

Oconee 3

4Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance:  Jun 28, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Detect Non-Conforming Parts during Receipt Inspections

A NCV of 10CFR50.55a(g)(4) and 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion VII was identified by the inspectors, in that measures taken to preclude the installation of non-conforming replacement parts and the ability to evaluate the suitability of replacement during the Quality Assurance (QA) receipt inspection process were not adequate. Specifically, this was identified for inadequate QA review during receipt inspections that resulted in the licensee installing one non-conforming Control Rod Drive Mechanisms (CRDM) (Split Nut) Flange Ring on Unit 2, and discovering, prior to the installation in Unit 3, 68 CRDMs and 552 CRDM Hold Down Bolts that did not meet the design and procurement specifications. This finding was more than minor because non-conforming material was actually installed in Unit 2. However, it was determined to be of very low safety significance because there was not a loss of system function. (Section 40A5.1C)

Inspection Report# : [2003003\(pdf\)](#)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Dec 27, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Failure to implement the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) diesel generator manufacturer's recommended preventive maintenance schedule for replacement of grommets

The inspectors identified a finding for failure to implement the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF) diesel generator manufacturer's recommended preventive maintenance schedule for replacement of grommets every six years. Consequently, at ten years some of the grommets were found to be "at or near failure." This finding is more than minor because a failure of the grommets could lead to diesel coolant leaks and loss of cooling to the diesel; thereby, affecting the reactor safety mitigating system cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of a system that responds to initiating events to prevent core damage. A Phase III evaluation, which credits the replenishment of SSF diesel generator cooling and recovery of offsite power, indicated that the performance deficiency was of very low safety significance. (Section 40A5.4)

Inspection Report# : [2003005\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Dec 27, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Design Calculation Contains Inaccurate Post LOCA Room Temperatures and a Lack of Assurance that Safety-Related Pumps were Capable of Operating in this Temperature Environment

A NCV of 10 CFR 50 Appendix B, Criterion III, was identified by the inspectors for failure to properly translate design basis parameters for emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) into applicable specifications, drawings, procedures, and instructions. Specifically, design calculation OSC-6667 documented that post LOCA temperatures in the low pressure injection (LPI) and high pressure injection (HPI) pump rooms could reach ambient temperatures as high as 257 degrees; however, safety-related pumps and motors in those rooms (i.e., LPI, HPI, and reactor building spray pumps and motors) were not environmentally qualified for this type of environment. The finding was considered to be more than minor because it potentially affected the mitigating systems cornerstone, in that it affected the environmental qualification of safety-related equipment needed to mitigate a loss of coolant accident. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) due to the fact that the re-calculated ambient temperatures were lower than 257 degrees and that actual testing indicated that the pumps and motors could operate successfully at the predicted ambient temperatures without adverse consequences. Therefore, there was no loss of function, and the issue was screened out in Phase 1 of the SDP as Green. (Section 4OA5.5)

Inspection Report# : [2003005\(pdf\)](#)



Significance: Dec 19, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: VIO Violation

Failure to Promptly Identify and Correct Insufficient SSF Pressurizer Heater Capacity

Contrary to 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, as of March 2002, the licensee failed to promptly identify and correct a condition adverse to quality involving pressurizer ambient heat losses that exceeded the capacity of those pressurizer heaters powered from the Standby Shutdown Facility (SSF). Evidence of this condition, which may have existed from the time the SSF was put into service in 1986 until the condition was discovered in March 2002, included pressurizer insulation problems (since pre-operational testing) and numerous Problem Investigation Process reports since 1996 identifying pressurizer heater capacity concerns. As a result of the failure to promptly identify and correct this condition, an insufficient number of pressurizer heaters powered from the SSF has been available to assure natural circulation during certain postulated SSF events. This issue has a low to moderate safety significance because of the importance of the SSF powered pressurizer heaters to maintain a pressurizer steam bubble during events where the SSF is used to achieve safe shutdown. Specifically, without a steam bubble to maintain primary system pressure, reactor coolant system (RCS) subcooling would be jeopardized, and single phase RCS natural circulation would be interrupted due to voiding in the hot leg. Decay heat would then challenge the pressurizer safety relief valves, and a failure of one of these valves to reseal would lead to core damage since the SSF standby makeup pump is of insufficient capacity to recover the resultant loss in RCS inventory.

Inspection Report# : [2003012\(pdf\)](#)



Significance: Sep 27, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to follow a procedure required by TS 5.4.1, resulting in multiple reactor operators/senior reactor operators failing to properly reactivate their licenses

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1(a) for failure to follow Operation Management Procedure 1-12, "Maintenance of Licensed Operator, Shift Technical Advisor, and Non-licensed Operator Qualifications," resulting in multiple reactor operators/ senior reactor operators failing to properly reactivate their licenses. This finding is greater than minor because it affected the Mitigating System Cornerstone human performance attribute to ensure that licensed operators are available, reliable, and capable to respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was evaluated using the Operator Requalification Human Performance SDP and was determined to be of very low safety significance. Based on more than 20 percent of the reactivated operators failed

to meet the requirements as defined in procedure OMP 1-12, the issue was a Green finding. (Section 40A5.6)
Inspection Report# : [2003004\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Jun 28, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Identify the SSF Degraded Grommets as a Deficient Condition in the PIP Corrective Action Program

A non-cited violation (NCV) of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, was identified by the inspectors for failure to promptly identify the degraded standby shutdown facility (SSF) diesel cooling water seals in the problem investigation process (PIP) program. This finding was considered to be more than minor based on the fact that subsequent analysis of the grommets noted significant degradation and this analysis would likely not have been performed without initiation of the PIP. Therefore, if the cause of the degradation was left uncorrected, the mitigation systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the continued reliability of equipment needed to respond to initiating events would be affected. In addition, continued degradation of the grommets would become a more significant safety concern. This issue was considered to be of low safety significance (Green) because the grommets were replaced during the SSF diesel overhaul before they failed in service. (Section 1R12.2)

Inspection Report# : [2003003\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  May 02, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Identify and Correct the Operability Impact of Previously Discovered Downstream Valve Leakage on Atmospheric Vent Valve 3MS-155

A non-cited violation of 10 CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, was identified for the failure to identify and correct the operability impact of previously discovered downstream valve leakage on atmospheric vent valve 3MS-155. As a result, 3MS-155 could not be initially opened with its chain operator during testing on April 21, 2003. The finding was more than minor because it affected the availability, reliability, and capability of a mitigating system; specifically, the ability to align the atmospheric dump valve flow path within the required time to mitigate certain reactor accidents. The finding was of very low safety significance because, although affected, the function of 3MS-155 was not lost since it could have been opened (if needed) using an available valve wrench (cheater bar) and ladder. (Section 40A3.5)

Inspection Report# : [2003010\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Apr 05, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Evaluate Combustible Material in the KHU Complex

A non-cited violation of Paragraph 3.D of the Oconee Operating License was identified for failure to implement and maintain all provisions of the approved fire protection plan which includes Nuclear System Directive (NSD) 313, Control of Flammable and Combustible Material. The temporary storage of wooden crates at the KHU complex was not evaluated and approved by the fire protection engineer as required by NSD 313. Subsequent evaluation determined increase in fire loading necessitated a fire watch tour be performed every six hours. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) as it did not result in the impairment or degradation of fire protection features or defense in depth for safe shutdown. (Section 1R05)

Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Significance:  Dec 27, 2003

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Comply with 10 CFR 61.56(b)(2) Waste Characteristic Requirements Involving Liquid Content of Waste Shipped to a Licensed Burial Site for Disposal

A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 61.56(b)(2) was identified because the licensee transported a cask shipment for disposal at Chem-Nuclear Systems, Barnwell, South Carolina which contained liquid above regulatory limits. This finding is greater than minor because it was associated with the low level burial attribute of the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public domain. The finding is of very low safety significance because the shipping cask was discovered to have minimal liquid exceeding the regulatory limit of one percent of the waste shipment total volume transported to the burial site for disposal and the liquid was discovered prior to waste disposal. (Section 2PS2b.(1))

Inspection Report# : [2003005\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Dec 27, 2003

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Comply with 10 CFR 61.55 (a)(2)ii requirements for Classifying Waste Shipped to a Licensed Burial Site for Disposal

A self-revealing NCV of 10 CFR 61.55(a)(2)(ii) was identified because the licensee transported a cask shipment for disposal at Chem-Nuclear Systems, Barnwell, South Carolina with the incorrect waste classification. The cask was originally shipped to Chem-Nuclear Systems, Barnwell, South Carolina, as Class A stable waste and later determined by the licensee to be Class B stable waste. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with the low level burial attribute of the Public Radiation Safety Cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety from exposure to radioactive materials released into the public domain. The finding is of very low safety significance because the shipping container was discovered by the licensee to have been under-classified prior to its final disposal and the burial site representatives were properly notified of the classification error. (Section 2PS2b.(2))

Inspection Report# : [2003005\(pdf\)](#)

Physical Protection

Miscellaneous

Significance: N/A Jul 11, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Problem Identification and Resolution Inspection

The team identified that the licensee was effective at identifying problems and entering them into the corrective action program (CAP) for resolution. The licensee maintained a low threshold for identifying problems as evidenced by the continued large number of Problem Investigation Process reports (PIPs) entered annually into the CAP. The inspector's independent review did not identify significant adverse conditions which were not in the CAP for resolution.

Evaluation and prioritization of problems was generally effective; although, one example was noted where an evaluation did not thoroughly examine the potential for generic implications. Corrective actions specified for problems were generally adequate; although, several examples were noted where corrective actions were not complete or not comprehensive. Audits and self-assessments continued to identify issues; however, some examples were noted where the issues were not correctly classified for resolution. Previous non-compliance issues documented as non-cited violations were properly tracked and resolved via the CAP. Personnel at the site felt free to raise safety concerns to management and to resolve issues via the CAP.

Inspection Report# : [2003009\(pdf\)](#)

Last modified : March 02, 2004