

San Onofre 3 1Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

Initiating Events

Significance:  Feb 10, 2003

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Thermocouple packing not replaced in accordance with procedural requirements

The licensee failed to ensure that packing material for a heated junction thermocouple penetration on the Unit 3 reactor vessel head was installed in accordance with procedural requirements. A human performance deficiency in the compliant use of procedures directly contributed to this violation. A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.5.1.1 was identified. This issue had a credible impact on safety because, if left uncorrected, the finding would become a more significant safety concern in that reactor coolant system inventory would be lost and boric acid would be introduced to the reactor vessel head. However, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the leak was small, did not affect any plant mitigating equipment, and was discovered and repaired while the plant was in a shut down and cooled down condition with primary system pressure equal to or less than 150 psig.

Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Jan 28, 2003

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate procedure results in reactor vessel lining damage

Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Jan 17, 2003

Identified By: Self Disclosing

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Reactor coolant pump gasket not installed in accordance with procedural requirements

The licensee failed to ensure that a reactor coolant pump vapor stage gasket had been properly installed in accordance with procedural requirements. A human performance deficiency in the compliant use of procedures directly contributed to this violation. A self-revealing noncited violation of Technical Specification 5.5.1.1 was identified. The issue had a credible impact on safety because, if left uncorrected, the leak could become a more significant safety concern in that corrosive boric acid could have degraded a reactor coolant pump casing and reactor coolant system piping. The issue is therefore more than minor. However, the finding was determined to have very low safety significance because the leak was very small, did not contribute to the likelihood of a loss of coolant accident or a reactor trip, did not affect the likelihood that mitigation equipment functions would not be available, and did not increase the likelihood of fire or flooding.

Inspection Report# : [2003002\(pdf\)](#)

Significance:  Jun 16, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadvertent reactor cavity leakage to SG 2E088

The inspectors identified a noncited violation for a lapse in procedural compliance that resulted in a leak path for water from the reactor refueling cavity across a steam generator nozzle dam to the cold leg side of Steam Generator 2E088. This was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V. This issue was more than minor because it resulted in an inadvertent leak from the reactor coolant system of approximately 1500 gallons. The finding was considered to have very low safety significance because the leak rate was very small (approximately 0.3 gallons per minute), and the leak was quickly isolated once it was identified. This violation is in the licensee's corrective action program as Action Request 020601156.

Inspection Report# : [2002002\(pdf\)](#)

Mitigating Systems

Barrier Integrity

Significance:  Sep 24, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Inadequate corrective actions in response to a Part 21 notification

The inspectors identified a noncited violation after the licensee implemented inadequate corrective actions in response to a Part 21 notification for Asea Brown Boveri K-line circuit breakers. The licensee was unaware that Containment Cooling Fan 3ME402 Circuit Breaker 3B0611 was within scope of the Part 21 notification until after two surveillance test failures occurred. This was a violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI. The issue was considered more than minor because it resulted in Containment Cooling Fan 3ME402 exceeding its allowed Technical Specification outage time of 7 days. However, the finding was considered to have very low safety significance because of a low probability for failure (three failures out of approximately 10,000 breakers in service industry-wide), and both containment cooling trains remained capable of performing their safety function.

Inspection Report# : [2002006\(pdf\)](#)

Emergency Preparedness

Significance:  Nov 08, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

Procedures inadequate to implement a site area emergency action level

A noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E IV.B was identified for inadequate procedures for implementation of an emergency action level. EAL C.3.1(c) requires that a site area emergency be declared if radiation readings outside

of containment exceed established levels. These locations are not monitored by installed devices and licensee procedures do not require these readings to be taken. The finding was determined to be a performance deficiency in that the licensee failed to identify that, during certain plant conditions, the emergency response procedures would not evaluate EAL C.3.1(c.) The finding was evaluated using the Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process to be more than minor because failure to evaluate a potential SAE could result in delayed facility and public evacuations. The finding was evaluated as having very low safety significance, since it was a failure of a regulatory requirement but not a failure to meet an emergency planning standard. This violation is being treated as a noncited violation in accordance with Section VI.A of the NRC Enforcement Policy.

Inspection Report# : [2002006\(pdf\)](#)

Occupational Radiation Safety

Public Radiation Safety

Physical Protection

Significance: N/A Nov 15, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

Verification of Compliance With Interim Compensatory Measures Order

On February 25, 2002, NRC imposed by Order Interim Compensatory Measures that addressed waterborne threats, vehicle bombs, insider threats, land-based assaults, and mitigative measures. The inspectors determined that, overall, the licensee appropriately: evaluated the impact of the interim design basis explosive on the site; incorporated the Interim Compensatory Measures into the site protective strategy and access authorization program; developed and implemented relevant procedures; evaluated the impact of losses of large areas of the site and vulnerabilities of their computer systems; ensured that the emergency plan could be implemented; and established and effectively coordinated interface agreements with offsite organizations.

Inspection Report# : [2002013\(pdf\)](#)

Miscellaneous

Last modified : May 30, 2003