

Braidwood 1

2Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Mitigating Systems

Significance:  Sep 30, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

FAILURE TO ESTABLISH COMPENSATORY FIREWATCHES FOR TWO REMOVED FIRE RATED BARRIERS

A finding of very low safety significance was identified by the inspectors for a violation of Technical Specification Fire Protection Program requirements. The licensee removed two fire rated barriers (floor plugs) in the auxiliary building, and left them off for over five months, without establishing the required compensatory fire watches. The primary cause of this violation was related to the cross-cutting area of Human Performance. The licensee Fire Marshall failed to identify that the floor plugs were rated fire barriers, despite labels indicating that the 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, program applied to them, before authorizing their removal. This issue was more than minor because a fire in one elevation of the auxiliary building could have spread to other elevations and therefore affected redundant trains of mitigating systems. The issue was of very low safety significance because the inspectors could not develop realistic fire scenarios in one elevation that could reasonably propagate to the elevations above. The issue was a Non-Cited Violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1 which required the implementation of written procedures covering the Fire Protection Program.

Inspection Report# : [2002007\(pdf\)](#)

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Feb 18, 2003

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

FAILURE OF VALVE TO STROKE TO THE OPEN POSITION DURING TESTING

A finding of very low safety significance was identified through a self-revealing event when the licensee failed to incorporate the correct instantaneous current trip setpoint following maintenance and replacement of a safety-related, motor operated valve's molded case circuit breaker. This was a recurrent issue based on similar problems occurring in Sep 2001 and Feb 2002, and thus was related to the cross-cutting area of problem identification and resolution. This finding was considered more than minor, because it affected the availability of the 1B and 1D reactor containment fan coolers, which mitigate containment temperature and pressure increases following a design basis accident, and thus could affect the integrity of the containment barrier. The finding was of very low safety significance because it did not represent an actual reduction of the atmospheric pressure control function of the reactor containment because redundant equipment was available and the breaker could have been rapidly reset. The inspectors identified a Non-Cited Violation

for the inadequate corrective action from a previous event.

Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)

Emergency Preparedness

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Miscellaneous

Last modified : September 04, 2003