affected power supply. During this inspection, replacement of 34 Westinghouse Model 75IC controller power supplies was incorporated into the Preventive Maintenance (PM) program.

The finding was greater than minor because it affected the barrier performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the objective to maintain the radiological barrier functionality of the control room. Specifically, the failure to implement corrective actions and correct a condition adverse to quality resulted in reduced effectiveness of the CREF Charcoal Filters to limit control room dose and over 19 hours unplanned unavailability of the “B” CREF System. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green). The finding was determined to have a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution because the licensee did not take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues in a timely manner.

P. 1. (d).

Inspection Report# : [2007006](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Jun 29, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**FAILURE TO PERFORM A RISK ASSESSMENT WHEN REQUIRED BY 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4)**

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50.65(a)(4) when PSEG did not assess and manage the increase in risk for corrective maintenance activities on the ‘C’ SSW pump following an emergent failure of a ‘B’ SSW ventilation supply fan. PSEG updated the risk assessment, implemented appropriate risk management actions, repaired and restored the ‘B’ SSW fan to service, and created notification 20326624 to address the inadequate risk assessment.

The finding was greater than minor because PSEG’s risk assessment had errors or incorrect assumptions that changed the outcome of the plant risk assessment. Specifically, PSEG’s risk assessment did not consider the emergent failure of the ‘B’ SSW supply fan risk prior to performing planned maintenance on the ‘C’ SSW pump. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the incremental core damage probability deficit was in the low E-8 range. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because PSEG did not appropriately plan work activities by incorporating risk insights (H.3.a). Specifically, PSEG did not adjust the work schedule to ensure overall plant risk was minimized because PSEG did not evaluate the change in plant risk caused by the emergent failure of the ‘B’ SSW ventilation supply fan.

Inspection Report# : [2007003](#) (*pdf*)

# Emergency Preparedness

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## Occupational Radiation Safety

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## Public Radiation Safety

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## Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

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## Miscellaneous

**Significance:**  Mar 23, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **FITNESS-FOR-DUTY (FFD) COLLECTION PERSONNEL COLLECTING FFD SAMPLES FROM CO-WORKERS**

The NRC identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 26, Appendix A, subpart B, 2.3 (1) when the inspectors observed PSEG's fitness-for-duty (FFD) collection technicians and security officers perform urine and breath collection on co-workers on March 21, 2007. PSEG implemented immediate corrective actions by stopping the practice of collection personnel performing urine and breath collections on other collection technicians, enhancing the station FFD procedures, and by conducting FFD testing of the affected individuals.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would affect the integrity of the FFD program. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) using the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance in that PSEG did not have FFD adequate procedures that ensured that the regulatory requirements prohibiting collectors from collecting samples from co-workers were followed.

Inspection Report# : [2007007](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Mar 23, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **FITNESS-FOR-DUTY (FFD) COLLECTORS LEAVING FFD SPECIMENS UNATTENDED**

The NRC identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 26, Appendix A, Subpart B, 2.4 (g) (20) when the inspectors observed PSEG's fitness-for-duty (FFD) collection technicians leaving split FFD urine specimens in unsealed aliquot tubes and sealed specimen containers in unattended work areas on March 21, 2007. The licensee implemented immediate corrective measures by capping and sealing FFD aliquot specimens, requiring that FFD donors witness the transfer of their FFD urine specimen to a laboratory technician through a chain-of-custody form, and by sampling an additional 25 percent of PSEG employees for a FFD test.

The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because, if left uncorrected, it could affect the integrity of the FFD program. The inspector determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green)

using the Physical Protection Significance Determination Process. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Human Performance in that PSEG failed to effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel did not follow procedures.

Inspection Report# : [2007007](#) (*pdf*)

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