

# Ginna

## 2Q/2006 Plant Inspection Findings

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### Initiating Events

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### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Mar 31, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **INADEQUATE CONTROL OF TRANSIENT COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL**

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.d, which requires, in part, that written procedures be established, implemented, and maintained for the fire protection program. Contrary to TS 5.4.1.d, during a fire walkdown of the auxiliary building operating floor the inspectors identified four drums of charcoal which were not identified as a transient combustible load and did not have a transient combustible permit in violation of Ginna fire protection procedure FPS-16. Ginna entered this performance deficiency into their corrective action program for resolution

The inspectors determined that the failure to properly implement procedure FPS-16 was more than minor because it affected the objectives of availability and reliability for systems which respond to mitigate events under the protection against external hazards attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and because the amount of charcoal exceeded the transient combustible limit of the Fire Hazards Analysis for that area of the plant. The inspectors assessed the finding using Appendix F of the Significance Determination Process (SDP) and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance. The finding is of very low safety significance because the charcoal in question has a fairly high ignition point (350°C) and they were stored in approved containers resulting in a Degradation Rating of Low, which screens to Green in the fire protection SDP. A contributing cause of this finding is related to the cross-cutting element of human performance. (Section 1R05)

Inspection Report# : [2006002\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:**  Mar 31, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **SIMULATOR INCORRECTLY REPLICATED PLANT DESIGN**

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 55.46 (c)(1) which requires a plant-referenced simulator used for the administration of an operating test or to meet experience requirements must demonstrate the expected plant response to operator input and to normal, transient, and accident conditions to which the simulator has been designed to respond. Contrary to the above, on January 25, 2006, the inspectors identified that Ginna failed to ensure that the simulator correctly replicated the expected plant response to accident conditions as a result of an improperly implemented modification to add PPCS to the simulator in 2001. This error was entered into the Ginna corrective action program.

The inspectors determined that this simulator fidelity issue was more than minor because it affected the capability objective of the human performance attribute under the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The finding was evaluated using the Operator Requalification Human Performance SDP (MC 0609 Appendix I). In the SDP, Appendix I, Block 12, the inspectors is required to determine if deviations between the plant control room and the plant reference simulator negatively impact operator actions or result in the potential for negative training. The inspectors determined that negative training was the result of this condition which screens to a finding of very low safety significance. (Section 1R11)

Inspection Report# : [2006002\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:**  Mar 31, 2006

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **MISSED FIRE BRIGADE DRILLS**

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, App. R III.I.3.b which requires that drills shall be performed at regular intervals not to exceed 3 months for each shift fire brigade. Contrary to the requirement, four of five shift fire brigades were not drilled during the fourth quarter of 2005. This finding was entered into Ginna's corrective action program.

The inspectors determined that the failure to meet the fire brigade drill requirement was more than minor because it affected the reliability and capability objectives of the protection against external factors attribute under the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The finding was evaluated using Fire Protection Significance Determination Process (Manual Chapter 0609, App F). The finding category is Fire Prevention and Administrative Controls with an assigned degradation factor of low which screens to Green in Step 1.3.1. A contributing cause of this finding is related to the cross-

cutting element of human performance. (Section 40A2)

Inspection Report# : [2006002\(pdf\)](#)

**G**

**Significance:** Dec 31, 2005

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Failure to Maintain Fire Protection Procedures as Required by Technical Specification 5.4.1**

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1, which requires, in part, that fire protection procedures be established, implemented, and maintained. Contrary to TS 5.4.1, during a walkdown of fire protection procedure SC-3.16.1, the inspector noted that the procedure contained incorrect operating instructions for the diesel-driven and motor-driven fire pumps.

The inspectors determined that the procedure errors in SC-3.16.1, were more than minor because they were associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating System Cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The inspectors assessed the finding using the fire protection Significance Determination Process (SDP) and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance. The finding was of very low safety significance because the procedure errors did not result in a loss of safety function. Specifically, the fire pumps were not rendered inoperable by the procedure errors. As a result, the procedure issues were assigned a degradation rating of low, which screens to Green in the fire protection SDP. The cause of this finding is related to the cross-cutting area of problem identification and resolution.

Inspection Report# : [2005005\(pdf\)](#)

**G**

**Significance:** Oct 07, 2005

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Inadequate Battery Test Procedure Resulted in Use of Inaccurate Test Instrumentation**

The inspectors identified a nont-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, "Test Control," for failure to assure that the station battery test procedure incorporated acceptance limits and that test results were evaluated to assure that the test requirements had been satisfied. During the period 2000-2005, the licensee performed three Technical Specification surveillances on each safety-related station battery to verify the Operability of the safety-related components. The inspection team found that the results from the battery test procedure were not adequately assessed. Test results from this period indicated erratic readings on several battery cells; however, the licensee failed to evaluate the impact these readings had on the Operability of the batteries. In response to the team's questions, the licensee entered the issue into their corrective action program (CAP) and was able to show via subsequent test results that the batteries were Operable.

Inspection Report# : [2005006\(pdf\)](#)

**G**

**Significance:** Sep 30, 2005

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

**Auxiliary Operators Did Not Properly Monitor the Performance of the Relay Room Air Conditioning Systems**

Green. The inspectors identified that auxiliary operators (AOs) during their rounds, did not properly verify the relay room air-conditioning systems were operating as required by procedure P-13, "Auxiliary Operator Tour Guidelines." Specifically, the AOs failed to identify that the "B" relay room air-conditioning system was not functioning properly. As a result of this deficiency, the temperature of the relay room began to increase, and the multiplexor (MUX) cabinets for the plant process computer (PPCS) began to overheat, which could have rendered the system inoperable. In addition to installing temporary fans, Ginna corrective actions included increasing oversight of AO rounds to ensure degraded conditions are properly documented. The cause of this finding is related to the cross-cutting element of problem identification and resolution.

This finding is more than minor since it affected the reliability objective of the Human Performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone. The inspectors assessed the finding using the Significance Determination Process (SDP) and determined the finding to be of very low safety significance. The finding was of low safety significance since the finding did not result in a loss of safety function. Specifically, operators took appropriate compensatory measures to limit the temperature increase of the multiplexor (MUX) cabinets before the PPCS failed. (Section 1R04)

Inspection Report# : [2005004\(pdf\)](#)

## Barrier Integrity

**G**

**Significance:** Sep 30, 2005

Identified By: Self-Revealing

Item Type: FIN Finding

**Failure to Properly Restore the Blowdown System Resulting in a Shutdown to Correct Steam Generator Chemistry**

Green. The inspectors identified a self-revealing finding for a failure of plant operators to use the correct procedure to restore the steam generator blowdown system. As a result of using the incorrect procedure, a steam generator water chemistry excursion occurred, which required a plant

shutdown to restore secondary chemistry to acceptable levels. In addition to restoring steam generator water chemistry to within specification, corrective action included implementing a work package review process that would verify all work packages have proper restoration actions. The cause of this finding is related to the cross-cutting element of human performance.

This finding is more than minor since it affected the physical design barriers objective of the Configuration Control attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone. This finding is not suitable for the significance determination process evaluation, but was reviewed by NRC management is determined to be a green finding of very low safety significance. The finding was of very low safety significance because there was no evidence that the steam generator tubes had been degraded, and the operators implemented appropriate actions after the chemistry excursion occurred.

Inspection Report# : [2005004\(pdf\)](#)

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## **Emergency Preparedness**

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## **Occupational Radiation Safety**

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## **Public Radiation Safety**

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## **Physical Protection**

[Physical Protection](#) information not publicly available.

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## **Miscellaneous**

Last modified : August 25, 2006