

McGuire 1

3Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Sep 11, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to comply with design control for a design assumption associated with the nuclear service water system

A non-cited violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion III was identified by the inspectors for inadequate design control involving an assumption that supported nuclear service water flow following a seismic event. The assumption was that non-seismic condenser circulating water pipe would be available for an extended period of time after a seismic event as the discharge path for nuclear service water train A. Similar to Example 3.a. of Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, this issue is more than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure reliability of systems that respond to initiating events and associated attributes of design control and protection from external factors (seismic). Following the identification of the issue, the licensee performed a seismic evaluation of the piping and determined that it would sufficiently perform the relied upon minimal service water flow function after a seismic event. Consequently, the issue was determined to be of very low safety significance. (Section 1R15)

Inspection Report# : [2004005\(pdf\)](#)

Significance: SL-IV Sep 11, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing an unreviewed safety question associated with the nuclear service water system

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10CFR50.59 for failure to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a change to plant procedures that involved an unreviewed safety question. The unreviewed safety question dealt with extending the availability of non-seismic condenser circulating water piping to perform a safety-related function following a seismic event. This issue is more than minor because it would require NRC review prior to implementation. A subsequent engineering evaluation determined that the non-seismic piping would not collapse or kink, and although it may leak, it will provide the necessary minimal service water flow function. Since the technical issue was determined to be of very low safety significance, the regulatory significance was categorized as a Severity Level IV violation. (Section 4OA2b.(1))

Inspection Report# : [2004005\(pdf\)](#)

Significance: SL-IV Sep 11, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to obtain a license amendment prior to implementing a design change to the facility associated with the auxiliary feedwater system

A non-cited violation of 10CFR50.59 was identified by the inspectors for changing the design of the auxiliary feedwater system as described in the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report without performing a safety evaluation or obtaining a Technical Specification change. The change reduced the required number of trains of auxiliary feedwater from three independent trains to two independent trains to safely shutdown the reactor.

This failure to perform a safety evaluation and submit a Technical Specification change is more than minor because it would require an NRC review prior to implementation. Because there was no evidence to indicate that the licensee had used the change the safety significance was determined to be very low. Consequently, the regulatory significance was categorized as a Severity Level IV violation. (Section 4OA2b.(2))

Inspection Report# : [2004005\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Sep 11, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Separation and Protection of Cables Associated With Redundant Trains of Instrumentation Located in the Same Fire Area

A non-cited violation of Unit 1 Operating License Condition 2.C.4 and Unit 2 Operating License Condition 2.C.7 was identified by the

inspectors for failure to comply with McGuire's approved fire protection program and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. Specifically, Train A and Train B cables for the primary and backup power supplies for all four reactor protection system (RPS) channels were routed in close proximity in Room 803A (Unit 1 Fire Area 15/17) and Room 805A (Unit 2 Fire Area 16/18). The cables did not have adequate protection (i.e., 20-foot separation or fire barriers) to remain free of fire damage in the event of a fire. The licensee entered this issue into its corrective action program. The finding is greater than minor because it is associated with the protection against external factors attribute, and degraded the reactor safety mitigating systems cornerstone objective. The finding degraded the defense-in-depth for fire protection. This finding is of very low safety significance because the likelihood of a fire, in either room 803A or 805A, that would damage all four reactor protection system channels was relatively low due to the small ignition sources and the horizontal distance of the ignition sources from the cables. (Section 40A5)

Inspection Report# : [2004005\(pdf\)](#)

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Significance: Jun 12, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to update fire strategy plans when a modification removed numerous extinguishers.

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of the operating license condition for fire protection for failing to update fire strategy plans when a modification removed numerous fire extinguishers from plant fire areas that contain safety-related equipment. The non-updated fire strategy plans could decrease the effectiveness of the fire brigade. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with fire protection equipment availability and degraded the ability to meet the manual suppression Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective. The finding is of very low safety significance because the areas where the inspectors found extinguishers missing did not have both trains of safe shutdown and the standby shutdown system in the same fire area while utilizing 20 foot separation between trains, hence, the significance of the fire brigade's decreased effectiveness was reduced. (Section 1R05)

The inspectors identified a second example of non-cited violation 05000369,370/2004004-01 which involved inadequate fire strategy plans and was a violation of the license condition for fire protection. The strategy plan for fire area 21, auxiliary building 750 elevation, did not identify that class D combustibles were located in the fire zone and identified that extinguishants were in locations where none existed. The strategy plan for fire area 4, auxiliary building elevation 716, did not list one of the rooms that was in the fire area. The failure to have comprehensive pre-fire strategy plans was considered a degradation for manual fire fighting effectiveness. This finding is more than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objectives to ensure capability of features that respond to initiating events and the associated attributes of protection from external factors (including fire), procedure quality, and design control. The licensee's corrective actions for the previous violation have not yet been implemented for these fire areas. The inspectors determined these corrective actions would likely have identified the deficiencies. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it only minimally diminished manual suppression effectiveness without affecting the low fire ignition frequency within the compartments or the previously established safe shutdown strategy for a fully developed fire within the applicable compartments. (Section 1R05 of IR 05000369,370/2004005)

Inspection Report# : [2004004\(pdf\)](#)

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Significance: Jun 12, 2004

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Adequately Correct Configuration Discrepancies for ECCS Sump Valve.

A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action was identified for failure to take adequate corrective action to resolve a deviation from the as-designed configuration for the B train containment spray suction isolation valve actuator (1NS-1B). The deviation prevented the B train common emergency core cooling system containment sump isolation valve (1NI-184B) for the residual heat removal and containment spray systems from opening when manually actuated from the valve's main control board switch. The self-revealing finding was greater than minor because it affected the availability and reliability of the emergency core cooling system recirculation function for the Mitigating System Cornerstone and the containment spray system for the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone. The finding is of very low safety significance because of the short time interval during which both the automatic function and manual backup function were unavailable, and the availability of a redundant train during this short time interval. (Section 1R22)

Inspection Report# : [2004004\(pdf\)](#)

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Significance: Mar 13, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to have pre-fire plans for the Unit 1 and 2 interior and exterior doghouses

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of the operating license condition for fire protection (2.C.4 for Unit 1, 2.C.7 for Unit 2) for failure to have pre-fire (strategy) plans for the interior and exterior doghouse fire areas as part of the fire fighting procedures. The dog houses contain safety-related main steam piping and main steam isolation valves, steam generator power operated relief valves, main steam safety valves, main feed piping and isolation valves, and auxiliary feedwater piping and isolation valves.

This finding was considered to be more than minor because the manual fire suppression defense-in-depth feature was moderately impacted, which affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of protection from external factors including fire. This finding was considered to

be of very low safety significance because the dog houses are physically independent (separated by distance and enclosed in 3-hour fire barriers) and either the interior or exterior doghouse can independently provide the necessary safe shutdown functions.

Inspection Report# : [2004003\(pdf\)](#)

Significance: SL-IV Mar 13, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to update the UFSAR - (two examples)

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation for failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e) for inclusion of all aspects of the fire protection program, including the standby shutdown facility (SSF) and fire protection safe shutdown methodology. This issue is greater than minor because the failure to include descriptive information on fire protection defense-in-depth features in the UFSAR could have an impact on future design or operational changes to the safe shutdown methodology or SSF. However, it is of very low safety significance because use of the un-updated UFSAR did not result in unacceptable changes to the facility or procedures.

The inspectors identified an additional example of a previously identified non-cited violation (05000369,370/2004003-02) for failure to update the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) as required by 10 CFR 50.71(e). Specifically, the inspectors noted a failure to resolve an UFSAR discrepancy with the Design Basis Document regarding feedwater isolation valve stroke time requirements. This issue is greater than minor because the failure to include descriptive information on feedwater isolation valve stroke time requirements could have an impact on future stroke time tests and subsequent performance of the isolation valves. However, it is of very low safety significance because use of the un-updated UFSAR did not result in unacceptable changes to the facility or procedures. (IR 05000369,370/2004008; Section 4OA2c.(3).2)

Inspection Report# : [2004003\(pdf\)](#)

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Significance: Mar 13, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to have a rated 3-hour barrier around the SSF power system

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of the operating license condition for fire protection (2.C.4 for Unit 1, 2.C.7 for Unit 2) for failure to have a 3-hour-rated fire barrier that enclosed the SSF power system equipment as described in the McGuire Safety Evaluation Report Supplement 6.

This finding was considered to be more than minor because it is a degradation of the fire protection defense-in-depth feature to protect structures, systems, and components important to safety in order to minimize the affect of fire, which affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of protection from external factors including fire. This finding was considered to be of very low safety significance because B safe shutdown train equipment can independently provide the necessary safe shutdown functions and is physically independent of the SSF.

Inspection Report# : [2004003\(pdf\)](#)

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Significance: Mar 13, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Standby Shutdown Facility was Not Independent of Cables in Fire Areas 2 and 14

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation (NCV) of Unit 1 operating license condition 2.C.4 for the licensee's failure to provide a dedicated shutdown capability [the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF)] that was independent of cables that were located in Fire Areas 2 and 14.

This finding was of greater than minor significance because it affected the objectives of the mitigating systems cornerstone, in that, it affected the availability and reliability of the SSF to maintain the plant in hot shutdown following a fire in Fire Areas 2 or 14. This finding was of very low significance because the large sizes of Fire Areas 2 and 14 would prevent a credible fire from causing a challenging hot gas layer that could affect all cables in the fire areas; the ignition frequencies for credible fires that could damage the cables that would affect the SSF were sufficiently low; and sufficient fire mitigation and safe shutdown equipment would be available to reduce the risk to very low significance.

Inspection Report# : [2004003\(pdf\)](#)

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Significance: Feb 13, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Deviation from Design Requirements for Line Slope and Drain Legs for Containment Pressure Transmitter Impulse Lines Was not Identified or Evaluated

The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control requirements. The licensee had failed to identify and evaluate the impact on design of sloping the impulse lines for the containment pressure transmitters downward from the containment towards the transmitters without low point drain legs installed. This configuration was a deviation from the licensee's design requirements, and introduced the potential for water intrusion in the instrument impulse lines during normal operation and accident conditions. In response to this condition, the licensee performed an operability evaluation and entered the finding into their corrective program (Problem Investigation Process (PIP) Report No. M-04-00713). The finding is greater than minor because it affects the design control attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective, in that the formation of a loop seal would have the potential to affect the performance capability of

instruments used for automatic initiation of engineered safety features, containment pressure control, and post-accident monitoring. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) because it is a design deficiency that will not result in loss of automatic initiation of engineered safety features, containment pressure control, or post-accident monitoring capability (loss of function). (Section 1R21.21. b).
Inspection Report# : [2004002\(pdf\)](#)

G**Significance:** Dec 13, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to perform an adequate risk assessment for removing from service the auxiliary feedwater isolation valve to the 1D steam generator

A non-cited violation (NCV) was identified by the inspectors for failure to perform an adequate risk assessment as required by 10 CFR 50.65 (a)(4) when the 1B motor-driven auxiliary feedwater pump containment isolation valve for the 1D steam generator (1CA42B) was closed to perform maintenance on October 14, 2003 (Section 1R13). This finding was considered to be more than minor because the inadequate risk assessment resulted in the assignment of an incorrect risk action level (color) for this maintenance activity. This finding was considered to be of very low safety significance because had the error not occurred the only additional action required would have been management awareness of the additional risk associated with the activity.

Inspection Report# : [2003005\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

G**Significance:** Jun 12, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to establish adequate test conditions during surveillance testing of Ice Condenser lower inlet doors, 2 Examples.

The inspectors identified two examples of a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control for failure to perform adequate surveillance testing on the Ice Condenser lower inlet doors under suitable conditions. The first example involved the failure to control the environmental conditions in the containment during the testing of the lower inlet doors which resulted in obtaining inaccurate data. This finding is more than minor because the failure to establish suitable environmental conditions to obtain accurate door torque data impacts the ability to verify that the lower inlet doors will open at the appropriate limits. Consequently, the mitigating function of the ice condenser to maintain containment integrity in the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone was affected. The finding is considered of very low safety significance because when the plant returned to cold shutdown (one week later) and the licensee conducted a retest under the appropriate accident configuration, all values were found to be within acceptable limits. (Section 1R22)

The second example involved the inappropriate performance of preventative maintenance immediately prior to the lower inlet doors surveillance test which resulted in unacceptable preconditioning. This finding is more than minor because performing preventative maintenance immediately prior to the surveillance test has the potential to mask the as-found condition of the lower inlet doors and results in the inability to verify operability. Consequently, the equipment operability and function objectives of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone were affected. The finding is of very low safety significance due to the licensee performing an as-found visual inspection of the lower inlet doors at initial cold shutdown and having not found any degraded conditions that would affect lower inlet door operability. (Section 1R22)

Inspection Report# : [2004004\(pdf\)](#)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

G**Significance:** Jun 12, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Failure to implement/use adequate engineering controls to effectively manage the radioactive contamination source term during IEOC16 steam generator eddy-current testing activities.

The inspectors identified a finding for inadequate implementation of proposed contamination control initiatives for Unit 1 End-of-Cycle 16 refueling outage eddy current test (ECT) activities. The primary control initiative which involved scrubber brushes used to clean particulates from ECT drive and communication cables during their withdrawal from S/G tubes were improperly sized and thus ineffective in minimizing

the transfer of radioactive particulate contamination from the S/Gs onto the work platforms. Further, backup contamination control equipment and felt pads were not available until the end of the subject task. The inadequate implementation of the proposed controls resulted in extensive contamination on the S/G platforms resulting in increased general area dose rates. This finding is greater than minor because it adversely affects the source term control attribute of the Occupational Radiation Safety Cornerstone and resulted in the unexpected increase in general area S/G platform dose rates and increased worker exposure. This finding is of very low safety significance because the licensee's three year rolling average collective dose per unit was less than 135 person rem, and all individual worker exposures were closely monitored by the licensee and were within regulatory limits. (Section 2OS2)

Inspection Report# : [2004004\(pdf\)](#)

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Significance: Jun 12, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to establish proper engineering and monitoring controls during 1EOC16 S/G maintenance activities.

An NRC identified example and a self-revealing example of a non-cited violation (NCV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1(a) were identified for failure to follow approved radiation protection guidance for Unit 1 (U1) steam generator (S/G) maintenance activities.

NRC identified example: The licensee failed to properly configure ventilation equipment and conduct required radiological analyses for initial airborne particulate samples collected. Failure to properly establish the ventilation system equipment contributed to the uncontrolled dispersion of airborne particulate radiological material within the U1 reactor building. Self-revealing example: The failure to monitor for alpha emitting radionuclides in particulate air samples prevented timely and thorough evaluation of potential radiological hazards for occupational workers. These examples are more than minor because they adversely affect the plant equipment and the program and process attributes of the Occupational Radiation Safety cornerstone. The failure to properly establish the ventilation equipment resulted in unnecessary radionuclide intakes by workers and the failure to conduct particulate air sample alpha analyses impacted the thorough and timely evaluation of potential airborne radiological hazards. The examples were determined to be of low safety significance because subsequent analyses did not identify any significant alpha emitter hazards, workers were monitored for exposures from external radiation fields and from internally deposited radionuclides as appropriate, and no individuals exceeded either internal or external exposure limits. (Section 2OS1)

Inspection Report# : [2004004\(pdf\)](#)

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

[Physical Protection](#) information not publicly available.

Miscellaneous

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