

Dresden 2

2Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance:  Jun 30, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Reactor Steam Dome Pressure Exceeds Technical Specification Limit

The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, for the operators failure to follow a procedure, in monitoring reactor pressure, during power ascension activities. This failure resulted in the licensee inadvertently operating with reactor steam dome pressure above the Technical Specification limit of 1005 psig for more than 2 hours. The finding was considered more than minor because the issue affected the initiating events objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during power operations. However, the finding was determined to be of low safety significance because the highest reactor steam dome pressure recorded during this event remained within the design basis accident limits.

Inspection Report# : [2003006\(pdf\)](#)

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Jun 30, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Failure to follow work order rendered the Unit 2 "D" Electromatic Relief Valve Inoperable

A self-revealed Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, was identified for the failure of two electricians to install a jumper and perform concurrent verification in accordance with a work order on June 13, 2003. This rendered the Unit 2 "D" electromatic relief valve (ERV) inoperable. This finding was more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective. However, the finding was of very low significance because there was no loss of safety function in that four of the five ERVs remained operable.

Inspection Report# : [2003006\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Jun 30, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Degraded Mechanical Penetration Fire Barriers

The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation of the Unit 2 and 3 operating licenses for 34 mechanical penetration seals not containing the required minimum of 8" of ceramic fire blanket to establish a 3-hour rated fire barrier. The finding was more than minor because it affected the mitigating systems cornerstone objective. However, the finding was of low safety significance because for 33 of the 34 seals, no credible fire scenarios could be developed due to physical configuration of post-fire safe shutdown equipment on either side of the penetration seals or the deficient

penetration seals were not used to protect safe shutdown capability. For the remaining penetration, the inspectors determined that the recovery actions in the isolation condenser room could be successfully implemented and ensure safe shutdown of the plant.

Inspection Report# : [2003006\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Mar 31, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Inadequate Operability Evaluation Prepared for Generic Non-conforming Condition if 480 Volt Motor Control Center Auxiliary Contact Assemblies

The inspectors identified one finding regarding the licensee's preparation of an inadequate operability evaluation. The finding involved inadequacies in the licensee's documented operability evaluation for a generic non-conforming condition affecting a number of safety-related 480 volt motor control center cubicle (MCC) auxiliary contact assemblies. This finding was more than minor because it could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event, and if left uncorrected, the finding could become a more significant safety concern because the station could have non-conforming conditions which render safety-related equipment inoperable, even though the operability evaluations would conclude the equipment was operable. The finding was of very low safety significance because none of the safety related plant equipment was adversely affected by the non-conforming condition. Even though inadequacies were noted in the evaluation, the equipment was ultimately determined to be operable and no violations of NRC requirements were identified.

Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Mar 31, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Maintenance Workers Perform Unauthorized Work on 2B Containment Cooling Service Water Pump

The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XIV, due to licensee personnel performing work on safety related equipment without authorization and ignoring protected pathway equipment signs. This error resulted in both divisions of low pressure coolant injection/containment cooling service water (LPCI/CCSW) becoming inoperable. This finding was more than minor because the availability of the LPCI/CCSW systems was adversely impacted and both trains were rendered inoperable as a result of this human performance deficiency. The finding was of very low safety significance because operators would easily be able to unisolate the 2B CCSW pump, all other mitigating systems were available, and the total exposure time was short.

Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Mar 31, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Station's Untimely Response to Generic Non-conforming Condition with 480 Volt Motor Control Center Auxiliary Contact Assemblies

The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, due to the licensee's failure to promptly implement effective corrective actions upon the discovery of a generic non-conforming condition affecting a number of safety related 480 volt motor control center cubicle (MCC) auxiliary contact assemblies on both units. This finding was determined to be more than minor because it could be reasonably viewed as a precursor to a significant event and if left uncorrected the finding could become a more significant safety concern because the station personnel could fail to evaluate non-conforming conditions which could render safety related equipment inoperable. The finding was of very low safety significance because safety related plant equipment was not rendered inoperable as

a result of the degraded condition.
Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Mar 31, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Including Live Load in the Reactor Building Crane Calculation

A Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," was identified for failure to incorporate the rated live load of the RB crane into the original calculations for the reactor building (RB), a Seismic Category 1 structure. Significant NRC intervention was required over a two year period to ensure the licensee resolved the compliance and safety issues related to the qualification of the reactor building crane in a manner consistent with the Dresden licensing basis and NRC regulations. The finding is of more than minor significance because it affects the cornerstone attribute of design control as it relates to both the Mitigating System and Barrier Integrity cornerstone objectives. Due to the low seismic initiating event frequency, the short duration of time that the heavy loads were suspended on the RB crane, the nature of the load path and load lift controls, and the recent licensee calculations which demonstrated that the RB superstructure will support the crane in a seismic event, the findings were determined to be of very low safety significance

Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Mar 31, 2003

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Overstressed Structural Steel

A Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, "Design Control," was identified for the licensee's failure to ensure design stresses in roof truss members and interior building column members of the RB superstructure remained below allowable limits. Significant NRC intervention was required over a two year period to ensure the licensee resolved the compliance and safety issues related to the licensee's allowance of stress values above allowable design limits in a manner consistent with the Dresden licensing basis and NRC regulations. The finding is of more than minor significance because it affects the cornerstone attribute of design control as it relates to both the Mitigating System and Barrier Integrity cornerstone objectives. Due to the low seismic initiating event frequency, the short duration of time that the heavy loads were suspended on the RB crane, the nature of the load path and load lift controls, and the recent licensee calculations which demonstrated that the RB superstructure will support the crane in a seismic event, the findings were determined to be of very low safety significance

Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Dec 28, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Adequacy of the Plant-Referenced Simulator to Conform With Simulator Requirements Specified in 10 CFR 55.46

Green. The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation (NCV) of 10 CFR 55.46(d)(1), "Continued Assurance of Simulator Fidelity" due to the licensee's failure to adequately maintain simulator fidelity for two discrepancies, that had both an actual and potential plant impact. The deficiencies included an incorrect first stage pressure turbine trip reactor scram bypass setpoint and the incorrect operation of the reactor water cleanup (RWCU) room temperature instrument recorder. This finding was more than minor because the incorrect first stage pressure turbine trip reactor scram bypass setpoint in the simulator had an actual impact on the plant. The incorrect simulator setpoint led to inaccurate training,

that subsequently failed to adequately alert the licensed operators of the potential impact of first stage pressure conditions during an actual reactor startup following the Unit 2 power uprate. The lack of simulator fidelity combined with the operators' lack of awareness/attention to the plant effects from the turbine first stage pressure led to an actual reactor scram during the November 7, 2001, reactor startup (see Licensee Event Report 50-237/2001-005-00). Although an actual reactor scram occurred due to high turbine first stage pressure, the finding is of very low safety significance because the discrepancy was on the simulator and the actual plant responded as expected to the high turbine first stage pressure and all safety-related equipment functioned properly. The incorrect operation of the temperature instrument recorder led to an incorrect emergency classification by the Shift Manager during the recent licensed operator requalification annual operating examination. The finding is also of very low safety significance because the discrepancy was on the simulator and the real recorder in the plant functioned properly. Furthermore, no actual plant emergency occurred and there was no actual impact on equipment or personnel safety. (1R11.3)
Inspection Report# : [2002017\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Sep 30, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

The licensee routinely failed to follow the procedure for installing, inspecting and removing scaffolding.

The inspectors identified that the licensee routinely failed to follow the procedure for installing, inspecting and removing scaffolding as indicated by several examples of incorrectly installed scaffolding. This finding was repetitive and indicated weakness in problem identification and resolution. This finding was considered more than minor because the inspectors' continued identification of this issue during the inspection period demonstrated routine failure to follow the scaffolding installation and inspection procedure. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because all of the safety-related equipment affected by the scaffolding remained fully capable of performing all of their safety functions. This finding was dispositioned as a Non-Cited Violation. (1R04)

Inspection Report# : [2002012\(pdf\)](#)

Significance: SL-III Sep 27, 2001

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: VIO Violation

Licensee Provided Material Inaccurate Information

during a telephone conference call on September 27, 2001, Exelon Nuclear failed to provide complete and accurate information to the NRC Region III staff concerning the high pressure coolant injection (HPCI) system for Dresden Nuclear Station, Unit 3. Specifically, during the call, the NRC staff described various indications of a potential water hammer, including damaged, bent, or loose pipe supports and spalled concrete. In response during the call, Exelon Nuclear staff told the NRC that, had a water hammer occurred following a reactor scram on July 5, 2001, HPCI support M1187D-83 would have been damaged. They stated that they had conducted a walk down of the system on September 26, 2001, that HPCI support M1187D-83 was not observed to be damaged, and that no other signs of a water hammer existed. One employee of Exelon Nuclear found that HPCI support M-1187D-83 was loose during a visual examination on September 26, 2001, and did not provide that information to the NRC on September 27, 2001. The incomplete and inaccurate information provided to the NRC on September 27, 2001, was material to the NRC because the NRC staff was evaluating the licensee's operability determination for the Dresden Nuclear Station, Unit 3, HPCI system.

Inspection Report# : [2003009\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

Emergency Preparedness

Significance:  Sep 30, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification 5.5.3 for the failure to fully implement the program for post accident sampling.

The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification 5.5.3 for the failure to fully implement the program for post accident sampling to ensure the capability to obtain containment (drywell) atmosphere samples under accident conditions, as required by chemistry procedures (Section 2OS3.2). The finding included a cross-cutting element as a contributing factor related to the licensee's problem identification and corrective actions because the problem was identified by the licensee but not adequately evaluated or promptly corrected. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the high radiation sampling (post accident sampling) system, which included equipment for containment air sampling, was installed consistent with the licensee's Updated Final Safety Analysis Report, the equipment was recently demonstrated to be operable, and because alternate means of sampling the containment atmosphere and assessing core degradation under accident conditions were available. (2OS3)

Inspection Report# : [2002012\(pdf\)](#)

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Significance:  Jul 31, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Security personnel who participated in a performance exercise demonstrated a reduced level of proficiency than that necessitated by the licensee's established protective strategy plan.

The inspector observed that security personnel who participated in a performance exercise on July 18, 2002, demonstrated a reduced level of proficiency than that necessitated by the licensee's established protective strategy plan. The finding affected safety because it demonstrated a reduced level of proficiency needed to support the licensee's established protective strategy. This finding was evaluated through the SDP and determined to be of very low safety significance because no intrusions had occurred, and there had not been greater than two findings in the last four quarters. There is no specific requirement for this specific demonstration of proficiency in the licensee's approved security plan; therefore, no violation occurred (Section 3PP3).

Inspection Report# : [2002013\(pdf\)](#)

Miscellaneous

Last modified : September 04, 2003