

Robinson 2

4Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

G**Significance:** Jun 30, 2005

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

FAILURE TO IDENTIFY AND CORRECT A SURVEILLANCE PROCEDURE THAT UNACCEPTABLY PRECONDITIONS THE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL PUMPS

Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, for failure to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality, in that a surveillance procedure that directed unacceptable preconditioning of the residual heat removal (RHR) pumps was not identified and corrected from 1997 to 2005.

The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the procedure quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability and reliability of systems that respond to events to prevent undesirable consequences. Unacceptable preconditioning of the RHR pump could mask a condition that renders the pump inoperable. The finding is of very low safety significance because it is not a design or qualification deficiency, does not represent an actual loss of safety function for a system or train, and is not risk significant due to a seismic, fire, flooding, or severe weather initiating event.

Inspection Report# : [2005003\(pdf\)](#)**Significance:** SL-IV Mar 24, 2005

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

FAILURE TO FULLY EVALUATE A CHANGE TO THE DISCHARGE PATH OF A SAFETY INJECTION SYSTEM RELIEF VALVE WHICH POTENTIALLY INVOLVES AN UNREVIEWED SAFETY QUESTION

The inspectors identified a Severity Level IV (SL IV) non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.59 requirements for the failure to fully evaluate a change to the plant which potentially involved an unreviewed safety question (USQ). Specifically, the licensee implemented a plant change in 1992 which directed the discharge of a safety injection system (SIS) relief valve to an open floor drain in the auxiliary building (contrary to the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report), without evaluating the effects on dose consequences. The potential USQ was related to an increase in the dose consequences, if the relief valve, which is located outside containment, were to lift (and potentially fail to reseal) during post-LOCA recirculation conditions.

This finding was evaluated using traditional enforcement and is more than minor because it was a change to the facility which would require NRC review and approval prior to implementation. This finding affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to preclude undesirable consequences. However, the technical issue was determined to be of very low safety significance, given the low likelihood of a scenario involving a loss of coolant accident and actuation of the relief valve.

Inspection Report# : [2005006\(pdf\)](#)**G****Significance:** Mar 24, 2005

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

FAILURE TO IDENTIFY AND TRANSLATE DESIGN INPUTS AND ASSUMPTIONS INTO EMERGENCY PROCEDURES

Green: The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, for the failure to assure that applicable design requirements were correctly translated into a residual heat removal (RHR) emergency procedure. Specifically, the licensee did not incorporate the postulated failure of an RHR pump to stop on demand as a design input into an engineering service request.

This finding is more than minor because it affected the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to preclude undesirable consequences. This finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the licensee provided field validation information for the emergency procedure which indicated that, under worst case conditions, margin was available to achieve the switchover to recirculation within the time assumed in the accident analyses. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program and initiated a revision to the emergency procedure.

Inspection Report# : [2005006\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Sep 30, 2005

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure of Two Procedures to Have Appropriate Acceptance Criteria for Restoration of Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Seal Cooling

The inspectors identified a green non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V for two procedures which included instructions for restoring reactor coolant pump seal cooling but did not include any requirement or precaution regarding the time at which seal cooling is restored, even though information provided by the Westinghouse Owners' Group indicated that restoration of RCP seal cooling was time-critical.

This finding was more than minor because it affected the procedure quality attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that the reactor coolant system protects the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding was evaluated using Appendix A to Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process. Because the finding affects a Barrier Integrity Cornerstone objective, the Phase 1 worksheet requires a Phase 3 risk evaluation be completed. A Phase 3 screening analysis was conducted and determined that because of the low likelihood of a station blackout, and the probable recovery of an offsite or onsite alternating-current power source prior to core damage, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance.

Inspection Report# : [2005004\(pdf\)](#)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

[Physical Protection](#) information not publicly available.

Miscellaneous

Last modified : March 03, 2006