

## Braidwood 2

### 2Q/2005 Plant Inspection Findings

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#### Initiating Events

**Significance:**  Mar 31, 2005

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

##### **POOR CONTROL OF COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL AND TEMPORARY POWER SOURCES**

A finding of very low safety significance was identified after the inspectors observed numerous fire hazards (i.e., poor control of combustible material and temporary power sources) during a walkdown of several non-safety related, abandoned buildings located inside the Protected Area. These conditions increased the potential for a loss of offsite power from an external fire, due to the proximity of the buildings to overhead 345 kV transmission lines and the Unit 2 safety related system auxiliary transformers. The primary cause of this finding was related to the cross cutting area of Human Performance (organization), because of the failure of licensee staff to follow station procedures for proper storage of transient combustible materials and use of temporary power sources. This finding was considered more than minor, because of the potential for a loss of offsite power due to an external fire. This issue also affected the Mitigating Systems cornerstone objective to ensure that external factors (i.e., fire, flood, etc) do not impact the availability, reliability and capability of systems that respond to initiating events in order to prevent core damage. The finding was of very low safety significance because there was a reasonable potential for the licensee to identify and respond to a fire; additionally, if offsite power were lost, both Unit 2 emergency diesel generators were available and licensee control room staff were routinely trained in existing station procedures for addressing this event. No violation of NRC requirements occurred.

Inspection Report# : [2005002\(pdf\)](#)

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#### Mitigating Systems

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#### Barrier Integrity

**Significance:**  Sep 30, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

##### **FAILURE TO HAVE APPROPRIATE PROCEDURES FOR OPERATION OF THE HYDROGEN RECOMBINERS**

The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance when they noted that the procedures for operating the hydrogen recombiners, if followed as written, would have resulted in the recombiners operating at too low of a temperature to be effective. This was due to a revision that changed the startup procedure, but not the panel lineup and shutdown procedures. The causes of this violation were related to the cross-cutting areas of Human Performance, because a system engineer failed to properly revise the procedures, and Problem Identification and Resolution, because the purpose of the revision was as a corrective action for a previously identified violation and was not effective. The condition existed for a period of 2 weeks before being identified and corrected through another procedure revision. The finding was more than minor because it affected the Barrier Integrity cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that the physical containment barrier would protect the public from radio nuclide releases caused by accidents or events. The finding was of very low safety significance because the hydrogen recombiner system is not a significant contributor to the large early release frequency for pressurized water reactors with large dry containments. This issue was determined to be a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria V, for procedures that were not appropriate to the circumstances.

Inspection Report# : [2004007\(pdf\)](#)

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#### Emergency Preparedness

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#### Occupational Radiation Safety

## **Public Radiation Safety**

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## **Physical Protection**

[Physical Protection](#) information not publicly available.

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## **Miscellaneous**

Last modified : August 24, 2005