

## Hatch 2

### 3Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings

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#### Initiating Events

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#### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:** SL-IV Sep 25, 2004

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Failure to Perform 10 CFR 50.59 Evaluation**

The inspectors identified a SL-IV non-cited violation (NCV) when the licensee failed to perform a 10 CFR 50.59 screening or evaluation for failing closed the RHRSW minimum flow valves. This evaluation was required to demonstrate that the change did not create the possibility of a malfunction of equipment important to safety with a different result than any previously evaluated in the updated final safety analysis report (UFSAR).

As described in the NRC Enforcement Policy, violations of 10 CFR 50.59 are considered to potentially impede or impact the regulatory process. Therefore, the significance of this finding was assessed using the Enforcement Policy Supplements. The inspectors determined the finding was more than minor because the inspectors could not reasonably determine that the change would not ultimately require NRC approval, based on the lack of licensee documentation related to compensatory measures, short or long term corrective actions. Based on the inspectors review of the licensee's 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation, this violation was determined to be of very low safety significance.

Inspection Report# : [2004004\(pdf\)](#)

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**Significance:** Mar 27, 2004

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Inadequate Maintenance Instructions Results in Emergency Diesel Generator Start and Inoperability**

A self-revealing non-cited violation (NCV) was identified for inadequate work instructions provided to workers to remove a section of Plant Service Water (PSW) piping. This resulted in spilling water on to the 2C Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) relay panel causing an auto-start of the 2C EDG and subsequent inoperability.

This finding is more than minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone in that the water spillage affected EDG operability. The finding was determined to be of a very low safety significance because the required redundant equipment trains were operable and the 2C EDG was restored to operable status within the Technical Specification (TS) allowed outage time.

Inspection Report# : [2004002\(pdf\)](#)

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#### Barrier Integrity

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#### Emergency Preparedness

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#### Occupational Radiation Safety

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#### Public Radiation Safety

## **Physical Protection**

[Physical Protection](#) information not publicly available.

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## **Miscellaneous**

Last modified : December 29, 2004