

Beaver Valley 1

4Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Sep 28, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

INADEQUATE PROCEDURE AND MONITORING PROGRAM FOR TURBINE-DRIVEN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMP TURBINE, 1FW-T-2

Green. (Section 40A2) The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings," for the failure to specify post-maintenance acceptance criteria for important turbine parameters after turbine overhaul, or maintenance that could affect turbine bearing performance, and prescribe adequate performance monitoring of the Unit 1 turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) turbine (1FW-T-2). The licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program (CR 07-24074).

The finding was more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the failure to adequately monitor turbine performance after significant maintenance could result in the TDAFW turbine being degraded without the knowledge of the licensee. The licensee has revised applicable post-maintenance test procedures and has implemented adequate turbine performance monitoring for 1FW-T-2. The inspectors determined the finding did not result in an actual loss of safety function of a system or train of equipment; therefore, the finding was considered to be of very low safety significance.

There is no cross cutting aspect for this finding, because it was determined that this finding is not reflective of current licensee performance.

Inspection Report# : [2007004](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Mar 31, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to effect timely and adequate corrective actions related to deficiencies in a safety-related river water valve pit.

Green. (Section 1R06) The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for inadequate and untimely corrective actions regarding deficiencies in a safety-related river water valve pit at Unit 1. Specifically, the NRC identified that FENOC had performed inadequate inspections of the valve pit in February 2006, as evidenced by a recent inspection that revealed an unsealed penetration between two halves of the pit that contain the 'A' and 'B' headers of the river water system. FENOC subsequently utilized the corrective action program, inspected the valve pit, identified additional deficiencies, and aggressively evaluated and dispositioned specific deficiencies based on significance.

The inspectors determined that this finding is more than minor because it impacted the external factors attribute regarding the availability and reliability of the river water system, and the capability to respond to initiating events and prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors determined that this finding is of very low safety significance, because there was no loss of system or overall function due to the remaining mitigating equipment capability. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, in that FENOC did not properly identify quality issues completely, accurately, and in a timely manner commensurate with their safety significance, when deficiencies in the valve pit were not identified in a February 2006 inspection [P.1(a)].

Inspection Report# : [2007002](#) (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : February 04, 2008