

San Onofre 2

1Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance: N/A Oct 10, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

95001 for Green to White

During this supplemental inspection, performed in accordance with Inspection Procedure 95001, the inspector determined that the licensee performed a comprehensive and thorough evaluation in which specific problems were identified, an adequate root cause evaluation was performed and corrective actions were taken or planned to prevent recurrence.

Inspection Report# : [2003011\(pdf\)](#)

Mitigating Systems



Significance: G Dec 29, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

High pressure safety injection header isolation valve failure to open during testing

The inspectors determined that the licensee implemented an inadequate procedure that did not ensure that electrical leads in safety-related circuitry were properly landed.

A inspector-identified noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.5.1.1 was identified. The finding was considered to be more than minor because the reliability and capability of a portion of the safety injection system was compromised when high pressure safety injection header Isolation Valve 2HV9323 failed to open on a simulated safety injection actuation signal. However, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the other three Train B high pressure safety injection header isolation valves were operable and capable of opening on a safety injection actuation signal to allow injection into the reactor coolant system. As a result, the actual safety function of the Train B safety injection system remained intact because only two of the four valves were needed.

Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)



Significance: G Jul 11, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to promptly identify and correct linestarter degradation

A noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, was identified as a result of inadequate corrective actions in response to the improper use of trichloroethane-based cleaners during linestarter maintenance. This resulted in unnecessary degradation of safety-related linestarter auxiliary contacts.

This issue was considered more than minor because the damage caused by improper maintenance practices to safety-related linestarters, if left uncorrected, could lead to a more significant safety concern in that a risk-significant valve could fail to perform its safety function. The finding was characterized under the Significance Determination Process as having very low safety significance because there was no actual impact on the safety-related function of any Unit 3 valve. Additionally, the results of the inspection of the remaining Unit 2 risk dominant valves, completed on July 11, 2003, did not result in any additional test failures.

Inspection Report# : [2003004\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Significance: SL-IV Apr 01, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Change to EAL C3 resulting in decrease in effectiveness of EP in violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q)

Between March 3 and April 25, 2003, the licensee implemented a change to Emergency Action Level C3 which constituted a decrease in effectiveness of the emergency plan because two conditions which would previously have resulted in site area emergency classification would not be classified by the revised emergency action level. Implementation without prior NRC approval of changes to the emergency plan which constitute reduction in the effectiveness of the plan was a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.54(q).

The finding was evaluated using NUREG-1600, "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Actions," Section IV, because licensee reductions in the effectiveness of its emergency plan impact the regulatory process. The finding had greater than minor significance because deletion of conditions indicative of a site area emergency has the potential to impact safety. The finding was determined to be a noncited Severity Level IV violation because the emergency action level change constituted a failure to implement an emergency planning standard and did not constitute a failure to meet an emergency planning standard as defined by 10 CFR 50.47(b). This finding has been entered into the licensee's corrective action program as Action Request 030400514.

Inspection Report# : [2003003\(pdf\)](#)

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Miscellaneous

Last modified : May 05, 2004