

# Prairie Island 1

## 1Q/2003 Plant Inspection Findings

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### Initiating Events

**Significance:**  Dec 28, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

#### **FAILURE TO FOLLOW INTERNAL FLOOD CONTROL PROCEDURE**

Green. A finding of very low safety significance was identified for the existence of prohibited loose materials in the safety-related cooling water pump rooms on three separate occasions. The materials were specifically prohibited due to the potential for the loose materials to obstruct required critical drainage paths from these areas adversely affecting measures for internal flood protection. This finding is more than minor because it was associated with two of the cornerstone attributes, affected the initiating events cornerstone objective, and was repetitive. However, it was of very low safety significance because it did not contribute to the likelihood of a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident, did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available, and did not increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flood. The finding was determined to be a NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.

Inspection Report# : [2002009\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:**  Sep 30, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: FIN Finding

#### **INAPPROPRIATE MAINTENANCE RULE SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE CLASSIFICATION OF THE EXTERNAL CIRCULATING WATER INTAKE SCREEN BYPASS GATES**

A finding of very low safety significance was identified by the inspectors investigating the repeat failures of the external circulating water intake screen bypass gates to fully open and to latch in the open position. The finding resulted from performance deficiencies associated with the establishment of an appropriate maintenance rule safety significance classification of the external circulating water intake screen bypass gates. The bypass gates were classified as low safety significant components, not as low safety significant standby components as specified by industry maintenance rule guidance. This finding was more than minor because it increased the likelihood of a reactor trip event due to a loss of circulating water. The finding was of very low safety significance because it did not contribute to the likelihood of a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident, did not contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available, and did not increase the likelihood of a fire or internal/external flood. A violation determination could not be completed until appropriate maintenance rule performance criteria have been established and will be tracked by an Unresolved Item.

Inspection Report# : [2002008\(pdf\)](#)

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### Mitigating Systems

**Significance:**  Sep 30, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **FAILURE TO CORRECT DEFICIENCIES ADVERSE TO QUALITY INVOLVING POTENTIAL FLOW DIVERSION PATHS**

Green. A finding of very low safety significance was identified by the inspectors during a review of licensee corrective action taken to address concerns documented in LER 1-98-15 pertaining to Appendix R potential flow diversion paths. The primary cause of this finding was related to a failure to correct or implement appropriate compensatory actions to address potential flow diversion paths that had existed since 1999. This finding is more than minor because, if left uncorrected, the finding would become a more significant safety concern. Failure to resolve fire protection non-compliance items and failure to establish appropriate compensatory measures could potentially affect the availability, reliability, and capability of fire protection safe shutdown equipment and response efforts. The inspectors determined that the finding was not suitable for SDP analysis. However, the finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because the probability of having a fire event in the affected areas such that the fire would cause more than one valve to reposition to cause a flow diversion was very low.

Inspection Report# : [2002008\(pdf\)](#)

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## **Barrier Integrity**

**Significance:**  Dec 28, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **LACK OF ASME CODE REQUIREMENTS IN THREE UT PROCEDURES**

Green. The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance regarding inadequate instructions in three procedures used to conduct ultrasonic examination of plant components. Specifically, the licensee had not included the mode of ultrasonic wave propagation for the material under examination in these procedures. The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it could have adversely affected the licensee's ability to perform an adequate inspection of safety-related components including the reactor vessel. The finding was of very low safety significance because the licensee confirmed that appropriate ultrasonic examinations had been conducted during past examinations. This finding was determined to be a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR 50.55a(g)4.

Inspection Report# : [2002009\(pdf\)](#)

**Significance:**  Dec 28, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **MISSED TECHNICAL REVIEW FOR UT PROCEDURE**

Green. The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance regarding failure to conduct a periodic technical review for an ultrasonic examination procedure used to detect cracks in steam generator and main steam nozzle inner radii. The finding was more than minor because if left uncorrected, it could have resulted in failure to incorporate the appropriate technical requirements into the procedure and consequently lead to an ineffective examination of plant components. The finding was of very low safety significance because the appropriate technical review was completed and only one technical error was identified which impacted the technical adequacy of the procedure. This finding was determined to be a Non-Cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V.

Inspection Report# : [2002009\(pdf\)](#)

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## Emergency Preparedness

**Significance:**  Dec 28, 2002

Identified By: NRC

Item Type: NCV NonCited Violation

### **MISSED EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATION AND DECLARATION**

Green. On November 3, 2002, the licensee failed to classify and declare an Unusual Event in accordance with emergency plan implementing procedures following receipt of a seismic event annunciator in the control room and after confirmation with an offsite agency of the occurrence of an earthquake in Alaska. The failure to declare an Unusual Event is associated with a risk significant planning standard and determined to be of very low safety significance using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix B, "Emergency Preparedness Significance Determination Process," Sheet 2. The finding was determined to be an NCV of 10 CFR 50.54(q), 50.47(b)(4), and Sections IV.B and IV.D.3 of Appendix E of 10 CFR 50.

Inspection Report# : [2002009\(pdf\)](#)

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## Occupational Radiation Safety

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## Public Radiation Safety

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## Physical Protection

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## Miscellaneous

Last modified : May 30, 2003