

Watts Bar 1

2Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance:  Apr 05, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Adequately Define the Root of the Weld or Root Pass in G-29 General Welding Procedure Specification.

Green. A licensee welding procedure was determined to be inadequate because it defined the root pass of a weld as up to two layers, while applicable codes and standards defined a pass as a single layer. This allowed the licensee to perform Liquid Penetrant (PT) examinations on the second layer of welds instead of the first layer or root of the weld. This practice could mask defects existing in the root pass or root of the weld. An inspector-identified, non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criteria IX, Control of Special Processes, was identified. This finding is greater than minor because it affected the objective of the Initiating Events cornerstone. Failure to perform a PT on the root pass of certain welds could allow weld defects in the root pass to remain undetected. Undetected defects could develop into cracks or other problems later and impact component or system safety. The issue was determined to be of very low safety significance based upon no actual failure of welds.

Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Apr 05, 2003

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: FIN Finding

Inadequate Preventative Maintenance of C-phase Main Transformer Potential Device.

Green. A self-revealing finding was identified for inadequate preventive maintenance (PM) work instructions for an electrical connection associated with the potential device on the C-phase main transformer. Problems with the PM caused a ground fault which resulted in a reactor trip. This self-revealing finding is greater than minor because it resulted in a perturbation in plant stability by causing a reactor trip. The finding was of very low safety significance because, although it caused a reactor trip, it did not increase the likelihood of a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident (LOCA) initiator, did not contribute to a combination of a reactor trip and loss of mitigation equipment functions, and did not increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flood. The finding was not a violation of regulatory requirements because it occurred on nonsafety-related secondary plant equipment.

Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Dec 21, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Meet Conditions of License.

Green. A grading error on a comprehensive licensed operator requalification biennial written examination allowed two failed licensed operators to receive passing scores and return to shift without remediation. A non-cited violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 50.54(i) was identified. This finding is greater than minor because it allowed two failed licensee operators to return to shift without remediation. The finding was of very low safety significance, as determined by the Operator

Requalification Human Performance SDP, Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix I.

Inspection Report# : [2002004\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Sep 14, 2002

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: FIN Finding

AUTO TURBINE/REACTOR TRIP - MAIN TRANSFORMER PROTECTION CIRCUIT GROUND DUE TO INADEQUATE CABLE SPLICE

A self-revealing, finding was identified for inadequate work controls for an electrical splice associated with a main generator C-phase current transformer. The finding was of very low safety significance because, although it caused a reactor trip, it did not increase the likelihood of a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident initiator, did not contribute to a combination of a reactor trip and loss of mitigation equipment functions, and did not increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flood.

Inspection Report# : [2002003\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Sep 14, 2002

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY IMPLEMENT A RISK MANAGEMENT ACTION

A self-revealing, non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.65 (a) (4) was identified for inadequate implementation of a risk management action to protect vital DC busses during maintenance on a 6.9 KV shutdown boardroom chiller. The finding was of very low safety significance because, although it increased the likelihood of a reactor trip, it did not increase the likelihood of a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident initiator, did not contribute to a combination of a reactor trip and loss of mitigation equipment functions, and did not increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flood

Inspection Report# : [2002003\(pdf\)](#)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Jun 28, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Adequately Perform a Post-Maintenance Test

Green. The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification (TS) 5.7.1, Procedures, which requires that written procedures be implemented covering programs such as TS 5.7.2.11, In-service Testing Program. Standard Programs and Processes (SPP)-6.3, Pre-/Post-Maintenance Testing (PMT), specifies the process for an adequate PMT and references the inservice testing program. Contrary to this, the procedure used to rebuild the component cooling system thermal barrier booster pump (TBBP) 1A did not specify the required inservice flow test prior to returning the pump to service. The licensee consequently failed to specify and perform a required flow test PMT prior to returning the pump to service. The finding is more than minor in that it affects the mitigating systems cornerstone objective and the attribute of protection against the external factor of fire (the pump is credited for response). In addition, a continuation of similar deficient PMTs on this component would become a more significant safety concern in that the absence of a PMT flow test would not allow the detection of an internal pump problem. The finding is of very low safety significance based on the low fire ignition frequencies in the areas that require use of TBBP 1A, the availability

of TBBP 1B, and the short duration of time between the return to service of the pump and subsequent completion of a successful flow test.

Inspection Report# : [2003003\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  May 02, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate corrective action for a previous NCV.

Green. The team identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, for a failure to correct problems in the post maintenance test program that had resulted in a previous non-cited violation. Corrective actions for the previous violation called for lessons learned to be issued so that specific test conditions would be used on work orders. However, in April 2003, the licensee used non-specific conditions, such as, normal operating temperature and pressure, in the work order for testing a diesel generator jacket water temperature switch. The technician subsequently did the test without waiting for the jacket water to fully warm to operating temperature. The team also identified numerous similar examples in other work orders. This finding is greater than minor because, if left uncorrected, it would at some time result in more significant occurrences of testing under incorrect conditions. The finding was of very low safety significance because the diesel jacket water testing was later successfully done at the correct conditions and the other work orders did not actually test under incorrect conditions.

Inspection Report# : [2003008\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Miscellaneous

Significance: SL-II Jun 16, 2001

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: VIO Violation

EMPLOYEE PROTECTED ACTIVITY

On February 7, 2000, a Severity Level II violation with a proposed civil penalty was issued to the licensee. The violation related to corporate activities and involved employment discrimination contrary to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.7, "Employee Protection," in that the licensee did not select a former employee to a competitive position in the corporate chemistry organization in 1996, due, at least in part, to his engagement in protected activities. On January 22, 2001, the licensee denied the violation and on May 4, an Order was issued sustaining the violation and imposing the civil penalty. On June 1, TVA requested an enforcement hearing on the Order.

Inspection Report# : [2001002\(pdf\)](#)

Last modified : September 04, 2003