

Wolf Creek 1

2Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance:  Jan 03, 2003

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Manipulation of component outside of procedural guidance causes reactor trip.

The inspectors documented a failure to follow Procedure AP 21D-005, "Component Manipulation Control." Step 6.1.2 of Procedure AP 21D-005, requires shift manager or designee authorization to operate all systems or components. While restoring a rod-drive motor generator to service, an operator did not receive authorization prior to operating the motor-generator output breaker handle. The manipulation of the handle was an action not directed by procedure and resulted in a reactor trip. The failure to follow Procedure AP 21D-005 was identified as a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, for a Regulatory Guide 1.33 referenced procedure. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2003-0010. This issue was considered more than minor because the failure to follow procedure resulted in an unplanned reactor trip and the inherent challenges to plant safety systems and equipment associated with a reactor trip. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because the finding did not contribute to the likelihood of: (1) a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident, (2) mitigation equipment or function unavailability; and (3) a plant fire or internal/external flooding affecting plant response.

Inspection Report# : [2003003\(pdf\)](#)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Jun 24, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Correctly Translate a Design Basis into the Applicable Flooding Calculation

The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," regarding internal flooding Calculation FL-08, Revision 0. The calculation improperly credits nonexistent 0.25 inch gaps under four doors for drainage of Room 3302 which contains vital Train "B" switchgear equipment. The finding is greater than minor because it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective to ensure reliability and capability of systems that respond to flood hazards. Additionally, this finding is similar to Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Appendix E, Example 3i. The licensee's engineering staff had to recalculate the maximum flood level in Room 3302 because Calculation FL-08, Revision 0, improperly credited drainage under doors. The team considered this finding to be of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual loss of safety function since the new analysis demonstrated that the maximum flood level in Room 3302 (approximately 5 inches) would not damage the vital electrical equipment located in that room. The capability to safely shut down the plant, therefore, would not be compromised.

Inspection Report# : [2003007\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Oct 11, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Alternative Shutdown Procedure

The team identified a noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 for the failure to provide an adequate procedure for ensuring the safe shutdown of the reactor in the event of a fire in the control room that requires control room evacuation. Procedure OFN RP-17, "Control Room Evacuation," Revision 17, was inadequate because certain operator actions specified in Attachment C to the procedure could not be performed within the required time. The licensee entered this finding into their corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2002-2393. This finding was of greater than minor significance because it impacted the mitigating systems cornerstone. This resulted from the issue's potential to affect the licensee's capability to safely shutdown the reactor in response to a fire in the control room requiring control room evacuation and remote shutdown. For fire protection findings, the Phase 1 screening worksheet in Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, refers fire protection findings to Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix F, for significance evaluation. Using the significance determination process described in Appendix F, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance, due to the licensee's demonstration that operators would have performed the most time-critical step (to isolate the power-operated relief valves) in time to prevent core damage. Inspection Report# : [2002008\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Sep 25, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Implement Appropriate Corrective Actions for Degraded Emergency Diesel Generator Heat Exchanger Tubes

The inspectors identified a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for failure to: (a) implement corrective action for past indications of emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tube degradation; (b) provide acceptance criteria for eddy current testing of emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes; and (c) promptly identify significantly degraded emergency diesel generator heat exchanger tubes. These failures were identified as a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation consistent with Section VI.A.1 of the NRC Enforcement Policy and is in the licensee's corrective action system as Performance Improvement Request 2002-0048. This noncited violation closes three unresolved items identified in NRC Inspection Report 50-482/2002-06. This issue was considered more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the finding would result in a more significant safety concern. Additionally, the issue affected the operability, availability, reliability, and function of accident mitigation equipment. This issue was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not result in the loss of the safety function of a Technical Specification train or system. Inspection Report# : [2002004\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Jul 10, 2002

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Follow Procedure While Drawing a Vacuum on the Reactor Coolant system

The inspectors documented a failure to follow procedure while drawing a vacuum on the reactor coolant system. Although Item 4.6 of Operations Procedure SYS BB-112, "Vacuum Fill of the RCS," Revision 17, stated that residual heat removal pump flow rate during vacuum venting shall be less than 2000 gallons per minute to prevent pump cavitation, operators allowed the flow rate to exceed 2000 gallons per minute. The failure to follow procedure while drawing a vacuum on the reactor coolant system was identified as a violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1, for a Regulatory Guide 1.33 referenced procedure. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation and is in the licensee's corrective action program as Performance Improvement Request 2002-1247. A risk analyst in the Office of

Nuclear Reactor Regulation determined that this issue was of very low safety significance because all other emergency core cooling components were available and inventory remained in the secondary side of the steam generators which would provide for reflux cooling of the reactor.

Inspection Report# : [2002002\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Significance:  Jun 27, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Critique an Exercise Performance Deficiency relating to Protecting Nonessential Workers

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10CFR50.47(b)(14) for failure to critique an exercise performance deficiency associated with implementation of a planning standard. The licensee did not identify failures to completely implement [simulated] station assembly and site evacuation during an exercise as a performance deficiency. This finding is greater than minor because had the performance deficiency occurred during an actual event the health and safety of non-essential workers would not have been adequately protected. The finding is of very low safety significance because it occurred during an exercise simulation, did not involve the risk-significant aspects of planning standard 10CFR 50.47(b)(10), and was not a failure of the planning standard function. This finding is a non-cited violation of 10CFR50.47(b)(14). The licensee has entered this issue into their corrective action system as Problem Identification Request 2003-1553.

Inspection Report# : [2003004\(pdf\)](#)

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Significance: N/A Feb 04, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Verification of compliance with interim compensatory measures order

On February 25, 2002, the NRC imposed by Order, Interim Compensatory Measures to enhance physical security. The inspectors determined that, overall, the licensee appropriately incorporated the Interim Compensatory Measures into the site protective strategy and access authorization program; developed and implemented relevant procedures; ensured

that the emergency plan could be implemented; and established and effectively coordinated interface agreements with offsite organizations.

Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)

Miscellaneous

Last modified : September 04, 2003