

Browns Ferry 2

4Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Dec 14, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Perform ASME Inspections of Safety-Related Piping.

The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)4 Codes and Standards. Specifically, the licensee failed to perform required code inspections of accessible portions of safety-related piping. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program.

This finding is more than minor because if left uncorrected it would become a more significant safety concern. The failure to perform required inspections of safety-related piping could have allowed undetected through-wall flaws to remain in-service. These undetected flaws could grow in size until leakage from the piping degrades system operation, or if sufficient general corrosion occurs, a gross rupture or collapse of the piping could occur. The finding is of very low safety significance because the finding did not represent a loss of safety function. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting element of problem identification and resolution under the operating experience aspect of the corrective action component [P.2(b)].

[Section 1R21.4]

Inspection Report# : [2007007](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Dec 14, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Corrective Actions for Cable Submersion Were Not Effective.

The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action. Specifically, the licensee failed to correct a cable submergence issue which resulted in the failure of a safety-related cable.

This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding is of very low safety significance because the finding was not a design or qualification deficiency, and did not represent a loss of safety function because the redundant train was available. The cause of the finding is related to the cross-cutting element of problem identification and resolution under the licensee thoroughly evaluates problems aspect of the corrective action component [P.1(c)].

Inspection Report# : [2007007](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Online Risk Assessment of Unit 2 Startup With All Three RFPs Out of Service (Section 1R13)

Green. The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) for the licensee's failure to conduct an adequate risk assessment prior to and during the startup of Unit 2 with all three reactor feedwater pumps (RFP) uncoupled and out of service. Subsequent configuration specific probabilistic safety analysis by the licensee

determined the risk was acceptable. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as PER 123308.

The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to perform an adequate risk assessment was more than minor because it was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of configuration control and adversely affected the cornerstone objective. Also, the licensee's risk assessment did not consider all the risk significant systems that were out of service which, when properly evaluated, resulted in an increased level of risk for Unit 2 (i.e., Red) from a Sentinel perspective. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the actual risk deficit for incremental core damage probability was less than 1E-6, and less than 1E-7 for incremental large early release probability. The cause of this finding was directly related to the "appropriately plans work activities using risk insights" aspect of the Human Performance (Work Control component) cross cutting area because the licensee failed to effectively use their risk assessment tools in the work planning process prior to Unit 2 startup with all three reactor feedwater pumps out of service. (Section 1R13)

Inspection Report# : [2007003](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Mar 31, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Corrective Actions to Resolve Deficiencies in SBO Mitigation Capabilities

The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for ineffective corrective actions by the licensee to ensure that the operating emergency diesel generators (EDGs) during a Unit 2 Station Blackout (SBO) event would have sufficient cooling water under worst case licensing-basis conditions. The licensee developed a new simplified mitigation strategy to address the issue. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as PER 119778.

This finding was greater than minor because it was associated with the Procedure Quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability and reliability of systems that mitigate initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because of the low frequency of occurrence of the specific combination of multiple EDG failures that could lead to a loss of cooling water flow to all of the running EDGs. The cause of finding was directly related to the appropriate and timely corrective action aspect of the Problem Identification and Resolution cross-cutting area because corrective actions developed for Unit 2 SBO mitigation strategy deficiencies were not effective in ensuring timely restoration of cooling water to the EDGs.

Inspection Report# : [2007002](#) (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Jun 30, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Follow the Freeze Seal Procedure and Procedural Inadequacy (Section 40A5.3)

Green. The inspectors identified a Green noncited violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion V, for inadequate procedure and failure to follow quality-related procedure MSI-0-000-PLG001, Installation of Freeze Seals, while installing a freeze seal on the Unit 2 Reactor Vessel Bottom Drain to the Reactor Water Cleanup System. The freeze seal procedure and its use was placed on hold pending further training and industry benchmarking. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as PERs 120928 and 121179.

This finding was considered to be greater than minor because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity cornerstone attributes of Human Performance and Procedure Quality, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that the Reactor Coolant System barrier provided protection to the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Furthermore, this finding could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding's risk was minimal due to the many systems available for reactor vessel injection, the instruments and alarms available to the

operators for monitoring water level, and the amount of time available to act. The cause of this finding was directly related to the aspect of “supervisory and management oversight of contractor work activities” in the cross-cutting area of Human performance (Work Practices component) because of inadequate supervisory and management oversight of contractor execution of critical freeze seal activities during the Unit 2 refueling outage. (Section 4OA5.3)

Inspection Report# : [2007003](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Mar 31, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Operation of Unit 2 Outside the Limits Allowed by the Power-Flow Map

The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of TS 5.4.1.a for the operators' failure to maintain Unit 2 core flow within the bounds of the Core Power/Flow Map established by operating procedures. When notified, the licensee promptly reduced reactor recirculation pump flow. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as PER 119305.

This finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, operators could have unknowingly allowed core flow to exceed the analytical bounds of the fuel vendor's reload report transient analysis which would have been a more significant safety concern. This finding was of very low safety significance because it is associated with fuel barrier integrity. Furthermore, core flow was still within the envelope of the fuel vendor's analytical limits and none of the reactor fuel thermal limits were exceeded. The cause of the finding was directly related to the procedure compliance aspects of the Human Performance cross-cutting area because of inadequate communication of management and supervisory expectations for unit operations in the increased core flow region and lack of operator attention to the proceduralized power/flow map limits.

Inspection Report# : [2007002](#) (*pdf*)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Significance:  Mar 31, 2007

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Two Examples of Failure to Perform Adequate Surveys.

Two examples of a Green self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501(a)(2)(i) were identified for failure to conduct surveys that were reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the magnitude and extent of radiation levels in areas where work was performed. On February 9 and 16, 2007, investigation into electronic dosimeter dose rate alarms, received during work activities, revealed dose rates in excess of those measured during pre-job surveys. Since the new dose rates exceeded the criteria for posting as a high radiation area, the licensee immediately posted and controlled these areas as high radiation areas. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as PERs 119482 and 119829.

This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Program and Process, and it adversely affected the cornerstone objective because the failure to conduct adequate surveys did not ensure adequate protection of worker health and safety from exposure to radiation. Using the Occupational Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the failures to survey did not pose a substantial potential for over exposure and did not affect the ability to assess doses. The cause of the finding was directly related to the work activity coordination aspect of the human performance cross-cutting area because pre-job radiological surveys were inadequate to apprise personnel of plant conditions that affected work activities.

Inspection Report# : [2007002](#) (*pdf*)

Public Radiation Safety

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Significance: Mar 31, 2007

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Properly Prepare a Radioactive Materials Package for Shipment

A Green self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 71.5 was identified for failure to properly package radiological material such that, under conditions normally incident to transportation, the radiation levels at the external surface of the package would not exceed applicable Department of Transportation (DOT) limits. When the two shipments arrived at a processing facility on April 21, 2005, the radiation dose rates measured on portions of the external surface of the packages were as high as 300 mrem/hr, which was in excess of the 200 mrem/hr limit specified by the regulation. The licensee established additional supervisory review and approval prior to shipping packages approaching DOT limits. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program as PER 81364.

This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the Plant Facilities/ Equipment and Instrument attribute of the Public Radiation Safety cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective, in that, the improper transportation packaging resulted in a shipping container with external dose levels exceeding regulatory requirements. Using the Public Radiation Significance Determination Process, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the areas on the packages with elevated radiation levels were inaccessible to the public and the radiation levels were less than two times the DOT limit.

Inspection Report# : [2007002](#) (*pdf*)

Physical Protection

Although the NRC is actively overseeing the Security cornerstone, the Commission has decided that certain findings pertaining to security cornerstone will not be publicly available to ensure that potentially useful information is not provided to a possible adversary. Therefore, the [cover letters](#) to security inspection reports may be viewed.

Miscellaneous

Significance: N/A Aug 24, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Problem Identification and Resolution

The licensee was effective in identifying problems at a low threshold and entering them into the CAP. Issues were typically properly characterized and evaluations such as root causes were sufficiently thorough and detailed. Strong management oversight of the CAP was evident. Initial prioritization of issues and corrective actions appeared to be appropriate to risk and program guidance; however, numerous delays in completion of corrective actions had led to increased backlogs in closure of Problem Evaluation Reports (PERs). Recent management attention had resulted in the backlogs beginning to decrease at the time of this inspection. In addition, the inspectors concluded that the licensee had been slow to effect significant improvement in equipment reliability based on the number of equipment problems and timeliness of corrective actions. Also, some repeat problems, such as, adequacy of corrective action implementation were noted; however, these problems were improved from previous inspections.

The licensee was effective in evaluating internal and external industry operating experience items for applicability and taking appropriate action.

Based on review of the licensee's Concerns Resolution Program (CRP), discussions conducted with plant employees

from various departments, and review of many PERs, the inspectors did not identify any reluctance to report safety concerns. The inspectors concluded that licensee management routinely emphasized the need for all employees to identify and report problems using the appropriate methods established within the administrative programs.

Inspection Report# : [2007008](#) (*pdf*)

Significance:  Mar 31, 2007

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Work Hours for I&C Mechanics Exceeded Overtime Limits Without Prior Authorization

The inspectors identified a Green non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.2.2.d due to inadequate management oversight and awareness of the administrative requirements for controlling overtime which resulted in multiple instances of Instrumentation and Control personnel exceeding overtime limits without prior authorization and documentation. Management immediately changed work schedules to comply with the Technical Specification requirements and entered the issue into their corrective action program as PER 119016.

This finding was greater than minor because if left uncorrected it could become a more significant safety concern due to excessive fatigue by key maintenance personnel performing safety-related activities. An NRC management review determined that the finding was of very low safety significance because no specific performance deficiencies were identified for the individuals during the time they exceeded the established overtime limits

Inspection Report# : [2007002](#) (*pdf*)

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