

La Salle 2

2Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Jun 30, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Inadequate assessment of long term RHR operation in the SPC mode.

A finding of very low safety significance was identified by inspectors when it was determined that the continuous long term operation of a single train of the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) system in the suppression pool cooling (SPC) mode was not within the licensee's design basis. In a Phase 3 SDP, the inspectors concluded that the continuous operation of a single train of the RHR system in the SPC mode from May 25, 2001 through September 3, 2001, increased the likelihood of an RHR train failure from a water hammer event. The finding was of very low safety significance due to the low magnitude of the increased probability of RHR train failure. There were no violations of regulatory requirements identified with this finding.

Inspection Report# : [2003003\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Sep 30, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Essential Switchgear Room Degraded Fire Barriers

The inspectors identified dried paint on the side of a safety-related switchgear bus duct which led to the identification of openings between the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Division 1 and Division 2 Essential Switchgear Rooms. These openings compromised the 3-hour fire protection barrier separating the two fire zones. The issue was of very low safety significance since it was not likely that redundant safe shutdown equipment would be significantly impacted. A Non-Cited Violation of License Condition 25 concerning the LaSalle Unit 1 and Unit 2 Fire Protection Program was identified.

Inspection Report# : [2002005\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Sep 30, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate Corrective Actions to Address Degraded Fire Barriers

A Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," was also identified due to the failure to take adequate corrective action to address a similar issue that occurred in June 2000.

Inspection Report# : [2002005\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Sep 27, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to Translate Starting Air System Design Basis Requirements into Specifications, Procedures, or Instructions

The inspection team identified a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, "Criterion III, Design Control," that applied to the air start systems for all the emergency diesel generators on both units. Specifically, the inspectors identified that the design basis requirement that the starting air systems have enough air to permit either five (Division 1 and 2 diesel generators) or three (Division 3 diesel generators) normal starts in rapid succession was not translated into specifications, procedures, and instructions. As a result, there was no objective evidence that the required starting air system capacity was being maintained. The finding was greater than minor based on the potential that degradation of the design basis capability of a starting air system would not be detected by the licensee.

Degradation of the design function impacts the base probabilistic risk assessment values used for diesel generator reliability. The finding was of low safety significance because it does not represent an actual loss of the starting air system safety function. (Section 1R21.1)

Inspection Report# : [2002011\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Sep 27, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

High Pressure Core Spray Diesel Generator Fuel Oil Storage Tank Volumes on Both Units Incorrectly Calculated

The inspection team identified an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, that applied to the fuel oil storage tanks for the high pressure core spray diesel generators on both units. Specifically, the inspectors identified that the licensee had incorrectly calculated the necessary volume for the fuel oil storage tanks. The finding was greater than minor based on the number of deficiencies associated with the diesel generator fuel storage tank capacities requiring preparation of new calculations and corrections to existing calculations, the updated final safety analysis report, the technical specification bases, to procedures, and, possibly, to the technical specifications themselves. The finding was of low safety significance because it did not represent an actual loss of the high pressure core spray diesel generator fuel oil storage volume as currently required by technical specifications. Furthermore, in the unlikely event that extended operation of the diesel generators was necessary, the licensee would likely be able to get fuel on site before the end of the seven day period. (Section 1R21.2)

Inspection Report# : [2002011\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Sep 27, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Test Valves Modified to Ones Having a Different Form, Fit and Function and Change was Not Commensurate with Original Design

The inspection team identified an NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, that applied to all the emergency diesel generators on both units. The test control valves on the diesel heads of all five emergency diesels were replaced by valves having a different form, fit, and function. The licensee did not ensure that the change was commensurate with the original design. The finding was greater than minor because it involved the licensee failing to implement a required regulatory process. The finding was of low safety significance because of a warning currently in the licensee's procedure and the fact that the valves are only opened during surveillance. (Section 1R21.2)

Inspection Report# : [2002011\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Dec 28, 2002

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Entry Into Region B of the Power-To-Flow-Map

Licensee personnel inadvertently placed Unit 2 in a prohibited region of the power-to-flow map during a control rod maneuver on November 10, 2002. Entry into this region increased the likelihood of power oscillations. The issue was of very low safety significance since no actual power oscillations occurred and the region was exited promptly after the condition was identified. A violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, "Corrective Action," was identified since this condition had occurred previously, but had not been identified. (Section 4OA3)

Inspection Report# : [2002006\(pdf\)](#)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Significance:  Jan 30, 2003

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Radiological intakes during RHR system drain valve replacement.

Failure to follow the requirements of the RWP by performing high energy (grinding) work outside the bounding conditions established by the ALARA evaluation, resulting in intakes to two workers.

Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Miscellaneous

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