

# Ginna

## 2Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

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### Initiating Events

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### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Apr 17, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Failure to Maintain the Ventilation over the SI and CS Pumps in Accordance with the Design Basis**

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, for failure to support the ventilation ductwork over the safety injection (SI) and containment spray (CS) pumps, as assumed in the seismic design evaluation. In addition, the required supports were not included on the design drawings associated with the ventilation for the SI and CS pumps. The finding is greater than minor because it affects the design control attribute of the mitigating system cornerstone objective to maintain the reliability of mitigating system equipment. The finding adversely impacts the reliability of the SI pumps and CS pumps to remain functional subsequent to a postulated seismic event, since the seismic class I ductwork and supports were not installed and configured consistent with the design analysis. The finding is of very low safety significance because it involved a qualification deficiency that did not result in a loss of function and the affected pumps remained operable.

Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:**  Mar 29, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Mitigation procedures for a control room fire were not accurate**

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.d; which requires, in part, that procedures be established, implemented, and maintained covering the fire protection program. Contrary to the above, RG&E did not maintain procedures that described how the Control Room Emergency Air Treatment System (CREATS) should be operated if a fire occurred in the control room.

Inspection Report# : [2003003\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:**  Mar 29, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **Intermittent control room roof leakage not identified and repaired**

The inspectors identified that ongoing water leakage through the control room roof had not been entered into the RG&E corrective action program. The roof had been leaking intermittently since the last time it had been repaired in 2000. A Green non-cited violation was identified for a failure of RG&E to identify and correct a degraded condition as required by 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI.

Inspection Report# : [2003003\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:** N/A Mar 29, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Three SRO licensed operator certifications were not renewed by RG&E**

The inspectors identified a non-cited violation in which three senior reactor operator (SRO) licenses had expired without the appropriate renewal forms being submitted. Two of these individuals improperly fulfilled Technical Specification positions that required an SRO license from October 2, 2002, to October 11, 2002.

Inspection Report# : [2003003\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:**  Dec 28, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

**Failure to implement adequate test or preventive maintenance program to ensure that check valves in the floor drain system sumps would prevent flow in the reverse direction**

The inspectors identified that RG&E did not implement an adequate test or preventive maintenance program to ensure that check valves in the floor drain system sumps would prevent flow in the reverse direction. When RG&E inspected the sump check valves in December 2002, two valves, one in the "B" Diesel Generator Room sump and the other in the "A" Battery Room sump were found to be inoperable. The potential for this problem to occur was identified in NRC Information Notice 83-44. An action report was written by RG&E to document this deficiency and the inoperable check valves were replaced. This finding associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone was determined to be greater than minor since if a severe flooding condition occurred, or combustible gas collected in the floor drain system and ignited, multiple trains of safety-related equipment could be adversely affected. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance in accordance with phase 3 of the SDP since the probability of a flood or fire event propagating through the floor drain system and rendering safety-related equipment inoperable was low and a flooding or fire event did not occur. The failure to test the check valves did not constitute a violation of regulatory requirements.

Inspection Report# : [2002006\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:**  Sep 28, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

**Operator error during performance of surveillance test PT-12.2; "Emergency Diesel Generator B," rendered the B diesel generator inoperable for approximately seven hours.**

Operator error during performance of surveillance test PT-12.2; "Emergency Diesel Generator B," rendered the B diesel generator inoperable for approximately seven hours due to the resultant troubleshooting activities. The emergency diesel generator output breaker tripped due to an out of phase condition. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance and did not constitute a violation of regulatory requirements.

Inspection Report# : [2002005\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:**  Sep 28, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

**Operator response to primary plant computer system (PPCS) alarms has not been fully effective.**

The inspectors identified that RG&E's prior corrective action for inadequate operator response to primary plant computer system (PPCS) alarms, has not been fully effective. This issue was considered greater than minor since

inadequate or poor response to primary plant computer alarms could be reasonably viewed a precursor to a significant event or, if left uncorrected, could become a more significant safety concern. The finding is not suitable for SDP evaluation, but was determined to be a green finding of very low safety significance however, not a violation of a regulatory requirement.

Inspection Report# : [2002005\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:**  Sep 28, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**A natural gas supply isolation valve to the screenhouse had been covered by several inches of gravel and asphalt pavement and could not be operated during a fire.**

The inspectors identified the natural gas supply isolation valve to the screenhouse had been covered by several inches of gravel and asphalt pavement. Operators would be procedurally directed to close this valve in the event of a fire in the screenhouse. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) and a non-cited violation of technical specification 5.4.1.d; which requires, in part, that procedures for the fire protection program be established, implemented, and maintained.

Inspection Report# : [2002005\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:**  Sep 28, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**Two out of four reactor protection over-temperature delta-temperature channels were found to be improperly calibrated and outside technical specification requirements.**

Two out of four reactor protection over-temperature delta-temperature channels were found to be improperly calibrated and outside technical specification requirements. Improper calibration of reactor protection circuitry could result in an unnecessary plant transient. The calibration error was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) and a non-cited violation of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, "Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings.

Inspection Report# : [2002005\(pdf\)](#)

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## Barrier Integrity

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## Emergency Preparedness

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## Occupational Radiation Safety

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## Public Radiation Safety

**Significance:** N/A Sep 28, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

**RG&E identified contaminated material had been inadvertently released and stored in an offsite warehouse.**

A violation of very low safety significance, which was identified by the licensee has been reviewed by the inspectors.

Corrective actions taken or planned by the licensee have been entered into the licensee's corrective action program.

Inspection Report# : [2002005\(pdf\)](#)

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## Physical Protection

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## Miscellaneous

**Significance:**  Mar 29, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

**RG&E did not have procedures that described when Self Contained Breathing Apparatus should be used by control room personnel.**

The inspectors identified that RG&E did not provide control room operators with guidance regarding when they should use the self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) located in the control room. Chapter 6.4.2.2.2 of the Ginna UFSAR and Licensee Event Report (LER) 2002-002 indicate operators would use the SCBAs if toxic gas or airborne particulate activity was detected in the control room.

Inspection Report# : [2003003\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:**  Dec 28, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

**Failure to implement all aspects of the fire attack strategy**

The inspectors identified that during a fire drill, RG&E did not fully implement all aspects of the fire attack strategy. This deficiency was not identified by RG&E in the post drill critique. An action report was written by RG&E to document this deficiency. This finding, associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone, was determined to be greater than minor because it has a credible impact on safety since incomplete implementation of the fire attack strategy may prevent a fire from being extinguished or cause a fire to propagate leading to a significant event. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance in accordance with Phase 1 of the fire SDP because the fire brigade is only a single element of the defense-in-depth fire protection strategy.

Inspection Report# : [2002006\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:** N/A Oct 25, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

**The PI&R team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated and corrected.**

The team concluded that, in general, problems were properly identified, evaluated, and corrected. The licensee's effectiveness at problem identification was acceptable overall. However, the NRC identified several minor deficiencies which were not identified or entered into the licensee's corrective action system. While some minor exceptions were noted, the licensee adequately prioritized and evaluated problems that were entered into the corrective action program.

Corrective actions, when specified, were generally implemented in a timely manner. Licensee audits and self-assessments were found to be adequate. On the basis of interviews conducted during this inspection, workers at the site felt free to input safety findings into the corrective action program.

Inspection Report# : [2002010\(pdf\)](#)

Last modified : September 04, 2003