

Surry 1

2Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance:  Apr 05, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Properly Evaluate and Approve the Storage of Flammable Materials in the Vicinity of Safety-related Equipment

The licensee failed to properly evaluate and approve the storage of flammable materials in the vicinity of safety-related equipment in the Auxiliary Building and the Unit 2 Safeguards area. An NRC-identified non-cited violation of the Technical Specification 6.4.E was identified. This finding is more than minor because the amount of material improperly stored exceeded the quantity specified in the licensee's Combustible Loading Analysis. The finding is of very low safety significance because it did not cause the impairment or degradation of a fire protection feature or defense in depth.

Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Apr 05, 2003

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Take Adequate Corrective Actions to Preclude Additional De-alloying Failures for Valves in the Charging Service Water System

The licensee failed to take adequate corrective actions to preclude additional de-alloying failures for valves in the charging service water system after a failure had occurred in August 2001. A self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI was identified. This finding is more than minor because of the potential impact on the reliability of the safety injection system. The finding is of very low safety significance because the failure did not actually cause the loss of cooling to the charging pumps.

Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Feb 14, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Adequately Test Diesel Driven Fire Pump Automatic Start Features

A failure to establish written operating test procedures to demonstrate the functional capability of the diesel-driven fire pump (DDFP) loss-of-power automatic start feature could have resulted in a loss of fire suppression water during a loss-of- offsite power condition. A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.48 was identified. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with fire protection performance and degraded the ability to meet the mitigating systems

cornerstone objective. The finding is considered to have very low safety significance because the DDFP successfully started when a loss-of-power test was performed.

Inspection Report# : [2003007\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Feb 14, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Control of Diesel Driven Fire Pump Fuel Oil Isolation Valve

A failure to properly implement and maintain an adequate fire protection program inspection and valve position control process could have resulted in isolation of the fuel oil supply to the diesel-driven fire pump (DDFP). The position of the DDFP fuel oil supply valve was not being controlled by the licensee. A non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50.48 was identified. This finding is greater than minor because it is associated with fire protection performance and degraded the ability to meet the mitigating systems cornerstone objective. The finding is considered to have very low safety significance because the fuel oil supply valve was in its proper position and it had not been mis-positioned in the past.

Inspection Report# : [2003007\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Sep 28, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Adequacy of emergency diesel generator contingency plans to meet intent of Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 99-02 guidance and report unavailability time accurately

A finding was identified when the Revised Oversight Process Working Group determined that the recovery actions in an emergency diesel generator (EDG) surveillance procedure did not meet the guidelines of NEI 99-02, and the corresponding unavailability hours should be counted towards the Safety System Unavailability - Emergency AC Power Performance Indicator (PI) during the testing of the EDG. When the licensee revised the PI data, the PI on Unit 1 changed from green to white for the fourth quarter of 2001 and the first and second quarters of 2002. The finding was of very low safety significance because the added unavailability hours reflect only a small portion of the time required for the PI to exceed the green/white threshold. The majority of the unavailability hours were the result of issues that were previously identified and inspected, and therefore, no additional regulatory response is required.

Inspection Report# : [2002003\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Miscellaneous

Last modified : September 04, 2003