

Beaver Valley 1

1Q/2004 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events



Significance: Dec 31, 2003

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

REACTOR TRIP DUE TO PERSONNEL ERROR DURING SOLID STATE PROTECTION SYSTEM TESTING

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1, for failure to follow a procedure associated with safety-related equipment on Unit 1. This failure involved human performance errors and resulted in an automatic reactor trip. The corrective actions for this event included procedural improvements and increased management oversight for risk significant activities.

This finding is greater than minor because it affected the Initiating events cornerstone in that the probability of a reactor trip was increased. The finding is of very low safety significance because the event did not increase the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available.

Inspection Report# : [2003005\(pdf\)](#)

Mitigating Systems



Significance: Dec 31, 2003

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

FAILURE TO PERFORM ADEQUATE AND TIMELY CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SPURIOUS 480-VOLT CIRCUIT BREAKER TRIPS

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, for the failure to take adequate and timely corrective actions associated with the spurious trip of Unit 1 480V circuit breaker 9P7. This failure rendered an Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) out of service for over 7 hours. The licensee is currently in the planning stages to resolve the spurious trip issue associated with the affected 480 volt circuit breakers.

The finding was considered a performance deficiency since there was existing generic communications, i.e., NRC IN 93-75, as well as similar failures that occurred in 1997, that were not adequately addressed. The finding is more than minor because it affected the Mitigating System cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding is of very low safety significance because the EDG was out of service for less than the technical specification allowed outage time of 72 hours.

Inspection Report# : [2003005\(pdf\)](#)



Significance: Sep 27, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

FAILURE TO DECLARE RIVER WATER PUMP INOPERABLE WITH HIGH VIBRATION READINGS

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.4.1, on Unit 1, because one train of River Water (RW) was inoperable for a time period that exceeded the Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) action time of 72 hours and the additional six hours required to place the unit in Mode 3 (78 total hours). Vibration measurements taken on the 'A' RW pump exceeded the ASME limit for operability, however, the pump remained in operation for 78.5 hours.

This finding is greater than minor because it affected the Mitigating System cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability and reliability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding is of very low safety significance because the pump was operating at required flow and pressure during the entire time period and thus remained in an available status.

Inspection Report# : [2003004\(pdf\)](#)

G**Significance:** Jul 25, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

FAILURE TO RE-EVALUATE A CONDITION ADVERSE TO QUALITY ASSOCIATED WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF MCCBs DURING TESTING

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," because First Energy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC) failed to properly evaluate a condition adverse to quality involving the trip function of molded case circuit breakers (MCCBs).

The finding was greater than minor since potentially degraded MCCBs remained in-service and a fault on a supplied load could have resulted in the loss of an entire motor control center and, hence, affect the ability of multiple safety-related systems to perform their safety-related function. The finding was of very low safety significance since no actual conditions were identified where a motor control center was lost as a result of this problem.

Inspection Report# : [2003008\(pdf\)](#)G**Significance:** Jul 25, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

FAILURE TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR A SIGNIFICANT CONDITION ADVERSE TO QUALITY INVOLVING THE USE OF UNCALIBRATED M&TE

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for failure to ensure that a significant condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, the licensee used uncalibrated measuring and test equipment (M&TE) during a surveillance test of safety-related equipment.

The finding was greater than minor because the use of un-calibrated M&TE during surveillance tests of safety-related systems affected the availability and reliability of safety-related mitigating systems required to respond to initiating events. The use of un-calibrated test equipment could result in the failure to identify unavailable mitigating equipment. The finding was of very low safety significance since an actual loss of the safety function of any mitigating system did not occur or go undetected.

Inspection Report# : [2003008\(pdf\)](#)G**Significance:** Jun 28, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

FAILURE TO FOLLOW PROCEDURE FOR MANUAL OPERATOR ACTION CAUSES EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR TO BE UNAVAILABLE

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 6.8.1 because a procedure associated with safety-related equipment was not adequately implemented. This resulted in an increased unavailability of the Unit 1, No. 1 emergency diesel generator (EDG).

Procedure 1/2OM-48.1.I, "Technical Specification Compliance," Rev. 13 required written restoration instructions be provided to a remotely-stationed operator in order to maintain continued EDG availability. Although verbally covered in the pre-job brief, the written instructions were not given to the designated operator.

This finding is greater than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring availability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Without written instructions in the field, operator actions could not be considered a virtual certainty (i.e., probability nearly equal to one) as described in Nuclear Energy Institute 99-02, Rev 2. The finding was of very low safety significance because the EDG was unavailable for less than the technical specification allowed outage time of 72 hours.

Inspection Report# : [2003003\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

W**Significance:** Apr 30, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: VIO Violation

ADEQUATE AND TIMELY EMERGENCY RESPONSE STAFFING IN FOUR KEY FUNCTIONAL AREAS NOT MAINTAINED AT ALL TIMES

The 12 augmented radiation protection (RP) technician responders (i.e., six to respond in 30 minutes (M) and six to respond in 60 M) in the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) were not capable of meeting the minimum and timely staffing requirements in Emergency Preparedness Plan (EPP), Section 5, Table 5-1. EPP Section 5.2 states that Table 5-1 identifies the staffing requirements and capabilities for additions of the ERO. Table 5-1 requires that 12 RP technicians must respond to augment the shift crew in the four functional areas of offsite surveys (two in 30M and two in 60M), onsite surveys (one in 30M and one in 60M), in-plant surveys (one in 30M and one in 60M), and in-plant protective actions (two in 30M and two in 60M).

This was an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and the EPP for not ensuring that adequate and timely emergency response staffing, in the four stated functional areas, was maintained at all times. This finding was of low to moderate safety significance because staffing augmentation processes were not capable of ensuring augmentation of the initial response staff in accordance with EPP facility activation commitments for RP technicians.

A violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), 10 CFR 50.54(q), and The Emergency Preparedness Plan, Table 5.1, was issued by EA Letter 03-054, dated July 10, 2003. Reference NRC Inspection Report 50-334(412)2003-003.

Inspection Report# : [2003009\(pdf\)](#)

Inspection Report# : [2003003\(pdf\)](#)

Inspection Report# : [2003006\(pdf\)](#)

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Miscellaneous

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