

Robinson 2

4Q/2006 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance: G Dec 31, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Prevent a Repetitive Failure of a Safety-Related Pump's Motor Controller

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, for failure to identify the cause and take corrective action to prevent recurrence for a significant condition adverse to quality, in that the licensee failed to prevent a repetitive failure of a safety-related pump's motor controller when the effects of temperature which reduced the life expectancy of wiring and insulation were not identified.

This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of equipment performance and affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability and reliability of systems that respond to events to prevent undesirable consequences. The failure to identify in 2004 that the effects of temperature had reduced the life expectancy of the coil insulation in the motor controller for a service water booster pump resulted in a repetitive failure in 2006. The inspectors determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not an actual loss of safety function because the redundant system was available. The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution. (Section 1R12)

Inspection Report# : [2006005](#) (*pdf*)

Significance: G Mar 31, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Demonstrate Performance of Safety-Related Breaker Effectively Controlled

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65(a)(2) for failure to demonstrate that the performance of a safety-related breaker was being effectively controlled through the performance of appropriate preventive maintenance, in that repetitive failures that caused a performance criteria to be exceeded were not identified and, as a result goal setting and monitoring was not conducted as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1).

The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). The failure to identify and properly account for repetitive failures of a safety-related valve breaker resulted in goal setting and monitoring not being performed between the period of October 2005 and March 2006. This finding was of very low safety significance because it is not a design or qualification deficiency, does not represent an actual loss of safety function for a system or train, and is not risk significant due to a seismic, fire, flooding, or severe weather initiating event.. The cause of this finding is inattention to detail during validation and verification of assumptions made during the MR evaluations, and is therefore, identified as a performance aspect of the Human Performance cross-cutting area. (Section 1R12)

Inspection Report# : [2006002](#) (*pdf*)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Significance: N/A Dec 31, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate 10 CFR 50.54(q) Evaluation for Emergency Plan Rev. 33

A Severity Level IV non-cited violation was identified for implementing a change to the emergency plan without appropriate justification, contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(q). The finding was evaluated under the NRC's Enforcement Policy using the traditional enforcement process because licensee reductions in the effectiveness of its emergency plan impact the regulatory process. The finding was determined to be a non-cited Severity Level IV violation because it involved licensee failure to meet an emergency planning requirement not directly related to assessment or notification (Section 40A5).

Inspection Report# : [2006005](#) (*pdf*)

Occupational Radiation Safety

Significance:  Jun 30, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Meet Technical Specification Requirements for Radiation Protection Manager Qualification

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specifications (TS) 5.3.1 for failure to ensure the Manager of Radiation Control function met the minimum qualification requirements specified in ANSI/ANS 3.1-1981, American National Standard for Selection, Qualification, and Training of Personnel for Nuclear Power Plants.

The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone attribute of Program and Process and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the adequate protection of the worker health and safety from exposure to radiation from radioactive material during routine civilian nuclear reactor operation. This finding was evaluated using the Occupational Radiation Safety SDP and was determined to be of very low safety significance because there were supervisors in the Radiation Protection department who met the minimum qualification requirements for this position and these individuals provided advise and assistance to the assigned Manager of Radiation Control. This finding was entered into the corrective action program as Action Requests (ARs) 187587 and 196260 (Section 2OS1).

Inspection Report# : [2006003](#) (*pdf*)

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

[Physical Protection](#) information not publicly available.

Miscellaneous

Significance: N/A Oct 20, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Identification and Resolution of Problems

No findings of significance were identified. The licensee was effective at identifying problems at a low threshold and entering them into the Corrective Action Program (CAP). The licensee properly prioritized issues and routinely performed adequate evaluations that were technically accurate and of sufficient depth. Management's involvement in the review of issues documented in the program was timely and appropriate. Self-assessments and audits of the CAP, and trend reviews were critical, thorough, and effective in identifying program deficiencies. Although not reflective of the general assessment into licensee problem identification, the inspectors identified a trend that was not identified by the licensee. The trend involves equipment failures where the root or contributing cause was identified as vendor-related.

Prioritization and evaluation of problems in the CAP were effective. The technical adequacy and depth of evaluations, proposed corrective actions and timeliness were commensurate with the safety significance of the issue. The inspectors identified only minor deficiencies associated with cause determinations. Overall, this area of the program was considered to be effective.

The CAP was effective in correcting problems consistent with the importance to safety of the issues. Effective management involvement in the process was evident. Outstanding corrective actions were tracked and delays in the implementation of corrective actions received the appropriate level of management attention. During the course of the inspection, the inspectors identified isolated problems with the implementation of corrective actions. However, these issues did not affect the overall assessment of corrective action implementation.

Operating Experience (OE), from within the Progress nuclear fleet, the industry, and the NRC, was being effectively used in the CAP. OE was evaluated for applicability at the station and was also used in the assessment of issues that occurred at Robinson. However, during the inspection the inspectors identified several instances where the licensee did not comply with the requirements of their procedure to enter issues identified by the OE program into the CAP. These instances had no safety impact and, therefore, were considered to be minor. Furthermore, these issues did not affect the overall assessment of the use of OE.

Self-assessments were effective in identifying issues, and prioritizing and evaluating them in accordance with their risk significance for operability, reportability, common cause, generic concerns, extent of condition, and extent of cause. Resulting corrective actions were generally effective to prevent recurrence.

Individuals actively utilized the CAP and employee concerns program (ECP). Issues entered into the ECP received the appropriate level of management involvement. Management demonstrated sensitivity to organizational attitude toward the CAP and a safety-conscious work environment. Based on discussions conducted with licensee and contract employees and a review of station activities, site personnel felt free to report safety concerns.

Inspection Report# : [2006009](#) (*pdf*)

Last modified : March 01, 2007