

Beaver Valley 2

3Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance:  Mar 29, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation


INEFFECTIVE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TO ADDRESS DEGRADED INSTRUMENT AIR SYSTEM PERFORMANCE

Ineffective corrective actions to address degraded instrument air system performance resulted in a Unit 2 loss of instrument air (LOIA) pressure event on March 8, 2003. Specifically, corrective and preventive maintenance (PM) activities were not performed as specified in work orders and station procedures.

The finding was an NCV of 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 50.65(a)(1) for failure to take appropriate corrective action for a maintenance rule scope system which did not meet its category (a)(1) performance goals. The finding was of very low safety significance because operator action recovered instrument air pressure in time to avoid a plant transient and mitigation equipment was not affected.

Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Jul 25, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

FAILURE TO TAKE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS FOR A SIGNIFICANT CONDITION ADVERSE TO QUALITY INVOLVING THE USE OF UNCALIBRATED M&TE

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10CFR50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," for failure to ensure that a significant condition adverse to quality was promptly identified and corrected. Specifically, the licensee used uncalibrated measuring and test equipment (M&TE) during a surveillance test of safety-related equipment.

The finding was greater than minor because the use of un-calibrated M&TE during surveillance tests of safety-related systems affected the availability and reliability of safety-related mitigating systems required to respond to initiating events. The use of un-calibrated test equipment could result in the failure to identify unavailable mitigating equipment. The finding was of very low safety significance since an actual loss of the safety function of any mitigating system did not occur or go undetected.

Inspection Report# : [2003008\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Dec 28, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

UNTIMELY AND INCOMPLETE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS REGARDING INADEQUATE CONTROL ROOM STAFFING

The inspectors determined that corrective actions for having no senior reactor operator (SRO) present in the Unit 2 control room during Mode 1 (at power) operation, were untimely and incomplete. Senior reactor operator presence is required to oversee operation of safety related structures, systems, and components, and to act as Emergency Director during emergency events. Station management initially incorrectly concluded that the November 21, 2002, occurrence was isolated and did not implement measures to verify all licensed operators understood the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(m)(2)(iii) for control room staffing. Nuclear Regulatory Commission inspectors independently determined that additional licensed operators were also unaware of the regulatory requirements for control room staffing and corrective action program requirements to address such an issue.

This finding was not suitable for NRC Significance Determination Process evaluation, but has been reviewed by NRC management and is determined to be a Green finding of very low significance. Absence of SRO oversight during licensed control room activities increases the likelihood of human performance errors, which in turn increase the likelihood of and initiating event and reduce the availability of mitigating systems. Knowledge of SRO control room staffing requirements is important to ensure appropriate oversight of licensed control room activities. No further control room staffing deficiencies occurred during the 3-day period of untimely and incomplete corrective actions. This finding was a violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI "Corrective Action."

Inspection Report# : [2002007\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Significance:  Apr 30, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: VIO Violation

ADEQUATE AND TIMELY EMERGENCY RESPONSE STAFFING IN FOUR KEY FUNCTIONAL AREAS NOT MAINTAINED AT ALL TIMES

The 12 augmented radiation protection (RP) technician responders (i.e., six to respond in 30 minutes (M) and six to respond in 60 M) in the Emergency Response Organization (ERO) were not capable of meeting the minimum and timely staffing requirements in Emergency Preparedness Plan (EPP), Section 5, Table 5-1. EPP Section 5.2 states that Table 5-1 identifies the staffing requirements and capabilities for additions of the ERO. Table 5-1 requires that 12 RP technicians must respond to augment the shift crew in the four functional areas of offsite surveys (two in 30M and two in 60M), onsite surveys (one in 30M and one in 60M), in-plant surveys (one in 30M and one in 60M), and in-plant protective actions (two in 30M and two in 60M).

This was an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2) and the EPP for not ensuring that adequate and timely emergency response staffing, in the four stated functional areas, was maintained at all times. This finding was of low to moderate safety significance because staffing augmentation processes were not capable of ensuring augmentation of the initial response staff in accordance with EPP facility activation commitments for RP technicians.

A violation of 10 CFR 50.47(b)(2), 10 CFR 50.54(q), and The 'Emergency Preparedness Plan, Table 5.1, was issued by EA Letter 03-054, dated July 10, 2003. Reference NRC Inspection Report 50-334(412)2003-003.

Inspection Report# : [2003006\(pdf\)](#)

Inspection Report# : [2003003\(pdf\)](#)

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Miscellaneous

Last modified : December 01, 2003