

Ginna

3Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Sep 27, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

RG&E did not have procedures to address potential high temperature conditions in the relay room.

The inspectors identified that RG&E did not have compensatory measures in place to prevent the air temperature in the relay room from exceeding the maximum values described in the plant Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR). High air temperatures in the relay room would degrade the performance of safety-related components located in that room.

Inspection Report# : [2003006\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Sep 27, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

The RG&E vendor manual control program did not ensure information regarding maintenance of the lube oil circulation pump for the "A" motor driven AFW pump was supplied to maintenance personnel.

The RG&E vendor manual control program was inadequate in that it did not ensure maintenance personnel were provided with the information needed to properly rebuild the lubricating oil circulation pump for the "A" motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump. As a result, the pump was not properly assembled during maintenance activities.

Inspection Report# : [2003006\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Sep 27, 2003

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Operators did not shutoff the "B" AFW Pump when the AFW system coss-tie valves are opened resulting in damage to the "B" AFW pump.

A self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a was identified due to the operating crew not correctly implementing procedures ES-0.1 "Reactor Trip Response." This resulted in a period of inoperability for the "B" motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump.

A contributing cause of this finding is related to the Human Performance cross-cutting area. Inadequate placekeeping in the procedure by the operating crew resulted in the omission of the step to shutdown the "B" motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump.

Inspection Report# : [2003006\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Apr 17, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Maintain the Ventilation over the SI and CS Pumps in Accordance with the Design Basis

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, for failure to support the ventilation ductwork over the safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) pumps, as assumed in the seismic design evaluation. In addition, the required supports were not included on the design drawings associated with the ventilation for the SI and CS pumps.

The finding is greater than minor because it affects the design control attribute of the mitigating system cornerstone objective to maintain the reliability of mitigating system equipment. The finding adversely impacts the reliability of the SI pumps and CS pumps to remain functional subsequent to a postulated seismic event, since the seismic class I ductwork and supports were not installed and configured consistent with the design analysis. The finding is of very low safety significance because it involved a qualification deficiency that did not result in a loss of function and the affected pumps remained operable.

Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Mar 29, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Mitigation procedures for a control room fire were not accurate

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d; which requires, in part, that procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the fire protection program. Contrary to the above, RG&E did not maintain procedures that described how the Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System (CREATS) should be operated if a fire occurred in the control room.

Inspection Report# : [2003003\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Mar 29, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Intermittent control room roof leakage not identified and repaired

The inspectors identified that ongoing water leakage through the control room roof had not been entered into the RG&E corrective action program. The roof had been leaking intermittently since the last time it had been repaired in 2000. A Green non-cited violation was identified for a failure of RG&E to identify and correct a degraded condition as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI.

Inspection Report# : [2003003\(pdf\)](#)

Significance: N/A Mar 29, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Three SRO licensed operator certifications were not renewed by RG&E

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation in which three senior reactor operator (SRO) licenses had expired without the appropriate renewal forms being submitted. Two of these individuals improperly fulfilled Technical Specification positions that required an SRO license from October 2, 2002, to October 11, 2002.

Inspection Report# : [2003003\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Dec 28, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Failure to implement adequate test or preventive maintenance program to ensure that check valves in the floor drain system sumps would prevent flow in the reverse direction

The inspectors identified that RG&E did not implement an adequate test or preventive maintenance program to ensure that check valves in the floor drain system sumps would prevent flow in the reverse direction. When RG&E inspected the sump check valves in December 2002, two valves, one in the "B" Diesel Generator Room sump and the other in the "A" Battery Room sump were found to be inoperable. The potential for this problem to occur was identified in NRC Information Notice 83-44. An action report was written by RG&E to document this deficiency and the inoperable check valves were replaced.

This finding associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone was determined to be greater than minor since if a severe flooding condition occurred, or combustible gas collected in the floor drain system and ignited, multiple trains of safety-related equipment could be adversely affected. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance in accordance with phase 3 of the SDP since the probability of a flood or fire event propagating through the floor drain system and rendering safety-related equipment inoperable was low and a flooding or fire event did not occur. The failure to test the check valves did not constitute a violation of regulatory requirements.

Inspection Report# : [2002006\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Sep 27, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Personnel did not properly sequence work activities and contrary to procedure requirements, allowed work to be performed on the spent fuel pool ventilation system when irradiated fuel was being moved.

While observing maintenance activities on the spent fuel pool system charcoal filtration system, the inspectors identified that contrary to requirements in the applicable maintenance procedure, RG&E personnel were working on the system when spent fuel was being moved in the spent fuel pool. The failure to correctly implement the maintenance procedure was a violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a which states, in part, that procedures shall be established, implemented and maintained.

Inspection Report# : [2003006\(pdf\)](#)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Miscellaneous

Significance:  Mar 29, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

RG&E did not have procedures that described when Self Contained Breathing Apparatus should be used by control room personnel.

The inspectors identified that RG&E did not provide control room operators with guidance regarding when they should use the self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) located in the control room. Chapter 6.4.2.2.2 of the Ginna UFSAR and Licensee Event Report (LER) 2002-002 indicate operators would use the SCBAs if toxic gas or airborne particulate activity was detected in the control room.

Inspection Report# : [2003003\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Dec 28, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Failure to implement all aspects of the fire attack strategy

The inspectors identified that during a fire drill, RG&E did not fully implement all aspects of the fire attack strategy. This deficiency was not identified by RG&E in the post drill critique. An action report was written by RG&E to document this deficiency.

This finding, associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, was determined to be greater than minor because it has a credible impact on safety since incomplete implementation of the fire attack strategy may prevent a fire from being extinguished or cause a fire to propagate leading to a significant event. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance in accordance with Phase 1 of the fire SDP because the fire brigade is only a single element of the defense-in-depth fire protection strategy.

Inspection Report# : [2002006\(pdf\)](#)

Significance: N/A Oct 25, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

The PI&R team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated and corrected.

The team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. The licensee's effectiveness at problem identification was acceptable overall. However, the NRC identified several minor deficiencies which were not identified or entered into the licensee's corrective action system. While some minor exceptions were noted, the licensee adequately prioritized and evaluated problems that were entered into the corrective action program.

Corrective actions, when specified, were generally implemented in a timely manner. Licensee audits and self-assessments were found to be adequate. On the basis of interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site felt free to input safety findings into the corrective action program.

Inspection Report# : [2002010\(pdf\)](#)

Last modified : December 01, 2003