

# Oconee 1

## 1Q/2007 Plant Inspection Findings

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### Initiating Events

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### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Mar 31, 2007

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Failure to Follow the Installation Procedure for the MDEFW Pump 1A Thrust End Bearing**

A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1 was identified for failure to adequately implement the procedure requirements for thrust end bearing installation on motor driven emergency feedwater (MDEFW) Pump 1A, resulting in thrust bearing failure following extended pump operation in response to a Unit 1 reactor trip. The inspectors determined that the licensee's failure to adequately implement their procedure for thrust end bearing installation was a performance deficiency. The finding was considered to be more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance since the pump operated for approximately 28 hours, which is greater than its 24-hour mission time. (Section 1R12)

Inspection Report# : [2007002](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:** **W** Aug 31, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: VIO Violation

#### **Inadequate Procedural Controls and Risk Management Associated with Breach in SSF Flood Protection Barrier**

Contrary to Technical Specification 5.4.1 and 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4), the licensee failed to use adequate procedures to control maintenance activities (removal of a CO2 access cover from SSF flood barrier to facilitate installation of temporary electrical power cables) that could affect safety-related equipment and therefore failed to assess and manage the increase in risk from external floods for this maintenance activity.

Inspection Report# : [2006017](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Jun 30, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Failure to promptly correct long-standing east penetration room blowout panel-related deficiencies that precluded flood mitigation in the auxiliary building.**

NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criteria XVI, Corrective Action, for failure to promptly identify and correct a significant condition adverse to quality. Specifically, as a result of inappropriate east penetration room blowout panel modifications (identified as a violation in 2002), in conjunction with the inappropriate addition of floor curbing and the inadequate strength of internal doors and block walls (all identified in DEC's corrective action program in 2001), Units 1, 2, and 3 continue to be operated outside their licensing basis with respect to HELB-related flood mitigation in the auxiliary building.

Inspection Report# : [2006014](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:** **SL-IV** Jun 30, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Failure to report east penetration room blowout pante-related deficiencies would prevent fulfillment of the HPI system safety function.**

NCV of 10 CFR 50.73, Part (v) was identified for the failure to report that east penetration room blowout panel-related deficiencies would prevent the fulfillment of the HPI system safety function to mitigate the consequences of a HELB (i.e., to shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a cold shutdown condition).

Inspection Report# : [2006014](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Jun 30, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Failure to Perform Adequate Examinations of Letdown Filter Supports.**

The inspectors identified a finding involving a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50.55a(g)(4)ii for failure to perform a visual (VT-3) examination of the letdown filter housing supports as required by Section XI of the ASME Code. The examinations were performed with a remote camera and the required examination coverage was not obtained as required by Section XI of the ASME Code. The limited remote VT-3 examinations found no indications that the structural integrity of the supports was unacceptable for service. The licensee entered this issue into the Corrective Action Program.

This finding was of more than minor significance because the incomplete examination of the letdown filter housing supports, if left uncorrected, could become a more significant structural support concern. In addition, a failure to examine the letdown filter supports as required by the ASME Code is related to the “Equipment Performance” attribute of the “Initiating Events” cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown, as well as power operations. This finding was evaluated using Phase 1 of the NRC IMC 0609, “Significance Determination Process (SDP).” This finding was of very low safety significance because the worst case degradation of the letdown filter supports would result in a detectable and isolable RCS leak that would not impair the mitigating function of the high pressure injection (HPI) system. (Section 1R08)

Inspection Report# : [2006003](#) (*pdf*)

**Significance:**  Jun 30, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Failure To Maintain Containment Electrical Penetration Enclosures.**

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI for failure to identify a condition adverse to quality in that East and West Penetration Room containment electrical penetration enclosures had not been maintained, such that a number of enclosures allowed the introduction of dirt and debris inconsistent with conditions under which these penetrations were environmentally qualified.

The finding was considered to be a performance deficiency in that the licensee failed to maintain the containment electrical penetration covers such that debris was allowed to accumulate in a number of enclosures; thereby, jeopardizing the environmental qualification of safety-related circuits. This finding was considered to be more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events in that, the degraded penetration covers, if left uncorrected could allow the environmental qualification of safety-related circuits to degrade such that they would fail following a high energy line break (HELB) in the east penetration rooms. Using the phase 1 screening worksheet of Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, as it did not result in a loss of operability of any equipment needed to mitigate the effects of a HELB.

This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, as the licensee did not appropriately identify the degraded penetration covers consistent with their corrective action program. (Section 4OA5.1)

Inspection Report# : [2006003](#) (*pdf*)

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## Emergency Preparedness

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## Occupational Radiation Safety

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## Public Radiation Safety

**Significance:**  Jun 30, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **Failure to calibrate 1RIA-37 Appropriately For The Radiation Measured.**

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 20.1501 (b) for failure to ensure that equipment used for effluent monitoring was calibrated for the radiation measured. Specifically, during a 2005 annual calibration of the Unit 1 Gaseous Waste Disposal Monitor (1RIA-37), an incorrect factor was used in calculating the monitor's expected response to a Chlorine-36 (Cl-36) calibration source. Since the expected response was calculated incorrectly, the detector's voltage parameters were also modified incorrectly during the calibration, which resulted in non-conservative detector output from June 6, 2005 to April 10, 2006. This finding was entered into the licensee's corrective action program.

This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of assuring adequate protection of public health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public domain as a result of routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. The failure to maintain appropriate monitor response of 1RIA-37 directly affected the monitor's isolation function during release of gaseous effluents. The finding was evaluated using the Public Radiation Safety Significance Determination Process (SDP) and was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not impair the licensee's ability to assess dose, and offsite doses from gaseous effluents during the time period in question did not exceed limits in 10 CFR 20.1301 and design criteria in Appendix I to 10 CFR Part 50.

This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance because poor work practices resulted in licensee staff not following established calibration procedures during the monitor calibration. (Section 2PS1)

Inspection Report# : [2006003](#) (*pdf*)

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## Physical Protection

[Physical Protection](#) information not publicly available.

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## Miscellaneous

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